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presented by **Ruxandra Paul**

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

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

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

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Citizens of the Market:
New Forms of International Migration and their Consequences for People, Parties and Political Systems

A dissertation presented
by

Ruxandra Paul

to

The Department of Government

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the subject of

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Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

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Citizens of the Market: New Forms of International Migration
and their Consequences for People, Parties and Political Systems

Abstract

How does high-mobility migration affect politics in the migrants' countries of origin? This dissertation examines the socio-political effects of intra-EU migrations using quantitative and qualitative data from Romania and Poland, two of the European Union's main migrant-sending countries. The project makes a triple contribution. First, it analyzes on multiple levels the impact of free movement, producing a complete picture of systemic political transformation. It examines shifts in migrants' worldviews, political attitudes and attachments (micro-level ethnography); changes in the electoral appeal of political parties in regions with relatively higher citizen mobility (meso-level quantitative analysis of Polish voivodships and Romanian judete); and the strategies migrant-sending countries use to cope with the challenges of free movement. Second, unlike sociological, economic and ethnographic studies of recent migratory flows, which treat the phenomenon's political dimension as a side effect, this project anchors the research agenda in mainstream political science by placing the state-citizen relationship at the core of the inquiry as a conceptual benchmark for understanding migration-related political evolutions. Third, by focusing on EU-associated free movement, it sheds light on a special case of international mobility that departs from previous population movements associated with globalization. As the dimensions of citizenship (civil, political and social) become unbundled, economic rights and access to the European supranational market are the elements governments use to compensate citizens for the erosion of welfare state citizenship. I introduce the concept of citizenship of the market to reflect this development. By analyzing the recalibration of the state-citizen relationship in high-mobility

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contexts, the project provides answers to questions that scholarship of immigration, political transnationalism, and diaspora management fail to address. The findings show that EU-triggered change does not occur only top-down, via government reform and political elites, but also bottom-up, under the influence of societal actors and new political power groups.

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Simul et singulis. Being together and being oneself. The thought-provoking motto of the *Comédie Française*, illustrated with the image of a beehive buzzing with activity, aptly captures the two essential and complementary dimensions of the ideal environment for dissertation writing: a vibrant community of knowledge and the possibility to follow one's own path within it. This dissertation entailed covering previously uncharted territory and taking many bold steps as a researcher. Harvard University is one of the most exciting and stimulating academic communities in which an aspiring young scholar can hope to flourish. It brings people together for fruitful collaborations and heated debates, while giving each member the space and resources needed for self-discovery, practice and creativity. I remain deeply indebted to all the people who provided mentorship, friendship, inspiration, support and valuable criticism along the way. In particular, Professors Grzegorz Ekiert, Peter Hall and Daniel Ziblatt shared with me their wisdom, talent and passion for Political Science. They indefatigably encouraged me and challenged my arguments, so that I could become a better scholar. At Harvard, they were my intellectual family from the very beginning. They will always be my mentors and role models.

I would like to acknowledge several institutions that made this project possible by providing funding for fieldwork, logistical assistance and opportunities for me to share my work: the French Government (through the Chateaubriand Fellowship); the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies; the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs; the Center for European Studies at Harvard University; Sciences Po – Paris; the Cultural Romanian Institutes in Rome, Venice, and Paris; and the Romanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

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During my year in Paris as a Chateaubriand Fellow, Jean Verdun and Laurencine Lot-Verdun made me feel at home and delighted me with the most exquisite travel and cultural experiences, including tickets to theater plays at the above-mentioned *Comédie Française*. With them, even the densest Parisian *grisaille* turned into a *feu de joie*. At Sciences Po, Professor Catherine de Wenden kindly agreed to be my academic host at the Centre d'Études et de Relations Internationales (CERI). During my year as a Harvard Academy Graduate Fellow, Professor Jorge Dominguez generously offered advice and professional mentorship.

Upon hearing that I love long-distance running, Professor Michael Rosen quipped that writing a dissertation is like running a marathon, except that in the former case there is no set finish line. Fortunately for everyone involved, I found the finish line after an exciting long-distance race. Along the way, colleagues, friends and family provided much-needed cheers and distractions. Since the dissertation itself is only the first phase of a longer research commitment, I would like to save those acknowledgments for the book that will come out of this manuscript.

I am thankful all persons in Romania, Italy and France who shared their stories with me and gave me a chance to see the world through their eyes. I am also grateful to the numerous policy-makers, national government and local officials, civil society leaders, political party leaders, church officials and diaspora organization representatives who provided insight from an experienced standpoint.

My deepest gratitude goes to my family who patiently (and impatiently) traveled this road by my side. Mom and Dad illumined the path with their surprises and love. Their passion for knowledge and ever-expanding range of interests never cease to amaze me. My grannies helped me stay true to myself and think about my roots. My husband, best friend and most enthusiastic supporter, Albert, always knows how to make me laugh. Bernadette knows how to put things in perspective. To them, this manuscript is dedicated, with all my love and gratitude.

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Introduction. European Free Movement: "It's another life!..."

> "One's destination is never a place, but rather a new way of looking at things." (Miller 1957)

On a sunny mid-summer afternoon, Ioana, a jovial Romanian housewife aged 52 was taking a break from work and enjoying an ice-cream cone, while sitting on a bench overlooking the Grand Canal in Venice and chatting with friends about citizenship, rights and the European Union's integrated labor market. "When you are free to come here and work, it's a different story," explains Ioana. "It's another life, then. *Alta viata!* You come and go as you please. You visit your family. You are respected. You don't live in fear anymore and you don't have to hide from the *Carabinieri* (Italian Police). If the place where you work doesn't treat you right, you can report them!" As a citizen of the European Union (EU), Ioana benefits – after Romania's accession to the Union – from the right of free movement and the right to work abroad on EU territory. She is an exponent of the current Eastern EUropean dream: she works hard in another country to climb the social ladder in her own. She lives austerely in luxurious Venice to save every penny and build a better future for her family. "You have rights here. You do not have to stay invisible. So, yes, the European Union is a good thing."

This dissertation examines the socio-political effects of intra-EU migrations using quantitative and qualitative data from Romania and Poland, two of the EU's main migrant-sending countries. The project makes a triple contribution to political science. First, it analyzes the impact of free movement in migrant-sending countries, at multiple levels: micro, meso and macro. It examines shifts in migrants' worldviews, political attitudes and attachments (micro-level); changes in the electoral appeal of political parties in regions with relatively more participation in migrato-

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ry flows and regions with lower levels of citizen mobility (meso-level); and the strategies migrant-sending countries and political parties use to cope with free movement (macro-level).

Second, unlike sociological, economic and ethnographic studies of recent migratory flows, which treat the phenomenon's political dimension as a side-effect, this project anchors the research agenda firmly in mainstream political science by placing the state-citizen relationship at the core of the inquiry, as a benchmark for tracking and decoding migration-related political evolutions. As the dimensions of citizenship (civil, political and social rights) become unbundled, in an era of welfare state retrenchment, economic rights and access to a supranational market provide governments with a way to compensate citizens for the erosion of social citizenship.

Third, by focusing on EU-associated free movement, I shed light on a special case of international mobility that departs from previous population movements associated with globalization and post-national membership (Falk 2000; Kriesi et al. 2006; Sassen 2003; Soysal 1994). The analytical lenses that have been used to examine traditional migratory flows do not capture the full scope of changes, as EU citizenship and free movement of persons are *sui generis*. In this dissertation, I take into account the unique characteristics of high-mobility contexts and introduce new analytical categories to contribute to the development of a new research agenda.

Scholars of Central and Eastern European (CEE) politics predicted that the painful restructuration of the welfare state and adjustments to implement the EU's *acquis communautaire* would trigger a wave of populism, jeopardizing democratic consolidation (Rupnik 2007; Greskovits 2007). Surprisingly, these phenomena did not occur in countries like Poland and Romania, where a significant proportion of the work force participates in the integrated labor market. Instead, center-right, pro-market, pro-EU parties gained and remained in power, while Euro-skeptic, populist and/or nationalist agendas lost ground in elections. I hypothesize that current political evolutions in post-communist democracies like Poland and Romania are in part caused

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by a bottom-up process of transformation that has its roots in intra-EU mobility. I argue that intra-EU migrants are the agents of this transformation, as the migratory experience changes them into citizens of the market.

There is a vast literature on the coping strategies of migrant-receiving states, i.e. studies on inclusion and exclusion (Bellamy et al. 2006; Odmalm 2006; Castles & Miller 2009; Castles & Davidson 2000). A more recent body of scholarship analyzes the way in which countries of origin attempt to reconnect with émigré communities, i.e. the diaspora management literature (Mylonas 2013; Mazzucato & Kabki 2009; Mohan 2008; Henry & Mohan 2003; Glick Schiller & Fouron 2001; Iskander 2010; among others). What we do not know is how migrant-sending countries cope with extraterritorial, highly-mobile citizens who, while exiting the national economy, do not exit the nation-state politically by changing their citizenship status. I introduce the notion of free movement management to capture this analytically distinct category of state policies and institutions. By examining dynamics related to highly mobile citizens and their countries of origin, this dissertation establishes a new research agenda and provides answers to questions that scholarship on immigration, political transnationalism, and diaspora management fail to address.

The findings show that EU-triggered change does not occur only top-down, via government reform and political elites (Haller 2008; Mungiu-Pippidi 2006), but also bottom-up, under the influence of societal actors and new political power groups. Mobile citizens become the agents of accession, transforming sending communities, influencing the attitudes on non-migrant citizens and even, determining adaptive shifts in the strategies of national governments and political parties. At the household level, migrant remit a rights-centered view of citizenship and a life philosophy based on self-reliance, hard work, individual responsibility, and emancipation from the constraints of the nation-state. Migrants preserve their national sentiment without falling into the trap of "long-distance nationalism" (Anderson 1992; Anderson 1998) like transnationals

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(Glick Schiller & G. Fouron 2001; Ong 2006). They favor a minimalist state that guarantees the rule of law and provides citizens with a wide range of life choices. They believe their country's accession to the EU is a good thing, but do not idealize European integration in all its dimensions. At the sub-national level, regions with higher levels of participation in free movement migration develop over time different voting profiles from those with lower levels. At the national level, historical legacies of state-diaspora relations influence the strategies governments adopt to cope with citizen mobility. The nature of free movement management depends to a certain extent on institutional precedents.

This project, while focusing on the demand-side of politics, contextualizes migration-triggered changes within sending-state histories and traditional spatial mobility repertoires. It shows how governments and political parties manage this unprecedented phenomenon. It compares and contrasts diaspora management with free movement management, and reveals the influence of historical legacies on contemporary strategies that states adopt.

In high-mobility liberal contexts, citizens can exercise temporary and partial exit from the national economy, while preserving their political connection with the state. By exiting the national economy and practicing European citizenship, with the attached rights, duties and compliance, migrants become *citizens of the market*. This does not officially disrupt citizenship in the country of origin, but it does affect the calibration of the state-citizen relationship in ways that constitute this dissertation's object of study. The combination of loyalty and voice that migrants exercise towards their home country produces a wide range of interdependent economic, socio-political and cultural effects, i.e. *remittances*. This project focuses on the political facet of migration-associated contributions, which I refer to as *political remittances*.

I ask three clusters of questions about the recalibration of the state-citizen relationship:

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(1) About POLITICAL PREFERENCE FORMATION and PREFERENCE CHANGE among MIGRANT and NON-MIGRANT CITIZENS: How does high-mobility migration affect the migrants' worldviews, economic preferences and political orientations? How does it change migrants' attitudes towards their home country? How does it influence their support for the EU? How does the shift in migrant citizens' preference influence the preferences of non-migrants?

(2) About POLITICAL EFFECTS (changes in voting patterns) in SENDING REGIONS: How does free movement affect political party support and voting at the county-level (voivodships for Poland, judete for Romania)? Are the micro-level effects of political remittances discernible at higher levels of aggregation? Do counties with higher citizen mobility develop a different economic and political profile from counties with lower levels of migratory participation?

(3) About COPING STRATEGIES that STATES and POLITICAL PARTIES develop: What policies do states adopt to cope with this new kind of citizen mobility? What institutions are established to deal with free movement? How do politicians and parties adjust to the geographic dispersion of constituencies across state borders?

Although often undertaken for economic, professional or personal reasons, migrations also carry a deep political meaning. In the state-citizen relationship, they signal a weak link, an aspect in which the state falls short of citizens' expectations, a domain of life in which citizens cannot rely on the state alone, a necessity or aspiration that cannot be fulfilled within homeland boundaries. Since resources available at home do not suffice, citizens have to look elsewhere for solutions to their problems. Usually, when out-migration reaches massive proportions and persists over several years, citizen exodus signals deteriorating state performance and tensions in the

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state-citizen relationship. If analyzed systematically and rigorously, migratory signals provide valuable information about the demand-side of politics and, specifically, the ways in which state performance falls short of citizen expectations. In other words, migration becomes a recuperation mechanism for actors engaged in national-level politics in migrant-sending countries.

In *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States*, Albert Hirschman sets forth an analytical framework that political scientists can use to examine spatial mobility in terms of state-citizen relations (Hirschman 1970). The Hirschmanian typology of bottom-up responses to deteriorating quality identifies the "mechanisms of recuperation" that consumers, members and societies use to pressure firms, organizations and states, respectively, into ameliorating their performance. There are two ways in which management or the state can learn about its failings: exit and voice. Exit simply means that disgruntled customers stop buying a firm's products, discontent members leave the organization or dissatisfied citizens leave the state. By resorting to exit, customers use the market to defend their welfare and improve their position through a powerful process that relies on impersonal market forces, avoids direct confrontation and "inflicts revenue losses on delinquent management" (Hirschman: 4; 21). This is a recuperation mechanism frequently applied in the economic sphere, where the costs of exit are lower than those of expressing discontent and attempting to get the firm to change its practices. Due to their permanent, unidirectional character, traditional migratory flows (emigration and immigration) are usually classified as a form of exit.

Voice (or interest articulation) is the political recuperation mechanism *par excellence*. By applying voice, "the firm's customers or the organization's members express their dissatisfaction directly to management or to some other authority to which management is subordinate or through general protest addressed to anyone who cares to listen" (Hirschman: 4). When exit costs are exorbitant (as is the case in emigration/immigration scenarios, in which citizens pay high ma-

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terial and non-material costs to leave one country for good and build a new life elsewhere), voice provides a viable, more affordable alternative. By exercising voice through political communication channels, citizens try to influence state practices, policies and outputs, "to change, rather than escape from an objectionable state of affairs" (30). When exit is unavailable, which usually happens in "basic social organizations as the family, the state, or the church" (33), states establish "institutions and mechanisms" to allow citizens to "communicate complaints cheaply and effectively" (43). In the political arena, exit has often been cast as a criminal act: desertion, defection or treason (17). In the past, forced exit – external exile – was used punitively, as an alternative to the death penalty, to cast out individuals deemed dangerous for society or the political order (e.g. ostracism). Organizations and states that try to restrict voice may resort to expulsion as a "management strategy" (76). Non-democratic regimes use forced exit to silence political opposition and prevent anti-systemic messages from spreading.

Writing before the current migratory wave, Hirschman describes exit as "ordinarily unthinkable, though not always wholly impossible, from such primordial human groupings as family, tribe, church and state." Given the high obstacles to exit, "the principal way for the individual member to register his dissatisfaction with the way things are going in these organizations is normally to make his voice heard in some fashion" (76). When both exit and voice are possible, there is a strong bias in favor of exit (*idem supra*). Reframing this observation for contemporary migratory contexts generates pessimistic predictions about the impact of permanent exit on politics. As immigration becomes more available and affordable, citizens may disengage from politics, preferring to leave rather than resort to messier and costlier means to press for political change. Implications become ambiguous if we consider the fact that transnational engagement allows diasporas to participate in local or national politics from abroad. Temporary and incomplete exit cases are even less clear, and hence deserve scrutiny.

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To illustrate the difficulty in combining exit and voice, Hirschman uses the case of the Nigerian public rail transport that deteriorated despite facing competition from trucking companies. Since the most quality-sensitive customers were also the first ones to exit, the rail transportation system continued to decline in the absence of public pressure. "Those customers who care *most* about the quality of the product and who, therefore, are those who would be the most active, reliable, and creative agents of voice are for that very reason also those who are apparently likely to exit first in case of deterioration" (44 and 47). For political scenarios, this is the equivalent of dissatisfied citizens leaving their country rather than attempting to change political circumstances through engagement, participation and voting.

"Loyalty" is the decision to remain a client of a firm, a member of an organization, or a citizen of a state despite declining quality or performance, either with the intention to exert voice or to "suffer in silence, confident that things will soon get better" (38). Those who are loyal refrain from exit. Hirschman underlines the beneficial effects of organizational slack for firms and of political disengagement for states, since both slack and apathy contribute to stability, allowing management to survive in times of crisis or transformation (15). The author discusses how loyalty affects combinations of recuperation mechanisms, as he tries to find the most effective path for performance recovery. He concludes that loyalty activates voice and can neutralize "within certain limits the tendency of the most quality-conscious customers to be the first to exit," hence serving the "socially useful purpose of preventing deterioration from becoming cumulative" (79). Loyalists may threaten exit or boycott and promise re-entry to maximize the impact of voice and persuade management to change practices or government to enact reform. Subtracting information and implementation costs from the equation, as loyalty decreases, the cost of exit approaches zero (82-83).

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Migration constitutes politically loaded behavior that can be decoded in terms of the pressures for change it creates within the state. The way mobility reshapes the state-citizen relationship cannot be reduced to the permanent exit scenario. Political reality is more complicated than switching brands. Even in that simple market situation, customers can change their mind and return. After emigrating, diaspora members can, individually or collectively, exercise voice aimed at their country of origin. Temporary migrations necessitate an even more nuanced treatment, since migrants do not change their citizenship. In their case, exit is neither permanent, nor complete. European citizenship enables Eastern European migrants to exit the national economy and labor market, while maintaining political loyalty. Hirschman noted that exit may enhance visibility, but thought this would occur only in highly unusual circumstances, such as martyrdom: "Exit is not usually undertaken for the purpose of gaining more influence than one had as a member. That is nevertheless the way it often works out..." (126).

Hirschman's paradigm does not account for multiple and simultaneous exit-or-voice decisions. This is, however, what happens for EU migrants, whose European citizenship gives them access, rights and privileges in a supranational market, enabling them to exit the state in economic terms and entitling them to receive benefits in their host state. Migrants remain citizens and exercise voice through the interest articulation channels available to all nationals, while relying on the EU for economic issues. Thanks to free movement, mobile citizens can conserve political loyalty, despite admitting their countries' inability to provide adequate economic solutions. It is worth quoting at length from Morokvasic-Muller's 1999 essay that captures the changing meaning of migration as it results from transformed individual opportunity structures for Eastern European migrants:

> Urbanized, with relatively high levels of schooling and qualification, circular migrants from Eastern Europe challenge a number of received ideas, inherited from the dichotomous and static vision of the migratory phenomenon (the one assuming the exclusivity of allegiances). According to

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that view, migration is nothing but the obligatory passage between two sedentary states (...); upward social mobility, success, would depend on settling in the country of destination, while maintaining contacts in and orientation towards the country of origin would impede it. This itinerancy of back-and-forth migrants, a "maintain migration," contrasts with the vision of "migration as rupture"... [to use the distinction developed in analyses of internal migrations]. Pendulum migrants show that they are not the mere victims of transitioning economies. Their migration cannot be reduced to a survival strategy; instead, it also becomes a quest for meaning, independence and social promotion. The affluence gaps between their country and those on their trajectory, countries that are now within arm's reach, become opportunities to seize, opportunities to which they answer by mobilizing the resource that gives them an advantage over the non-migrant: not just mobility itself, but also the *capacity to remain mobile for a long time*. The circulatory phase or pendulum migration can be especially long. After a period of living settled in mobility, migrants want nothing more than to go back home. Migration can thus have a meaning contrary to that most often attributed to it: *it would be a strategy for not leaving, an alternative to emigration* (Morokvasic-Muller 1999).

The findings show that migration constitutes a powerful engine of change. Free movement emancipates citizens from the nation-state's monopoly on socio-economic and professional opportunities. It severs the umbilical chord that links citizens to the state without forcing them to either become dependent on another state or remain disconnected from all countries. It does not put migrants in the vulnerable position of having to rely on the international human rights regime alone, as globalization does (Soysal 1994). It does not demand loyalty transfers to a supranational geo-political entity. While in the past only the relatively privileged and affluent could enjoy experiencing life in another country, free movement extends access to all.

Methodology and justification for the country cases

The project adopts a multi-method, interdisciplinary approach, combining quantitative and qualitative techniques. It builds on insights from political science, sociology and political economy to investigate the link between spatial mobility and socio-political transformation. The qualitative part of the dissertation is based on three years of extensive data collection that involved several rounds of fieldwork between 2009 and 2011). The resulting analysis, a multi-sited

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ethnography of migrants, examines socio-political transformation at the micro level and generates a full picture of migratory life experience at home and abroad, on the basis of in-depth interviews, participant observations and conversations with informants in migrant-sending communities (situated in *judetul* Neamt, *judetul* Satu Mare and *judetul* Maramures in Romania) and migrant-receiving communities (Paris and Strasbourg in France; Rome, Treviso and Venice in Italy). Overall, I conducted a total of 150 interviews. At the meso level, I use regression analysis and GIS software to compare electorally expressed economic and political orientations in counties with high levels of reliance on intra-EU migrations with those in counties where European mobility is relatively less frequent. The analysis reveals patterns at county-level, i.e. *voivodship* in Poland and *judet* in Romania. To account for the fact that CEE political parties often revise their policy position from one electoral campaign to another, I use party position scores assigned over time through a multi-round expert survey (Chapel Hill) to translate the meaning of vote shares in terms of the economic and political orientations they reflect and examine three main axes: support (or lack thereof) for government intervention in the economy (left-right economic preference); support (or opposition to) for European integration; and support (or lack of support) for traditional and nationalist values. To examine free movement management at the state level, I briefly review the political history of migration in Poland and Romania and then resort to policy analysis to investigate post-1989 institutional and legal developments. To better understand the exceptionally high level of politicization of free movement management in Romania, as well as the way in which political parties adapt to the dispersion of their constituencies, I track the expansion of national political parties in migrant-receiving countries and analyze a phenomenon characterizing Romanian migration (though absent in the Polish case): the emergence of immigrant and migrant political parties in receiving countries.

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Table 1. Major Remittance Corridors: Inflows in million Euros

Remittance Corridor	2008	2009	2010
Italy --> Romania	2,202	1,210	876
Spain --> Romania	1,579	868	628
UK --> Poland	899	665	N/A

Data: Eurostat (Chukanska & Comini 2012)

Historically, Central and Eastern Europe has a documented record of adapting imported political ideas to the realities of national politics to reform government and foster development (Morokvasic-Muller 1999; Ionescu 2006; Muntele 2003; Diminescu 2003; Burrell 2009b). Over time, international demonstration effects have had both positive and negative impact on economic and political developments in the region (Janos 2000). The very people who led the formation of a national idea in Central and Eastern Europe were, for most of their lives, internationally mobile individuals, either migrants or emigrants, who pursued political careers in their country of origin (Ivanov 2007). However, post-communist countries have very different historical legacies of migration and records of relations between the state and émigré communities.

Poland and Romania are among the top EU member states that are major recipients of workers' remittances. Remittance inflows come primarily from other member states (65% intra-EU in 2009 and 2010; and 70% in 2008). Together, Spain, Poland, Portugal and Romania received over half of the remittance flows into the then EU27 (Chukanska & Comini 2012). Table 1 shows the remittance levels of the major remittance corridors that have Poland and Romania on the receiving end.

Table 2 shows the differences in remittance inflows are among post-communist countries.

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Table 2. Workers' Remittances Inflows: Intra-EU versus Extra-EU, in million Euros

	2008			2009			2010		
Recipient	Total	Intra EU	Extra EU	Total	Intra EU	Extra EU	Total	Intra EU	Extra EU
Bulgaria	694	455	238	718	476	242	760	505	255
Czech R.	494	381	114	493	378	116	516	396	120
Estonia	41	39	2	41	39	2	41	39	2
Latvia	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
Lithuania	867	666	200	701	525	175	981	685	296
Hungary	33	30	3	34	32	2	37	35	2
Poland	3,192	2,918	274	2,633	2,412	221	2,725	2,494	231
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	121	100	22	81	81	0	76	76	0
Romania	5,156	4,792	364	3,021	2,661	359	2,398	1,952	446

Data: Eurostat (Chukanska & Comini 2012)

With their high levels of remittance inflows from migrant citizens working in other European Union member states, Poland and Romania set themselves apart among post-communist EU countries as by far the states that have the highest levels of participation in the integrated supranational labor market. This makes them ideal candidates for a research project such as this one, that aims at identifying and analyzing the political consequences of high-mobility migration on people, parties and political systems in migrant-sending countries.

To contextualize these figures, the table on the next page gives an overall summary of remittance inflows in EU and non-EU European countries, based on World Bank remittance data. This gives a sense of how Poland and Romania compare to other remittance recipients.

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Table 3. Migrant Remittances Inflows (in US$ million and as share of GDP): 1995-2012

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	% GDP
Albania	427	551	300	504	407	598	699	734	889	1,161	1,290	1,359	1,468	1,495	1,318	1,156	1,126	1,027	7.8%
Bulgaria	...	42	51	51	43	58	826	1,177	1,718	1,723	1,613	1,716	1,694	1,919	1,592	1,333	1,483	1,449	2.8%
Croatia	544	668	618	625	557	641	747	439	517	665	693	825	1,072	1,234	1,208	1,212	1,396	1,437	2.5%
Czech R.	191	112	85	350	318	297	257	334	498	815	1,460	1,688	1,897	2,043	2,016	2,016	2,075	2,026	1.0%
Estonia	1	2	2	3	2	4	11	19	51	167	264	402	411	362	306	320	407	401	1.8%
Hungary	152	169	213	220	213	281	296	279	295	1,717	1,913	2,073	2,309	2,509	2,137	2,162	2,441	2,302	1.8%
Latvia	...	41	46	49	49	72	112	138	173	229	381	482	552	601	591	614	695	730	2.6%
Lithuania	1	3	3	3	3	50	79	109	115	324	534	994	1,433	1,566	1,239	1,674	1,956	1,508	3.6%
Moldova	1	87	114	124	112	179	243	324	487	705	915	1,176	1,491	1,888	1,199	1,351	1,600	1,775	24.5 %
Poland	724	774	848	1,070	825	1,496	1,563	1,685	2,284	4,728	6,471	8,486	10,46 8	10,40 8	8,094	7,575	7,641	6,989	1.4%
Romania	9	18	16	49	96	96	116	143	124	132	4,708	6,673	8,461	9,285	4,881	3,879	3,889	3,541	2.1%
Slovakia	26	21	29	24	20	18	...	24	425	529	946	1,088	1,483	1,973	1,671	1,591	1,753	1,928	2.1%
Slovenia	272	279	241	228	226	205	200	216	238	266	261	279	320	347	277	309	433	563	1.2%
Ukraine	...	6	12	12	18	33	141	209	330	411	2,408	3,102	5,290	6,782	5,941	6,535	7,822	8,449	4.8%

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from IMF Balance of Payments Statistics database and data releases from central banks, national statistical agencies, and World Bank country desks. Online source: http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21121930~menuPK:3145470~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html

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Table 4. A Glimpse of High Mobility: Migration and Return to Romanian Villages

	Migrants who were abroad at the time the survey was conducted		Migrants found in their village at the time of survey		TOTAL MIGRANTS	
No returns	41,597	20%			41,597	13%
One return	41,030	20%	38,073	36%	79,103	25%
Two returns	33,792	16%	22,875	21%	56,667	18%
Several returns	91,272	44%	45,159	43%	136,431	44%
TOTAL	207,691	100%	106,107	100%	313,798	100%

Source: Diminescu and Lazaroiu, reproduced in Diminescu 2003

Quasi-free movement began *de facto* in the early pre-accession stages (i.e. after the introduction of the visa free travel regime). Table 4 gives a sense of the magnitude of citizen mobility trends and their nature (temporary or permanent) right after travel visas were removed.

While Poland and Romania are the main migrant-sending countries in the European Union, there are analytically interesting similarities and contrasts between their trajectories as candidates and participants to the European integration project. The migratory experiences of Polish and Romanian highly mobile citizens before, during and after EU accession are very similar. In terms of general periodization, the recent history of migration of both countries has certain characteristics determined by historical trajectories: there was a wave of emigration towards the West after World War II; then, migration prior to 1989 was mostly forced and driven by political considerations, while later migration was driven by unfavorable economic conditions (Düvell & Garapich 2011; Burrell 2009b; Diminescu 2003; Muntele 2003). For both countries, the pre-accession period was market by an increasing number of citizens engaging in irregular forms of migration, anticipating free movement of workers and exiting the country as tourists (either with or without a visa) to find a job and stay abroad. Many Romanians and Poles accepted jobs under their levels of qualification, undergoing downward social mobility abroad in order to invest in climbing up the social ladder at home. Both Romanians and Poles maintain strong connections

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with their countries of origin, constantly reassessing the pros and cons of working abroad versus coming back. In both cases, European citizenship and the prospects of EU accession set in motion groups of people who would not have had access to international mobility in conditions of higher migration costs. These were not privileged, urban and resource-rich groups, but rather people from relatively poor, rural, isolated communities, where employment and training opportunities were scarce. In both cases, migrants relied on mobility as a primary engine for personal evolution and community development. Both Poles and Romanians relied strategically on intra-EU inequalities and turned them to their own advantage. They sacrificed their own comfort and safety to achieve goals that would have been otherwise unattainable: securing a much higher living standard for themselves and their families, sending their children to college, building new family homes, starting small businesses, buying land, supporting parents in their old age, saving money for their own retirement etc. Both Polish and Romanian migrants faced significant levels of discrimination abroad and relied on their own professionalism and work discipline to persuade people in destination countries that they do excellent work. Both Polish and Romanian circular migrants faced the reality of a divided diaspora in their receiving countries (M. Garapich 2008; Ferro 2004): their jobs, lifestyles and priorities prevented them from socializing extensively with co-national immigrants who were typically highly skilled professionals, students or businessmen (Düvell & Jordan 2006). Furthermore, the latter avoided associating with the less educated, "less civilized" and homeland-anchored newcomers for fear of being themselves the victims of prejudice and exclusion; instead of showing solidarity, in most cases, older generations of immigrants blamed new migrants for "damaging their image" in the receiving country. Many studies documented that new East European migrants and other migrant communities did not mix well despite coming from the same country of origin, with relationships between migrant waves market by suspicion. While some note that EU accession appears to have reduced these tensions between

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new migrants and established diasporas, at least in the case of Polish migrants in Britain (Düvell & Garapich 2011), my own qualitative fieldwork in France an Italy suggests that Romanian-born immigrants still maintain a high degree of separation and skepticism towards circular work migrants. Finally, both in the Polish and in the Romanian case, migrant flows have certain degree of ethnic heterogeneity, in the sense that out-migration from both countries included an important migrant flow of ethnic Roma. Polish and Romanian Roma were among the first groups to exit their countries after 1989 (Diminescu 2003; Rey 2003; Düvell & Garapich 2011), and there has been a constant outflow of that group from both Poland (Nowicka 2003) and Romania (Reyniers 2003).

However, there are many dimensions on which Poland and Romania significantly differ. Poland was one of the first post-communist countries to become a candidate for accession, along with the group of four forerunners dubbed the Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia). For Polish citizens, entry on EU territory became visa-free as early as 1994 (Düvell & Garapich 2011). In contrast, Romanian citizens gained visa-free access to the Schengen area only in January 2002 (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2008). Romania, "arguably the most 'difficult' of the CEE countries" joining the EU, had a "turbulent 'return to Europe'": "from the very early stages of post-communist transition, the direction of political and economic reforms in Romania met with widespread suspicion in Brussels and many West European capitals" (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2008). While the country managed to maintain a presence on the EU's "enlargement radar" and was never relegated to the status of 'distant candidate' assigned to countries in the Balkans and Turkey, the failure of political elites to make a clean break from their own communist past made it impossible for Romania to remain among the group of accession frontrunners (the Visegrad countries: Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia). Of all the Central and Eastern European candidates, Romania arguably had a low "goodness of fit" (Börzel

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1999) in the political and economic coordinates of the European integration project. Incomplete democratic consolidation, corruption, chronic problems in the justice system, lack of state capacity, shaky commitment to economic reform, clientelism and the persistence of power structures linked to the communist regime prevented the country from generating and executing a coherent strategy of accession (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2008).

As a result, in July 1997, the European Commission did not include Romania among the post-communist countries recommended for accession negotiations (European Commission 1997). Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia became the leading group of candidates. The frontrunners were later joined by Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, leaving Romania and Bulgaria further behind in the accession process. The European Commission issued warnings that the government in Bucharest, while meeting the political criteria for accession and fulfilling some economic requirements, had a long way to go in terms of addressing corruption, protecting individual rights, and reforming its public administration. The economic front elicited severe concerns throughout the mid to late 1990s, as European officials reported – again and again – very little progress in the creation of a market economy capable to withstand the competitive pressures of the integrated European market (European Commission 1998); (European Commission 1999). The Commission advised Romania to "give absolute and urgent priority to restoring macroeconomic stability and establishing credibility in international financial markets" (European Commission 1998). In 2002, Romania and Bulgaria were the only two states that did not conclude accession negotiations. The Commission granted Romania the status of 'functioning market economy' only in October 2004 (idem: 92).

Most accounts of Romania's progress vis-à-vis the EU (e.g. Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2008: "from marginalization to membership") concentrate on the interaction between European institutions and political elites, without mentioning the existence of Romanian migrants. They

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simply point out that Romania's isolationism in the 1980s prevented the country from acquiring a knowledgeable diaspora, thus depriving it from an invaluable human capital and know-how, resources that could have supported the development of private initiative and entrepreneurship. The Romanian case is often presented in contrast with that of Poland or the Baltic states, "where sizable diasporas offered precious economic assistance and capitalist know-how during the early years of post-communist transition" (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2008). This project fills this gap by examining the role migrants play as agents of accession, in the case of Romania (a country with a relatively short history of migration marked by discontinuity and the absence of strong diaspora management before 1989) and in the case of Poland (where migration, while recognized for its long history and economic function, is largely ignored when it comes the new migrants' political contributions).

Poland developed over time a diaspora so considerable that it acquired its own name: *Polonia*. The name itself suggests that Poles think of themselves as an ethnically and culturally defined Polish nation transcending country borders and overcoming historical turning points, an entity that can survive – and, indeed, has experience surviving – when the nation-state itself ceases to exist. Some academics who treat historical legacies with unusual levity note that "in East Central Europe even a population of 38 million nationals does not spare one from brooding on the survival of the state," and recall that Poland's national anthem begins "somewhat ominously, 'Poland has not yet perished while we are alive'" (Liebich 2009). In Western European destination countries like Britain, "Polish immigration is nothing new": it goes back at least to the times of the 'Great European Emigration'. In the 19th century, about 120,000 Jews from what was then Tsarist Russia fled the 1881 pogroms and integrated into British society (Düvell & Garapich 2011). In 1939, the Polish government escaped the Russian-German occupation by resorting to self-exile in London, where they remained until the end of the war and the beginnings of com-

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munist rule. Some 120,000 members of the Polish armed forces and other units who fought with the allies chose to stay abroad to escape the communist dictatorship after the Red Army's took over Central and Eastern Europe (Düvell & Garapich 2011). Only in Britain, the Polish population rose from 44,642 in 1931 to 162,339 in 1951 (Holmes 1988). The diaspora, while well integrated in the receiving society, set up a "social infrastructure of associations and institutions" (ethnic shops, schools, churches and cultural centers, advice agencies etc.) particularly visible in cities like London or Manchester, but also dispersed over the country (Düvell & Garapich 2011). This historically exercised capacity to perpetuate the idea of *Polonia* somewhat independently from the concrete, physical and geo-political existence of a state called Poland creates a migratory tradition in which continuity is the norm. Thus, recent migrations under the aegis of European citizenship connect seamlessly with previous population movements, such as the migratory flows during communism, the displacements and relocations in the World War II years, mobility in the interwar period and before.

Analytically, in the Polish case, it becomes difficult to disentangle the political consequences of present and past mobility in and out of the country. While European migrations are exceptional in their scale and nature, the Polish state's approach crystallized against the background of historical experience of coping with external citizens and treating diaspora members as an integral part of the country, although they happen to live abroad. In that sense, both Polish citizens and Polish political elites could rely on pre-existing migratory repertoires. In the Romanian case, neither citizens, nor government officials benefited from recent experience with international migration and external citizens. Romania's communist regime sought to maintain political stability by preventing citizens from traveling to Western countries and bringing back subversive ideas from abroad. Even travel to other communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe was restricted and permitted only in exceptional circumstances, with heavy monitoring by secret

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service (Securitate) officers. As a result, very few average citizens could travel abroad and return. Those who exited the country either had secured official permission to return, or knew that coming back was not an option. Generally, exit was permanent: it entailed emigration and was tantamount to self-exile. The Romanian diaspora never had a special name of its own. The link between national territory and the idea of a national community was strong. The government approached an isolationist survival strategy, particularly during Ceausescu's rule: the regime's priority was to sever connections with the outside world and prevent damaging comparisons between realities at home and elsewhere. In a nutshell, lack of experience with international migration renders the effects of EU-associated mobility more easily discernible in Romania, where people are exposed to life outside the national territory for the first time. The detailed qualitative analysis of the Romanian case provides a fruitful path to discerning the political effects of high mobility and European citizenship on the state-citizen relationship.

Out-migrations have received much more attention from researchers in the Polish case (Burrell 2009b; Elrick & Brinkmeier 2009; Coyle 2007; Fomina & Frelak 2008; Eade et al. 2007; Drinkwater et al. 2009; M. P. Garapich 2008; Kosic & Triandafyllidou 2004; Galasinska & Kozlowska 2009). However, most studies adopted a single-case approach making it difficult to understand what was different about intra-EU migratory movements and their political consequences *in ensemble*. In this project, by comparing Polish and Romanian migrations, I open a new line of research that makes it possible to investigate political remittances in Central and Eastern Europe and suggests an approach for analyzing the political effects of spatial mobility in other parts of the world.

All in all, Poland and Romania constitute two excellent country cases for studying political transformations associated with high-mobility migration. They both have high levels of participation in the integrated supranational economy; however, they followed different trajectories

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in the process. Differences in historical legacies and recent political developments concerning state-society and state-diaspora relations create the setting for a nuanced analysis of interactions between past and present politics, with the possibility to test alternative hypotheses and examine the special characteristics of domestic contexts that increase the political effects of free movement.

The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter I develop a theory of citizenship and political transformation in high-migration contexts and derives testable hypotheses for three levels of analysis: micro, meso and macro. Chapter II presents an ethnography of Romanian high – mobility migrants and migrant-sending communities, showing how migration has affected the worldviews and political attitudes of migrant citizens. Based on quantitative data from Poland and Romania, Chapter III sketches the political and economic orientation profile of high-mobility regions, showing that the causal mechanisms identified at the micro level are also detectable in meso-level aggregates. Chapter IV analyzes free movement management in Poland and Romania and contrasts it with diaspora management strategies. The Conclusion summarizes the findings and reflects on their broader significance in political science research.

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Chapter I. Understanding Politics in Cross-National Mobility Contexts: Migrants, Between National Citizenship and Postnational Membership

> "To the extent that beliefs do affect regimes, we shall want to know what factors determine beliefs." (Dahl 1971)

> "I talk about rights because they alone will enable us to leave this magic-lantern show." (Kazimierz Brandys, cited in (Judt 1988)

Recent transformations in the nature of citizenship have received scholarly attention in the context of the literature on globalization and the evolution of the international human rights regime. In particular, social scientists have pointed out that, after World War II, citizenship began acquiring transnational significance beyond the nation-state. In her analysis of the "limits of citizenship," Soysal argues that "A new and more universal concept of citizenship has unfolded in the post-war era, one whose organizing and legitimating principles are based on universal personhood rather than national belonging. To an increasing extent, rights and privileges once reserved for citizens of a nation are codified and expanded as personal rights, undermining the national order of citizenship" (Soysal 1994). After analyzing the case of *extra-communautaire* migrants (persons from countries that are not EU members) in Western European countries, she concluded that their access to rights and privileges in the receiving countries contradicted classical conceptions of citizenship. "Incorporation into a system of membership rights does not inevitably require incorporation into the national collectivity" (Soysal 1994).

Soysal points out that, in the 20th century, there has been a shift in global discourse and models of citizenship across two phases of immigration: from the model of national citizenship, anchored in territorialized notions of cultural belonging and maintaining the expectation that

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migrants (i.e. immigrants) will be molded into citizens in the receiving country, to a new "postnational model of logic and praxis" that essentially represents a more universal model of membership anchored in deterritorialized notions of persons' rights (Soysal 1994). To reframe this from the perspective of migrant-sending countries, this evolution means that people do not have to emigrate anymore, but rather disconnect from the homeland and combine elements of citizenship with rights and entitlements in other countries, accessible through the international human rights regime. Many analysts have challenged Soysal's optimistic evaluation of the human rights regime: "The growth of the culture of human rights has so far failed to assert the right of people to choose where they wish to live, except within the states whose nationality they are born with, or have obtained" (Hayter 2007). While it is true that the idea of post-national, deterritorialized membership remains elusive, Soysal's contribution accurately depicts a larger phenomenon: the central dimensions of citizenship (civil, political and social rights) that used to be fused and inextricably linked to the nation-state are increasingly becoming unbundled. This erosion of classical citizenship gives birth to a range of brittle identities and complex membership arrangements, some formal, most irregular. The supranational contexts in which citizenship rights and post-national memberships are recombined vary tremendously. The emerging challenges from the standpoint of nation-states depend on context and on the direction of migratory flows. High-mobility migrations exist outside the European Union (as global migrations) generating problems that have to do with securitization and border policing. In contrast, European migrations (free movement of EU citizens) create new challenges for states that have to do with issues of market access and benefits.

Neither national citizenship in the receiving country, nor postnational membership in European nation-states on the basis of personhood and associated human rights are the framework that best reflects the situation of Eastern European circular migrants. Both alternatives capture

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situations in which the mobile citizens' link to their sending country either unravels (through incorporation in the receiving country) or becomes largely irrelevant (although migrants *de facto* leave their country, they do not have to go through the trouble of "filing for divorce" by acquiring the citizenship of the state in which they work). In both cases, sending countries are losing citizens, *de facto* in both cases, *de jure* in the former. "Postwar migrants are permanent, and nation-states do not seem to dispense with their foreign populations even when they are no longer 'functional'" (Soysal 1994). In the case of intra-EU migrants, countries of origin do not lose citizens in the political sense of the word. One can, in a way, speak of a citizenship *à la carte*, by which individuals are the ones determining on what citizenship levels they choose to depend for what rights – political, civic, social or socio-economic (Marshall 1992).

Soysal reverses one of the driving presuppositions in immigration literature by arguing that it is not the migrants' own conditions "customs, traditions, ethnoreligious background and so on" that mainly determine their interaction with and incorporation in host societies, but it is rather the "institutional repertoire of host political systems, which afford the model and rationale for both state and migrant action" when it comes to membership at both the nation-state and world level (Soysal 1997). What is unique in the case of intra-EU migrants is the degree to which they are mobile and the fact that their rights in receiving countries do not depend on these countries' institutional repertoires but rather on the regime established via European citizenship of the market.

Soysal argues that political sociology "axiomatically privileges the nationally bounded model of citizenship and bypasses the reconfiguration of contemporary membership," since it omits the global element and focuses on the nation-state as the unit of analysis (6). While adding a global layer to the discussion of citizenship reconfiguration is helpful, the case of European citizens of the market shows that there are other potential layers to consider, situated in terms of

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scale somewhere between the nation-state and the global dimension. For instance, it is clear that the degree of coverage that the international human rights regime provides around the world is far from uniform. Hence, speaking of a global element becomes unrealistic. It is necessary to first determine through rigorous comparative analysis what the international human rights regime actually means in different parts of the world. This type of study should be accompanied by a specification of the types of individuals for whom these definitions are applied and those who are excluded. Apart from the international regime and its non-uniform coverage, various regional integration arrangements allow people to trade and travel freely across borders. International conflict and the existence of failed states also generate complex patterns of population movement that disrupt the classic state-citizen link. Displaced or stateless individuals represent another category. This dissertation analyzes citizenship of a supranational market and focuses on the case of the European Union exclusively. Other combinations of citizenship and membership fall beyond the scope of this project.

Methodologically, following a standard distinction in citizenship studies, I differentiate between two institutional dimensions of citizenship: "the legal category of nationality that defines membership in a state understood as a territorial and national organization" and "citizenship as rights and duties stemming from membership and participation in a political community." The first dimension concerns matters of inclusion and exclusion. It "encompasses the construction of legal and political borders between state citizens and aliens." The second dimension "refers to the civil, political and social entitlements of citizenship (Marshall 1950)" (Iordachi 2009). It concerns the contents and meaning of citizenship for those who are "insiders" or members of a certain polity. In the literature on international migration, both dimensions are most frequently evaluated from the standpoint of immigrant-receiving countries with an emphasis on incorporation/exclusion and naturalization procedures. In the case of more recent research on citizenship

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in migrant-sending countries, studies typically focus on the first legal dimension of nationality, analyzing constitutions and citizenship laws. This branch of literature concentrates on issues of "diaspora management," i.e. policies that states implement in order to reconnect with citizens who have permanently left the country (emigrants, whether voluntary or involuntary) and naturalized in another country. It also covers the policies designed to encourage diaspora members to return home, and to facilitate the incorporation and integration of former emigrants (or their successors) who decide to come back (Mylonas 2013).

This project does not concern "diaspora management" in this classical understanding. In general, intra-EU circular migrants do not exit the country of origin permanently or seek naturalization: their formal citizenship status does not change. However, the content of the citizenship they practice changes significantly, since a new dimension – citizenship of the market – and a new set of associated entitlements detached from the national territory and the Marshallian classical triad become relevant in their lives. Their mobility not only influences them personally or their families, friends and communities, but ends up determining the migrants' countries of origin to adapt and rethink their policies in order to effectively reconnect with temporary, circular migrants who remain economically and politically relevant (for a more detailed analysis and more references, see the introductory section in Chapter IV).

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 explores what is new about contemporary European migrations and discusses how these characteristics matter politically. It briefly reviews the interrelated development of free movement and EU citizenship in European Community law (the EU's *acquis communautaire*) and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Section 2 summarizes how mobility affects life and politics in the EU's newest member-state and presents the empirical puzzles underlying the project. Section 3 reviews the literature on economic remittances, transnational political engagement and return migrants' po-

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litical attitudes. Building on these bases, section 4 concentrates on citizenship and synthesizes a theory about the recalibration of the state-citizen relationship in high-mobility contexts and its political effects. Finally, section 5 fleshes out the research design in more detail and provides a roadmap for following three empirical chapters.

What Is New About EU Migrations and Why Should Political Scientists Care?

It has been argued that, even though European integration has changed a lot in inter-governmental economic relations, not much has translated into political influence (Diez Medrano 1999). This section discusses how the mutually supportive evolutions of free movement and European citizenship have transformed politics by generating a new individual status: the *citizenship of the market*. Freedom of movement on EU territory, with the attached rights to seek employment and establish residence in host countries, gives political scientists a unique opportunity to examine the state-citizen relationship in high-mobility contexts. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the EU enlargement towards post-communist Central and Eastern Europe allows scholars to analyze the political effects of international mobility in new democracies, where political party systems are still unconsolidated and previous contact with other sources of international influence has been restricted for decades.

From its post-World War II beginnings, the European integration project adopted free movement as a pivotal principle. Cross-border mobility was the *sine qua non* condition for creating and consolidating the internal market. As many scholars pointed out, the European project did not render the state obsolete, but rather consolidated its power and directed it toward fulfilling new roles (Milward 1992). Article 14(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic

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Community (1957, also known as the Treaty of Rome) states that the Community "shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal market." Paragraph (2) defines the internal market as "an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured." These key features are commonly known as the 'fundamental freedoms', and represent the legal foundation upon which the entire *acquis communautaire* was subsequently developed. Over time, as the European project advanced, successive iterations of EU treaties fleshed out the ideas envisioned in the founding documents. As the European Community progressed from its economic core toward adding a political dimension, European decision-makers started viewing migrants as more than mere factors of production. ECJ jurisprudence played a decisive role in the crystallization of European citizenship, by interpreting broadly Treaty provisions and secondary legislation on free movement.

Citizenship of the market has its current legal basis in Part Two ("Non-Discrimination and Citizenship of the Union) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, i.e. the repackaged founding document after the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, which amended both the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht) and the Treaty establishing the European Community). Article 20, Paragraph 1 proclaims: "Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship" (Anon 2010). Paragraph 2 adds substance by stating that the new complementary citizenship creates rights and duties for European citizens in accordance with the *acquis communautaire*: "Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the treaties." This establishes a direct connection between citizens and the EU as a geo-political entity. The article enumerates European citizens' rights: (a) the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States; (b) the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their country of residence under the same

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conditions as nationals of that state; (c) the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which their state of citizenship is not represented, the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State as if they were nationals of that state; and (d) the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and the advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language. Article 21 (1) establishes free movement of people: "Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect."

Article 45 (1) TFEU establishes the free movement of workers ("Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union"). Article 49 concerns the freedom of establishment of self-employed persons, while Article 56 refers to the freedom to provide and receive services. Article 45 (1) states that "Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union," and (2) asserts that free movement shall entail the abolition of all discrimination based on nationality between workers as regards employment, pay and work conditions. Paragraph 3 allows for some limitations of this fundamental right on grounds of public policy, public security and public health. Paragraph (4) establishes an additional exemption for employment in the public service. A Member State can invoke reasons of public interest to justify a national measure only if that measure is compatible with fundamental rights (Barnard 2001).

Originally, Article 45 could only apply to persons engaged in economic activities, i.e. people who could qualify as "workers." It became obvious, however, that the implications of free movement extended far beyond the economic dimension. Thus, European institutions had to consider and address the human consequences of mobility. The ECJ interpreted broadly Treaty provisions and secondary legislation in ways that incrementally built up the legal foundations for

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treating migrants not just as workers, but also as human beings (i.e. citizens of the market, rather than factors of production). This foreshadowed the introduction of European citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht (1993). Over time, the Court ruled, for instance, that migrants had the right to enter another member state and remain to seek work in *Antonissen* (C-292/89) and that they had "ancillary" rights that compensate for the disadvantages that free movement might create. It was recognized and subsequently codified in secondary legislation that migrants had the right to receive social advantages under the same terms and conditions as host-state nationals and that the workers' family members had the right of entry and residence. Irrespective of the economic nexus, citizens could rely on the EU in demanding protection and rights (e.g. *C-85/96 Martinez Sala* – the right of non-workers to claim social security benefits; *C-138/02 Collins* and *C-258/04 Ioannidis* – work-seekers can claim social security benefits).

A set of Directives in the early 1990s offered residency rights to certain categories of citizens that did not need to be engaged in economic activities, but could demonstrate that (a) they were financially self-sufficient, so as not to burden on the host country's welfare system and (b) they held health insurance (Directive 90/365 on retired workers; Directive 93/96 on students; Directive 90/364). Directive 2004/38 consolidated and replaced several European legal instruments concerning free movement and residence. It underlined a fundamental entitlement of European citizens, provided less rigid conditions and formalities, and protected more effectively from expulsion.[1] It reaffirmed the right to equal treatment (Article 24) and conferred rights on migrants according to their length of residence in the host state. In addition to these, European

[1] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0038R%2801%29:EN:HTML

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citizens also enjoy the rights and protections specified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.[2]

Any EU citizen has the right to enter, reside and stay in the territory of another Member State for up to three months, without any other formality required beyond presenting a valid passport or a national ID card at the border. For periods exceeding three months, migrants must obtain a residence permit. The conditions in which this permit is granted vary according to the citizen's labor-market status (employed, self-employed, student, retired, inactive etc.). To legally take up an economic activity in another member state, either as employed or as self-employed, a migrant can obtain a residence permit by presenting an identity document and proof of employment or self-employment (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions - Eurofound 2011). In interpreting Council Regulation 1612/68 on free movement within the community, the European Court of Justice restricted the application of Article 45 TFEU to EU nationals, thus excluding third-country nationals who work and reside in a Member State. The ECJ ruled in *C-184/99 Grzelczyk* that EU citizenship is the "fundamental status of nationals of the Member states." Overall, the Court has adopted an incremental approach to EU law development on the citizenship and free movement front. As a result, despite the Court's activism, the case law does not suggest that all EU citizens who migrate are automatically entitled to all benefits in other Member States on the same terms as nationals.

In parallel, the ECJ also worked on strengthening the direct link between persons and the European law. In its early days, in *C-20/62 van Gend & Loos*,[3] the ECJ held that the Treaties can

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[2] Official Journal C 364, 18/12/2000 (2000/C 364/2000): http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?-uri=CELEX:32000X1218%2801%29:EN:HTML

[3] Case 26/62, *NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belanstingen* [1963]: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61962J0026:EN:HTML

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create obligations and rights for individuals independently from Member-States' legislation. The Court established the doctrine of direct effect for primary EU law. In *C-6/64 Falminio Costa v. Enel*, the Court developed the doctrine of European law supremacy, asserting that there are situations in which EU law should supersede national legislation in areas where member states have surrendered sovereignty to the EU (e.g. the single market):

> By creating a community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the community, the member states have limited their sovereign rights and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.[4]

The language of the Court rulings reflects the special nature of Community legislation and its bite for both citizens and state authorities. By setting the bases of an integrated economy, states surrendered a certain amount of control to EU institutions on market-related matters. "The law stemming from the treaty, an independent source of law, could not because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as community law and without the legal basis of the community itself being called into question" (from the Court decision in *Falminio Costa v. Enel*, *idem supra*). The doctrines of direct effect and the supremacy of EU law have allowed individuals to invoke Treaty provisions to make claims before domestic courts and override domestic law (e.g. in *Defrenne v. Sabena*, Case 43/75, [1976]), the ECJ held that "[national courts] have a duty to ensure the protection of the rights" which Treaty provisions vest in individuals[5]).

These legal developments link citizens directly to the European market in a way that goes beyond a simple contract for working abroad. As it has been shown above, the connection trans-

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[4] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61964J0006:EN:NOT

[5] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61975CJ0043:EN:NOT

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cends economic considerations and complements national citizenship, creating even a space in which citizens can challenge the state on the basis of the *acquis communautaire*. It has been said that "the process of integration involves a gradual reduction in the power of national governments and a commensurate increase in the ability of the center – in the context of the EU, supranational institutions (the Commission and the Parliament) – to deal with sensitive, politically charged issues" (Barnard 2004). The shift in decision-making mirrors, in fact, the impact of European integration on individual opportunity structures: as citizenship of the market occupies an increasingly prominent place in people's lives, the national citizenship that it complements also changes.

Puzzles and Paradoxes

Economic considerations often underlie deliberate migration. As early as 1932, Hicks wrote that "differences in net economic advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are the main causes of migration" (Hicks 1932). Moreover, migrants do everything within their power to maximize the payoffs of working abroad. What is new about contemporary migratory flows is that migrants who settle in mobility can benefit from the economic gap between sending and receiving countries not once, but twice: first, by earning more (the same wage differential that motivates classical forms of migration), and second, by spending or investing earnings not in the destination country, where living costs are higher, but rather in the country of origin, where the savings amount to a little fortune. This pattern creates a "status paradox" (Nieswand 2011). Abroad, far from the judgmental eye of the community, migrants can take jobs below their qualifications simply because they pay exceptionally well by sending-country standards. These are jobs that they would never accept or even consider at home. For the same set of skills, studies have shown

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that migrants earn two to three times more at destination than they would in the country of origin (Ambrosini et al. 2011). To make the most of this advantage, migrants sacrifice comfort and live in austere, often precarious conditions while abroad to save every penny. They undergo downward social mobility abroad and at the workplace, in order to climb up the social ladder at home. Distance and the now-affordable cost of migration allow them to participate fully in the integrated labor market. Distance can serve as a buffer, liberating migrants not only from home country monopoly, but also from the "tyranny of cousins" (Gellner 1994). Being away shields people from the power of traditional relations that restrict individual choice and affect prestige at home. The degree to which this emancipation from traditional ties happens depends on the structure of migratory networks, in particular the salience of family relations across country borders (see Chapter II for a full discussion of qualitative evidence from Romania).

Migrants develop a pragmatic, individualistic perspective that emphasizes self-reliance, discipline, merit and responsibility. They do not see themselves as immigrants or uprooted individuals, but maintain their identification with the home country. Even those who spend most of the year abroad speak of their trips as "going out" or "going to work." Non-migrants also adopt this language of temporary exit and fluid migratory projects when they speak of relatives "gone to work" or friends "working outside" (meaning outside the country). Migrants are not excessively concerned about perfectly fitting in or socializing in the destination country. They learn the language and customs as needed to communicate with colleagues and superiors at the workplace, to inspire confidence to customers or clients, and acquire new skills in their profession. Women caretakers spend most of the workday with their foreign employers (or live in the same house); other migrants do not have extensive contact with the citizens of receiving countries. Outside the workplace, both women and men have limited informal interaction with locals, not for lack of curiosity or due to autochthonous prejudice (which does occasionally manifest itself), but rather

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because migrants tend not to invest time in creating connections unrelated to their economic goal. Every chance to meet migrant co-nationals becomes an opportunity for professional networking. Everything revolves around work and employment-related issues. Even though migrants help one another, they admit sometimes avoiding other migrants for fear of being asked to offer job suggestions or connections. Abroad is not the time to hang out with friends. One can do that at home, where migrants enjoy the fruits of their labor. That is the environment where they project the status-salient self-image.

On a personal, social and political level, intra-EU migrants to not lose touch with realities in the sending country. While they report missing their non-migrant relatives and friends, especially in the first months of holding a job abroad, they do not become nostalgic, idealize the past or forget the general situation at home. As a result, they do not develop the forms of "long-distance nationalism" characterizing the transnational political engagement of other *émigrés* and diasporas (Anderson 1992; Ong 2006; Glick Schiller & G. Fouron 2001). Nor do they fall in the other extreme: free-movement migrants do not see themselves as "deterritorialized", "denationalized" or "post-national" (Soysal 1994; Sassen 2003; Sassen 1998; Appadurai 1996). They do not think of themselves as "uprooted" (Handlin 1979) and dismiss with a smile the suggestion that their national sentiment may have changed.

A majority of highly-educated and affluent elites from Western Europe migrates to expand personal and professional horizons, escape routine and experiment with liberating lifestyles. Many of these "Eurostars" identified first as European (Favell 2008). Eastern European citizens of the market do not, since discrimination and difficulty remind them everyday that European citizenship provides only partial access to destination countries. These migrants concentrate on economic objectives: finding a job that pays well, saving money abroad, using earnings at home to climb up the social ladder by shielding the family from poverty and material need, sending

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children to college, engaging in conspicuous consumption to promptly signal affluence and gain the respect of the community (e.g. "let the house be my witness and tell the story I myself cannot tell while I'm away" etc.). Politically, they reject the idea that working abroad may have diluted their national identity or love for their country. Yet, when it comes to living-making strategies, they unhesitatingly confess depending on the EU market and free movement ("I cannot imagine coming back here and working for peanuts. It's simply not enough money to live a decent life, " says Narcisa, who is 52 and has been working in Italy for 7 years. "While I can still work, I want to make money to help my family and be useful. I tried to come back and stay, but I couldn't. I had to go back, since I get bored here. I cannot stay still like I used to, like everyone around here does... I'll see how I feel about this in a few years, but for now, I can keep working. I'm still good for work (*bun de munca*)" – Gheorghe, 47).

Though they overwhelmingly assert that EU accession was a good thing for the country, migrants talk about international opportunities in very pragmatic, down-to-earth terms. For them, European mobility provides a solution to pressing problems, a remedy for all needs and wants. Migrants preserve their loyalty to the nation-state, but in economic matters, they strongly oppose state intervention in the functioning of markets beyond a minimalistic role that includes law enforcement and protecting the rule of law. A minimal state is desirable because it does not "get in the way" or overwhelm people with corrupt officials, burdensome taxes and heavy fees. While the homeland still inspires national sentiment, the state does not inspire trust. Migrants compare the legal situation at home and abroad, contrasting the rule of law as it functions elsewhere with the abuses that occur at home. Extraterritorial citizens also complain about their country's unwillingness to defend them through embassy or consulate officials when their rights are violated. While government representatives blame the situation on understaffed offices and limited resources, migrants perceive the authorities as unsupportive and aloof. To draw public

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attention, Romanians detained without trial abroad even resort to hunger strike. State authorities and citizens see mobility differently: the former talk about migrants as people who exited the state and are now making unreasonable demands on the country they left; the latter point out in frustration that, even though they are working abroad, they have not given up their citizenship and that authorities of the home country are still the ones who should provide legal protection.

As a result of practicing European citizenship, engaging in rights-related arguments with representatives of their government and learning how to make claims when interacting with authorities in receiving countries, citizens of the market think a lot about the laws that affect them at home and at the workplace. When migrants gather during their lunch breaks abroad, conversations usually involve a couple of anecdotes about the most interesting happenings at work, some requests to help newcomers find work and a lot of discussion about legislation, work contracts and benefits. The more experienced instruct those who have just arrived, teaching them where to report violations of labor law, how to initiate a conversation about getting a work contract and how to prepare documents before approaching consular authorities. Migrants know that EU citizenship provides the most effective protection against encroachment of rights while abroad. Over time, to exercise voice more effectively, migrants have adopted a rights-focused discourse and developed a "legal consciousness" (Gallagher 2006). Even for those working without a contract, the ultimate goal is to persuade their boss to get them "in order" or "in a regular situation," i.e. to submit the necessary paperwork and hire them legally. To convince employers that they are worth the bureaucratic hassle, migrants work hard and maintain impeccable conduct. They take pride in their perfectionism. In constructions, for instance, migrants learn and improve so much that, back in sending communities, people now prefer hiring teams who have experience working abroad.

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Working with contract, "being in order," as migrants call it, is everyone's goal, men and women, agricultural workers and caretakers. It constitutes a matter of pride, a marker of merit and a symbol of professional achievement. Legality is the guarantee of a retirement pension later on, but more importantly it represents a sign that the migrant made a great impression at the workplace and earned "honest, clean money." The migrants' constant focus on rights, legality and accountability manifested itself, in one form or another, in all the in-depth interviews with migrants and non-migrant family members, as well as in the interviews with policy-makers, government representatives abroad and migrant employers. Embassy and consulate officials complained about the fact that migrants invoke their rights and complain about rights violations too much, without actual cause. State representatives said that they had a hard time responding to the increasing number of requests to look into alleged cases of rights violations. Employers blamed EU accession for inspiring workers to be "cheeky and demanding": they complain when asked to work after hours (without pay) and make a "big deal about work conditions and about the contract." A few told me that, after scolding unruly workers, the latter threatened to report to city authorities unless they got a contract or a raise for the additional hours they worked.

Concerning the economy, migrants prefer minimal state interference in the market beyond law enforcement. They support center-right political agendas that favor economic openness and EU participation. With few exceptions, migrants express frustration with politicians, whom they see as corrupt and tainted by previous associations with communism. Many migrants say they are "not interested in politics," a statement that turns out to be just as politically loaded as it was during communism. Before 1989, it was subversive and signaled a rejection of the compulsory political participation that the regime required of all citizens. Anti-politics meant resistance and defiance. Now, it reflects a liberal-individualistic take on life that emphasizes individual rights and liberties, celebrates private priorities and the freedom to pursue one's self-interest, *il*

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particolare that Italian Renaissance thinker Francesco Guicciardini, Machiavelli's contemporary, opposed to civic virtue, duty and obedience. It praises the right to disengage from politics without fear of repression, a view that rings especially liberating after decades of mandatory participation and surveillance.

At the meso level, a quantitative analysis of electorally expressed political preferences at county-level (*voivodships* for Poland and *judete* for Romania) confirms the patterns emerging from the micro-level analysis. It reveals that counties in which a higher proportion of the population participates in intra-EU migration show higher levels of support for center-right parties with pro-market agendas. Free movement is associated with lower levels of support for social democrats and communist-successor parties, and also with lower support for extreme, nationalist agendas. At the macro level, the analysis shows how migrant-sending states and political parties try to manage and, eventually, adapt to citizen mobility. Free movement increases the visibility of mobile citizens, which empowers them in the public sphere and leads to institutional development and political strategy modifications.

While both Romania and Poland are post-communist countries and new EU members, they differ on several dimensions. Some are obvious: geographic localization, historical legacies, religion, language, ethnic composition of the population, relations with Western Europe and the US etc. After World War II, they also had different types of communist regimes, with different levels of repression and isolationism. They followed different paths to extrication from dictatorship. They pursued different reform strategies in the process of transitioning to democracy and free-market economy. They had and still have different economic circumstances. Even their pre-accession rapport with the European Union differed: Poland was in the Visegrad group and joined the EU in 2004 with the first wave of post-communist enlargement, becoming a Schengen

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space member, while Romania officially joined in 2007 and still encounters much resistance to the free movement of its citizens.

Despite these differences, in recent years after the introduction of visa-free travel to other EU countries, Romania and Poland have followed strikingly convergent political trajectories. From electoral campaign strategies to the profile of political parties winning elections, from state-society relations to the government's relations with extraterritorial citizens, the two countries now resemble one another more than they ever have. Center-right, pro-free market, EU-supportive political parties rose to prominence and managed to get re-elected (a first in the post-communist pattern of alternation in power and party instability). This happened despite conditions of economic crisis that triggered a recent rise in nationalism and Euro-skepticism in the region, as well as led to calls for state intervention in the economy.[6] Moreover, contrary to the regional pattern, the electoral appeal of nationalist, Euro-skeptic political parties has plummeted to the point of not clearing the threshold for parliamentary representation. Communist-successor parties and other social democratic, left-wing parties have also witnessed a drop in popularity levels. In a nutshell, Romania and Poland have converged in the last decade towards the center-right of the po-

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[6] In Romania, the only way in which the social-democrats (PSD – Partidul Social Democrat) managed to challenge the political dominance of the center-right democratic liberals (PDL) was to form a coalition with a former PDL ally, the National Liberal Party (PNL), that is even more strongly attached to European integration and welfare state reform than the democratic liberals. Following incumbent blunders, mismanagement, cronyism accusations and some authoritarianism-tinged remarks and actions by President Traian Basescu (PDL), the coalition won the parliamentary elections of 2012; yet, despite all efforts, it did not manage to fulfill its *raison d' être* objective, i.e. that of ousting the President by any available means. The referendum on whether Basescu should be removed from office and indicted failed to reach the 50% turnout threshold needed for validation. Under the pressures of Basescu's main rival, Social-Democrat Prime Minister Victor Ponta, the Government even changed the referendum law the day before the Parliament vote to enable the impeachment referendum to be valid if the majority of those who turn out to vote support impeachment (eliminating the 50%+1 turnout requirement). The EU reacted strongly, criticizing the Government for undermining the rule of law, which forced the government to reconsider its decision. When the Romanian Constitutional Court upheld the 50%+1 turnout requirement, Ponta accepted the decision. Since the referendum fiasco, the uneasy PSD-PNL alliance has required readjustments and suffers from chronic frictions. It came at a great credibility cost for the National Liberal Party and generated impetus for the emergence of new center-right, pro-market political parties to compete for that part of the vote (Partidul Forta Civica, Miscarea Populara etc.).

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litical spectrum, a trend coupled with a quasi-complete disappearance of extreme-right, nationalist parties from their political scenes and a weakening of social democracy and communist-successor parties. While democratic consolidation is not a surprising outcome for Poland (the only European country to maintain economic growth, even at the lowest point of the recent economic crisis), it is somewhat unexpected for Romania, where the crisis hit particularly hard while the center-right party (PDL) held both the Presidency and large majorities in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The Romanian government implemented strong austerity measures that led to some popular protest. Despite that, the Romanian center-right still enjoys high levels of popularity that make it indispensable in political coalitions.

This dissertation argues that the two countries' high levels of citizen participation in European free movement have decisively contributed to this convergence. While we cannot simulate a scenario in which Poland and Romania would evolve in the same way but without the citizens' reliance on EU mobility, there are two neighboring countries that would have been considered in the early 1990s similar politically and economically to Poland and Romania and that did not experience international mobility to the same degree. The two countries are Hungary and Bulgaria; and their current profiles diverge significantly from the patterns described above. In the 2000s, both have witnessed the ascent to power of right-wing coalitions. Far-right movements reached unprecedented levels of popularity. However, unlike Poland and Romania, where extreme nationalists and anti-EU campaigners lost ground quickly, in Hungary and Bulgaria they have maintained strong positions in national politics ever since, while more mainstream politicians have adopted some of their messages in more or less dilute form in response to popular/electoral demand.

In Hungary, a wave of extreme nationalism manifested itself after the country's accession to the EU in 2004, in the first wave of post-communist enlargement. The Movement for a Better

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Hungary emerged. The militaristic Hungarian Guard, later banned by the Supreme Court for actions that incited to hate and racism, also succeeded in mobilizing support. The far-right movement Jobbik entered parliament in 2010 with 47 seats (for comparison, the mainstream socialists won only 59). Even Fidesz, Hungary's former center-right party, became much more nationalist. The Hungarian right-wing government consolidated its control over media. Freedom House, while allowing Hungary to maintain its general democracy score, added a downward trend arrow next to the country's name in 2010 to signal the drop in the government's commitment to democracy. The Freedom House expressed concern over the government's efforts to strengthen its control over Hungary's independent institutions. The government created, for instance, a new media council dominated by the ruling party that has the power to impose large fines on broadcast, print and online media sources. The government installed a Fidesz loyalist as president in August 2010, and curtailed the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court over budgetary matters in November, after the latter tried to block a retroactive tax law. This involution is especially surprising since Hungary, along with Poland, started its democratization and transition to free-market economy as one of the Eastern European leaders, member of the Visegrad group like Poland, part of the early EU enlargement, receiving substantial support and favorable progress coverage from Western partners etc.

In Bulgaria, the extremist xenophobic National Union Attack (Ataka) has been, since 2005, the 4th largest party in parliament. Ataka runs under the leadership of TV host Volen Siderov (the movement was actually named after his popular show in which he made harsh statements against ethnic minorities like the Roma and Turks). Ataka had its first success in the June 2005 parliamentary elections. Siderov is a xenophobic politician whose persona has been described in a 2007 New York Times article as "a studied imitation of Hitler." The man has accused the Bulgarian state of practicing widespread discrimination against majority ethnic Bulgar-

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ians by not prosecuting crimes committed by minorities and privileging ethnic groups in the provision of social services that are denied to a majority of Bulgarians. Siderov ran for president in 2006, winning 21% of the vote and entering a runoff against incumbent Georgi Parvanov, former member of the Socialist Party (who got 65% of the vote but could not declared winner in the first round, due to the requirement that at least 50% of all registered voters turn out and vote in the first round in order for a second round to be unnecessary). Both Hungary and Bulgaria have recently witnessed massive manifestations of racism, with widespread protests, local militia spontaneous mobilizations, and deadly attacks against minorities, in particular the Roma.

The puzzling convergence in political preferences and state-citizen relations in Romanian and Poland results from the fact that people, parties and political systems in both countries adapted to a new phenomenon: citizenship of the market and the practice thereof by a high proportion of the labor force. Reliance on the state in socio-political matters and on the EU for economic necessities leads to a realistic and nuanced view of both: "circulatory migration, as opposed to permanent migration, entails an ambivalent valorization, at the same time positive and negative for the same place, of departure or arrival, or permanent residence or temporary residence. The home place is (...) valued positively from a socio-cultural point of view, and negatively from an economic point of view" (Sandu 2000). When migrants, their households and entire communities rely on European mobility for their prosperity, it becomes difficult for Euro-skeptic parties to diabolize integration and provide a credible state-centered alternative in the economic realm. As this dissertation shows, both migrants and non-migrants who live in high-mobility contexts generally value the EU positively from a labor-market, socio-economic point of view, even though they may have reservations when it comes to other dimensions of European integration. This sophisticated view has implications for state-society relations, as free movement expands the citizens' horizon of individual choice into a realm that homelands cannot control.

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Several bodies of scholarly literature offer valuable insight into the material and non-material consequences of international migration. The political economy literature has extensively documented how remittances, return migration and transnational economic networks contribute to development and human capital. Transnationalism scholarship has made great progress in examining changes in lifestyles, values, education, gender and family relations, professional formation, participation in diaspora non-governmental organizations (e.g. hometown associations) etc. of migrants around the world. The pages below summarize this literature on economic and non-material (social/political/cultural) remittances. The chapter then synthesizes their insights with the conceptual building blocks of literature on citizenship, building towards a theory of state-citizen relations in conditions of variable population mobility.

The positive impacts of return migration for migrant's sending countries have been theoretically analyzed (Ambrosini et al. 2011; Dustmann & Glitz 2011; Santos & Postel-Vinay 2006; Dustmann 1995). Research on older migratory flows confirmed the hypothesis that the emigration of the most productive workers due to higher wages abroad was indeed harmful for developing countries (Bhagwati 1976; Bhagwati & Rodriguez 1975). Yet, in the current globalization era, when migration tends to be temporary rather than permanent, workers are less pressured into the permanent exit option. Return migrants become successful entrepreneurs and bring back to their community highly productive professional skills acquired abroad (McCormick & Wahba 2001). Transnational migrants also engage in cross-border entrepreneurship that has positive effects in their countries of origin (Portes et al. 2002; Smith & Bakker 2008; Levitt 2001). Central and Eastern European return migrants have a higher propensity for entrepreneurship or self-

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employment than non-migrants (Kilic et al. 2009; Piracha & Vadean 2010). There is extensive evidence that returning migrants receive considerable income premia for their skills and the work experience in more demanding and competitive markets (Barrett & Goggin 2010). This finding has also been confirmed in the case of Central and Eastern European migrants who acquire new skills while abroad and receive significant income premia after coming back to the homeland (Martin & Radu 2012; Iara 2008; Hazans 2008; De Coulon & Piracha 2005; Co et al. 2000). Migration gives people an opportunity to improve, often dramatically, their living standards, a finding that has been supported by research projects on Latin America (Clemens et al. 2008), Eastern Europe (Budnik 2009), India (De Coulon & Wadsworth 2010) etc.

Differential returns to skills in origin and destination countries still function as a main driver of migration, but migration also represents an educational or professional investment (Dustmann & Glitz 2011). Social scientists have long viewed migration in the same way as education, i.e. as an investment in human capital (Sjaastad 1962; Kapur 2010). The positive influence that migration exerts on educational levels is not limited to migrants, but affects the educational decisions of those who do not migrate as well, generating "educational externalities" by easing credit constraints through remittances and by creating incentives to invest in a particular kind of human capital, thus changing the skill base of the receiving country (Dustmann & Glitz 2011; Anghel & Horvath 2009). Brain gain has been documented as a positive effect of spatial mobility for migrants themselves and for their countries of origin (Stark et al. 1998; Kapur 2004).

What are the political consequences of international mobility for individual migrants, for their communities and their countries of origin? What happens to the state-citizen relationship when the citizens' experiential space no longer coincides with national space (Beck 2002)?

External factors of democratization have received little scholarly attention relative to analyses of domestic factors, like political cleavages and elites, despite a surge in interest for for-

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eign influences in the post-Cold War context of democracy promotion programs (Whitehead 1996; Carothers 2006; Ottaway & Carothers 2000). The issue regained visibility in research on European integration and EU enlargement, but still from the perspective of a top-down process of reform via conditionality applied in more or less successful ways (Kubicek 2003; Ekiert 2008). Even when Europeanization entailed learning and transformation of political views, the process through which external factors influenced new democracies in general and post-communist transitional democracies in particular occurred still top-down, as an elite conversion to European values (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). This is an intentional exercise of influence that happens from one state to another through causal mechanisms that involve unidirectional diffusion from one institution to another as well as among policy-makers. As a result, the interaction between internal and external factors constitutes the missing link in democratization and democratic consolidation research (Erdmann & Kneuer 2009). With the case of labor migrants in high mobility contexts, the boundary between internal and external influences becomes blurred (Rüland et al. 2009; Rother 2009). This signals that new analytical categories are needed to get to the heart of this issue.

Recently, theoretical contributions in the literature on democratic diffusion have started acknowledging the potential impact of migration among other factors such as mass media, networks and secondary socialization in the education system and at the workplace (Lauth & Pickel 2009). Sociologists, anthropologists and area studies specialists have contributed to social remittance research, tackling the issue of political change. Transnational patterns of political activity and general cultural change have been examined in countries like Haiti (Glick Schiller & G. Fouron 2001; Glick Schiller & G. E. Fouron 2001), the Dominican Republic (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves 2011; Levitt 2001), Mexico (Pérez-Armendáriz & Crow 2010), the Philippines (Rother 2009), Honduras (Schmalzbauer 2004), Morocco (Zontini 2010) and Ghana (Nieswand 2011).

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Family relations (Herrera Lima 2001; Johnson et al. 2011; Chamberlain & Leydesdorff 2004), in particular motherhood (Schmalzbauer 2004; Hondagneu-Sotelo & Avila 1997) Gender (Anthias & Lazaridis 2000; Coyle 2007). On the political front, some research has been done on diaspora politics or external voting, with an obvious emphasis on dynamics in receiving countries or countries of naturalization (Itzigsohn & Villacrés 2008; Mügge 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003), on state-migrant partnerships in fostering development (Gonzalez Gutierrez 2009; Iskander 2010; Macalou 2009; Black et al. 2003).

Some exploratory and descriptive research has revealed various characteristics of post-Cold War migrations from Central and Eastern Europe (Black et al. 2010; Eade & Valkanova 2009; Fassmann et al. 2009) with much of that work focused on the two main migrant-sending countries: Poland (Burrell 2009; Eade et al. 2007; Drinkwater et al. 2009) and Romania (Diminescu 2008; Muntele 2003; Rey 2003). While there was a surge in academic interest for Eastern Europe in the years preceding EU accession, the political questions asked often concerned the EU as a geo-political entity and old member-states. Some contributions focused on the EU accession process and the effectiveness of conditionality. As a result, we still know very little about the political effects of high-mobility contexts on politics in migrant-sending countries. Over a decade has passed since the introduction of visa-free travel followed by European citizenship in post-communist Poland and Romania. This offers the first opportunity to analyze political remittances in detail. Generating a theory and formulating hypotheses can build on studies of transnational/diaspora politics, which evaluate the political engagement of migrants who have settled down in the destination country (Mügge 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003), as well as on the new literature on the political orientation, re-socialization and voting behaviors of return migrants (Pérez-Armendáriz & Crow 2010; Paul 2013; Rother 2009) and extraterritorial citizens (Burean 2011) in one specific and salient event (national elections, a referendum etc.).

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While a vast literature assesses the consequences of immigration in destination countries (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003), little progress has been made in the direction of studying how increased international mobility affects socio-economic hierarchies, worldviews, political preferences, electoral outcomes and political debates in the migrants' countries of origin. This relationship has become especially salient in an age of circular migration, characterized by the citizens' "incomplete," temporary and successive exits from and returns to their country of origin. In sending regions, due to their high visibility, newly acquired resources and rapid ascent in socio-economic status hierarchies, internationally mobile citizens (circular migrants and temporary or permanent returnees) have become the agents of economic, social, political and cultural change. Politically, migrants remain "new and unaccounted power groups" (Itzigsohn & Villacrés 2008). This dissertation contributes theoretically and empirically to filling this gap in political science, sociology and migration scholarship. It examines how migrants themselves are changed by migration and how, in turn, they become the agents of change in their communities and countries of origin.

In the current era of globalization, people travel to foreign countries more rapidly, easily and cheaply than ever before (Bauman 1998). With international mobility costs at all time lows, crossing borders does not entail permanent exit. To be sure, obstacles to international travel remain substantial in many parts of the world. Complex variations in border permeability to migratory flows determine global hierarchies of access that are constantly challenged by underground, irregular, clandestine movements across national frontiers. Overall, despite the nation-states' attempts to regain control over their borders and territories, migratory flows have increased and diversified in terms of structure and countries of origin. Legal and underground transnational networks have proliferated and expanded, connecting sending and receiving countries increasingly more distant and diverse. There has been a well-documented growth in migrant

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remittances between immigration areas (the Global North) and emigration areas (the Global South) over the last couple of decades, with emigration countries like Albania, the Philippines, Morocco, Haiti, Mexico, Moldova and Ghana becoming increasingly dependent on remittances (Nieswand 2011; Vertovec 2009; Ratha 2003).

Returning home after shorter or longer stays abroad now constitutes the norm rather than the exception (Dustmann & Glitz 2011). Immigrants can afford international travel and regular communication with non-migrant family members and friends. In countries where jobs are hard to find and salaries are low, international temporary migration has complemented or even replaced rural-urban commuting. Some people have capitalized on the new opportunities offered by integrated markets by including forms of international temporary migration into their problem-solving and living-making repertoires. In some parts of the world, the phenomenon has reached such proportions that scholars now refer to populations whose existence transcends the nation-state (Basch et al. 1994; Levitt 1998; Levitt 2001; Itzigsohn et al. 1999), communities that are settled in mobility and whose members embrace "bifocal" lifestyles, meaning they plan and live their life simultaneously in both their sending and receiving countries, with everyday practices in which the here-and-there are perceived as complementary dimensions of a sole space of experience (Vertovec 2004). Some interpret this as the beginning of a new era of "deterritorialized" or "denationalized" nation-states (Sassen 1998; Sassen 2003; Appadurai 1996) in which "immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement" and "the nation's people may live anywhere in the world and still not live outside the state" (Basch et al. 1994). Others point out that states are far from obsolete, that they still play the key role in regulating international mobility (Hollifield 1998); (Solomon 2009; Cohen 2006). Still others argue that the geographic dispersion of a social body (*corps social*) constitutes a

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spatial resource provided that atomization does not occur: dispersion becomes positive if migrants reclaim it and maintain the intra-diaspora connections active (Ma Mung 2004).

Migratory experiences affect citizens' worldviews and horizons on a wide range of dimensions. For mobile people, life experiences that determine worldviews and behaviors come from multiple socialization contexts and political systems. In high-mobility contexts, the possibility that the constellation of relevant socialization agents (individual and institutional) is not circumscribed to a single country's territory cannot be excluded. Indeed, it seems plausible that forces reaching across multi-national systems may influence values, ideas and behaviors. In previous work, I rely on insights from political socialization research to advance a few strategies of thinking about the causal mechanisms linking migratory experiences to attitudinal and behavioral changes. To facilitate the classification of various migratory experiences, I introduce the notion of a migrant socialization cycle, a conceptual tool that takes into account space and sequence, breaking down and classifying migrant learning according to a triad of socialization contexts (country of origin, migratory route/migratory system, host country), as well as the timing and sequence of exposure (Paul 2013). A growing body of literature in anthropology, sociology and political science includes previously omitted spatial variables in analyses of migration, particularly in studies of development and remittances (Careja & Emmenegger 2012; Faist 2009; Glick Schiller & Faist 2009; Glick Schiller & G. Fouron 2001; Kapur 2010; Mügge 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Roniger 2011). In light of this work, one can hypothesize that citizens' ideas about identity, national loyalty and attachments to domestic or foreign geo-political entities may shift as a result of migratory experiences. If transnationalism is defined as "those human activities, social networks and movements that extend across national boundaries" (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Roniger 2011) or as "the extent to which individuals are involved in cross-border interactions and mobility" (Mau et al., 2008: 5), it becomes obvious that we live in an increasingly transnational world.

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Analysts note "a growing awareness that collective identities and personal commitments as well as public spheres and political projects are reformulated as a result of the changing experience of human beings in space and time" (Roniger, 2011: 10).

As far as nation-states are concerned, migration is a source of *anomie* in the international political arena, since it erodes the two main pillars of the post-Westphalian system: sovereignty and citizenship. "The once taken-for-granted correspondence between citizenship, nation and state has been called into question as new forms of grassroots citizenship have taken on an increasingly transterritorial character. Resident noncitizens now routinely live and work (…) throughout the world, while maintaining social and political networks that link them to people and places in their countries and communities of origin" (Smith & Bakker 2008). Forms of co-presence reshape individual lives, making it difficult for states to control and connect with their citizens across boundaries. While some conclude that we are witnessing a gradual loss of control, a *de facto* disintegration of the nation-state monopoly over territory and population (Sassen 1998; Sassen 2000), others speak of mobility as a resource that states use in their attempt to improve their image and international standing (Kapur 2010) and reduce the gap separating them from more advanced and affluent countries (Ma Mung 2004). Ethnographic research has revealed the emergence from the population of old EU member-states of a highly mobile, highly educated, highly Europeanized group of citizens, the "Eurostars," who are settled in mobility, dividing their lives among several Western European countries in pursuit of job opportunities, new experiences and unconventional, liberating lifestyles (Favell 2008) traveling between the main urban hubs on the continent, "Eurocities." Favell notes the high level of *de-nationalization* that Eurostars exhibit: in the case of these Western, highly qualified free-moving citizens, intra-EU migration seems to weaken the link between a nation-state (and a traditional home community) and the individual citizen. Indeed, these European citizens opt in favor of a mobile lifestyle precisely because they

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expect it to help them distance themselves from familiar environments and acquaintances. It is unclear, however, whether *de-nationalization* may be a characteristic of this social group even prior to migration, i.e. whether the cosmopolitan view develops prior to and independently from EU citizenship. Prior to Favell's study of mobile elites in Europe's cosmopolitan hubs, discussions of "social denationalization" had emerged from works on interdependence and globalization, to capture a decline in importance of nationally defined borders when transactions within national borders are no denser than transactions across borders (Zuern 2003). Looking beyond the scope of his research project, Favell notes that European free movement generates a "new kind of regional freedom in the world, uniquely available in terms of European citizenship status rather than elite privilege. European movers discover themselves as individuals, learn to free themselves from norms they learned as nationals" (Favell & Recchi 2011). He integrates this conclusion in the broader tradition of social theory work that points out to the emergence of "mobile" (Urry 2000), "liquid" (Bauman 2000) and "reflexive" societies (Beck et al. 1994). Contributing to the emergence of a political sociology of the European Union requires moving beyond elite-driven, top-down processes to examine the dynamics of Europeanization from below. "What is missing from our understanding of the EU is a human dimension. A sociological account makes clear what should be self-evident: the EU does not do anything by itself; it is people as everyday political agents who make the EU happen" (Kauppi 2011).

"In an apparently ever more mobile world, ingrained structures are often being swept away by the forces of change represented by those who moved" (Favell & Recchi 2011). From the point of view of the social scientist, in a fluid context of relatively free movement, the problem becomes determining whether and where these forces of change make their impact on political realities and phenomena. Does intra-EU migration make a difference? If so, how? One possibility is that migration removes discontented citizens from political processes, providing a safety valve

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for a political system that would otherwise be unable to respond to its citizens' demands. In this scenario, dissatisfied citizens "exit" the system, which strengthens the status quo and, possibly, leads to deteriorating performance. This is the alleged "perversity of open borders," a hypothesis that appeared in the "new authoritarianism" scholarship to explain how inefficient, corrupt and non-democratic regimes manage to survive for extended periods of time by allowing disgruntled citizens to emigrate in order to prevent them from putting pressure on the system to demand reform and democratization (Krastev 2011). Those who stay behind are either relatively content or simply too apathetic to try to change the status quo through civic and political activities. Free movement ends up disabling the "state recuperation mechanism" based on political participation and citizens' interest articulation, i.e. voice: "the presence of the exit alternative can therefore tend to atrophy the development of the art of voice" (Hirschman 1970). To resort to voice entails attempting to change the practices, policies and outputs of the firm from which one buys or of the organization to which one belongs (Hirschman 1970: 30).

> The Soviet system locked its citizens in. Changing the system was the only way to change your life. Today's Russia, on the other hand, very much resembles the Nigerian railways [the example used in Hirschman's *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*] – it will remain inefficient as long as there is enough oil money to compensate for its inefficiency. The major reason why Russians are reluctant to protest is not fear; it is because the people who care most have already left the country or have resolved to do so in the near future – or they may simply have moved to the virtual reality of the Internet… The consequence is that there is no critical mass of people demanding change. (Krastev 2011).

Krastev is correct in arguing that emigration (permanent exit) of dissatisfied citizens functions as a safety valve for inefficient regimes. However, permanent exit and transnational migration are two completely different forms of mobility; consequently, insights about the political effects of the former cannot be generalized to the latter. What Krastev has in mind is not free movement, but rather exile (or self-exile) of potential troublemakers. It's mobility one way, one time. In contrast, transnational migration allows citizens to engage in short-term or medium-term forms of migration, to return to their homeland empowered financially and re-wired politi-

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cally, to apply the lessons and reference points of life abroad etc. While permanent exit may provide an effective strategy of exporting discontent, free movement removes dissatisfied citizens only temporarily. Those outside the polity remain in permanent connection with those left at home. As Tarrow noted, "it is through people's relations to significant others that cosmopolitan attitudes are shaped. What is new in our era is the increased number of people and groups whose relations place them beyond their local and national settings without detaching them from locality" (Tarrow 2005).

Around the world, new democracies are experiencing high levels of transnational migration. These forms of mobility include complex bi- or multi-directional movements across one or several state boundaries, with varying degrees of frequency and a wide range of purposes. In the context of increasingly porous borders, highly fluid, open, often precarious migratory projects emerge. As the cost of international transportation and communications drops, migratory projects allow for constant revision and frequent relocation, enabling migrants to maintain relatively strong connections with their homeland on multiple levels, from personal to informational. Many people engage in migration for pragmatic reasons (e.g. to work or study abroad), but do not intend to settle down in the country of temporary destination. In other words, they are not emigrants struggling to integrate and gain acceptance as citizens of the receiving country, but rather pragmatic participants in multinational markets who conceptualize their presence in one country or another in a fundamentally new fashion. This dissertation examines the way in which migratory experiences recalibrate the state-citizen relationship both from a bottom-up perspective (i.e. the state in the eyes of its citizens) and top-down (i.e. migrant citizens in the eyes of local and national authorities and politicians).

In their compelling book *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, Welzel and Inglehart underscore the role of "average" citizens in democratization

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and the effects of citizens' attitudes on democracy levels. The authors make a strong case for understanding development as an increase in human autonomy and free choice: as economic development enables cultural change, societies democratize (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Does migration contribute to development, the expansion of human autonomy and free choice, thus triggering migrant-led modernization and democracy, through a sequence to the one outlined above? According to the World Bank, remittances provide an invaluable source of capital for many developing countries, one that is particularly resilient even in times of economic crisis. Post-communist Central and Eastern European countries are no exception. Romania has been the EU's number one recipient of remittances, and ranked eighth largest remittance recipient in the world in 2008, with 7 billion Euros received in cash transfers. While the crisis reduced money transfers by half in 2010, remittances remained twice as high as the level of foreign direct investment for the same year.

Supranational geo-political entities like the European Union (EU) create new transnational spaces of citizen experience. Aside from its implications for national governments and local authorities in new member states, EU accession has modified the international legal status and rights of citizens from post-communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). EU citizenship allows Eastern Europeans to enjoy the quasi-unimpeded Schengen-wide freedom of movement and a wide range of associated economic, social and political rights. For instance, EU citizens have the right to freedom of movement and residence on the territory of other member states; they have the right to vote and stand for office in local elections and European Parliament elections in the state of residence; they have the right of protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any member state on the same conditions as nationals of the receiving state etc. The new bundle of rights has modified opportunity structures and migratory experiences for CEE migrants who work in Western or Southern Europe. As currently structured, "the EU does defy a narrow state-

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centrism, but also tempers post-national claims because it retains a strong state-centered focus, offers limited rights and entitlements to EU citizens, excludes non-EU nationals from EU-level rights, and seeks to build barriers between itself and neighboring states and regions to the east and south that may be sources of unwanted immigration" (Geddes 2003).

Migrants transport and transmit more than money and *savoir-faire*. Social scientists have acknowledged migration-triggered multi-dimensional transformation not only at the level of the individual migrant or of migrant households (the micro level), but also locally and regionally (meso level) and nationally (macro level). Migrations can "change demographic, economic and social structures, and bring a new cultural diversity" in migrant-receiving countries. More generally, new political forms may emerge not necessarily eliminating national states (Castles & Miller 2009). Research on the transnational linkages that Dominican migrants maintain with their community of origin revealed how migration causes non-economic change via "social remittances," the "ideas, behaviors, identities and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities" (Levitt 1998). Many discuss the emergence of a transnational public sphere (Soysal 1997). One thing is certain: any analysis of political remittances needs to acknowledge the fact that transformations happen at multiple levels, under the influence of very diverse agents: "Migrants' transnational political practices (...) are shaped through a multilevel process of institutional channeling constituted by the converging of differing interests of political authorities in not-only the country of origin but also the country of settlement, global human rights norms and regimes, as well as the network of other nonstate actors with which migrants' transnational political networks often are intertwined" (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).

Political remittances constitute the ensemble of direct and indirect effects of migration on how citizens connect with their country. Direct effects manifest themselves through the agency of migrants and returnees, temporary or permanent, to the extent that their opinions, beliefs and

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behaviors have shifted as a result of the migratory experience. These are the "imported" values and lessons learned about the interaction between people and political systems while abroad, knowledge that informs the migrants' behaviors and, through them, changes realities in sending communities. Indirect influences result from diffusion processes with migrants as emitters and non-migrants as receptors of political ideas and information. As migrants share information with family members and friends at home, non-migrants vicariously experience migration. In many cases, migrants become the primary breadwinners in the household. Not only do non-migrants depend on them with their living, but they also perceive migrants as the most well-informed and well-traveled people in the house. Migrants bring knowledge about the outside world, living knowledge about other customs, lifestyles, values and views that would otherwise remain completely inaccessible to people at home. Mobile citizens act as "collective agents of change" who either communicate via transnational connections or act after their return in ways that remit "political ideas, such as ideas on forms of government, rights and responsibilities, and democracy" (Faist 2008). To show that political remittances matter, one needs to demonstrate that (1) migrants themselves change as a result of migratory experiences and that these changes translate into specific political attitudes and behaviors; and (2) that non-migrants community members receive information (learn) from migrants, which generates significant diffusion effects at the community level.

For a long time, international migration has remained the blind spot of political science research. As transnational flows of people, goods, services and information grow in significance, the attempt to exclude migration and political remittances from analyses of economic preferences, political attitudes, civic and electoral behaviors, political party preferences and perspectives on citizenship becomes unsustainable. The justification behind past decisions to leave migration out of the equation is clear. For manageability, scholars chose to limit the scope of their

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analyses to domestic factors. Good-quality empirical data remain scarce, especially for non-Western contexts. To further complicate things, countries participating in some free-movement integrated areas like the Schengen space do not collect information about citizens who cross internal borders between participating member-states. This research project complements previous research by adding a much-needed transnational, spatial, dynamic agent-based dimension to a mostly scholarly conversation primarily predicated on relatively static, pre-determined or structural factors at the national and subnational levels. The dissertation takes transnational mobility as an independent variable and examines its socio-economic, political and cultural impact. Migrants have become the main agents of modernization in Central and Eastern Europe, decisively contributing to local and national development even in times of transitional austerity or crisis.

Until recently, the assumption was that citizens could be studied either in the environment of their home country or, if they chose to relocate and cross national borders, in their adoptive country where they were doing their best to fit in. Migratory projects were assumed fixed, permanent, unidirectional and comprehensive: when a person emigrated, they did so completely, with all dimensions of their existence, and with no intention of coming back. Loyalties thus transferred seamlessly from country of origin to adoptive nation-state, and connections with the former lost salience very quickly. Citizens would disconnect from the country of emigration and reconnect with the country of immigration; hence, the state-citizen relationship would remain at the core of socio-political and economic life constantly, dominating the agenda in relatively straightforward ways and directions. Reality revealed a much messier picture in which such "classical" forms of emigration/immigration coexist with incomplete exits and unsuccessful returns, impromptu migratory strategies, changing goals, new groups with unclear agendas, precarious existence and disinterest in integration in the host society, diaspora that stay active in the political life at home etc. More generally, social scientists have speculated about the effects bor-

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der-crossing social relations and experiential spaces have on politics, policy-making and political regimes.

Echoing classical arguments about the virtues of traveling (e.g. "les voyages forment la jeunesse") enthusiasts claimed that new forms of international living foster cosmopolitanism by positively influencing the migrants' political knowledge and openness towards the world (Mau et al. 2008). According to this line of argument, transnationalism generates worldviews that accept diversity and facilitate engagement with "the other" in the spirit of intellectual, socio-cultural and aesthetic openness. "Cosmopolitanism arises through the interrelated processes of increased connectivity and cultural contact" (Kwok-Bun 2002). Since migratory flows and transnational social networks have expanded and proliferated, these scholars concluded that international mobility has produced "more cosmopolitans now than there have been at any other time" (Hannerz 1990). Unlike immigrants, who are assumed to preserve their attachment to the nation-state as a key-organizing element of political life, cosmopolitans, while also growing distant from their homelands over time, are allegedly not transferring that attachment towards another country. Rather, they become loyal to their unfettered life-style and adopt a post-national perspective focused on the international human rights regime (Soysal 1994), rather than on the rights and obligations that states provide to and impose on their citizens.

Finally, skeptics feared that new citizens and diaspora members are prone to nostalgia, which renders them vulnerable to manipulation by opportunistic politicians. This can lead to the emergence of a compensatory, excessive and misinformed orientation towards the country of origin, to a kind of long-distance nationalism (Anderson 1992; Anderson 1998). Despite having left their country of origin for good (permanent exit), these migrants want to exercise voice across national boundaries and influence policy outcomes as external "objective" actors, self-appointed protectors of a country they left behind to whom they feel indebted. While well-intended and in

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good faith, cross-border interventions may prove subversive, precisely because migrants are not "objective" external observers, but rather misled individuals with enough leverage to influence the situation at home without taking into account the wishes of non-exiting citizens who actually bear the consequences of political actions and decisions (Ong 2006).Transnational networks may subvert democratic processes and cohesion because they loosen ascriptive ties without providing alternative strong and stable new references that citizens need to orient themselves in political space (Habermas 2001). To reestablish the "imagined community" of the country beyond national boundaries, in a way that includes citizens at home and abroad, political parties and governments may deploy nationalist rhetoric to stir up nostalgia, gain migrant loyalty and financial support.

As with the above "transnational political activities," other notions from the literature assume that the mobile citizen emigrates/immigrates, so that after exercising exit, they can no longer exercise voice through the usual (electoral) channel. For instance, Benedict Anderson's notion of "long-distance nationalism" describes the sentiment emerging in traditional diasporas, i.e. communities of emigrants who have naturalized in another country and are, thus, excluded from formal participation in homeland politics through voting etc. Even though they have exited their country of origin, emigrants want to make their voices heard, so they seek informal avenues of political engagement in the name of what they perceive to be a "just" and "noble cause. The national radicalization of diasporas results precisely because of the inability to exercise voice and to assume the consequences of that decision: *émigré* nationalists are insulated from the consequences of their actions and unaccountable, a lack of responsibility that allegedly enhances unwillingness to compromise:

> While technically a citizen of the state in which he comfortably lives, but to which he may feel little attachment, [the nationalist] finds it tempting to play identity politics by participating (via propaganda, money, weapons, any way but voting) in the conflicts of his imagined *Heimat* – now

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> only fax-time away. But this citizenshipless participation is inevitably non-responsible – our hero will not have to answer for, or pay the price of, the long-distance politics he undertakes. He is also easy prey for shrewd political manipulators in his *Heimat* (Anderson 1992).

Anderson's critics note that, around the world, migrants are now allowed to participate in homeland politics through formal channels. They have the right to vote from abroad in important national elections. They maintain close ties with families and friends back home, which makes it hard for the hypothesized "disconnect" from the country of origin to fully occur. Homelands are not only "imagined," but also real, accessible and salient in migrants' lives. As migrants send money home and invest their earnings in properties and businesses in their sending communities, they become less invulnerable to the effects of voice and bear the consequences of their choices to a certain extent, either directly or indirectly, through affected family members, friends and acquaintances. "The *Heimat* becomes *real* when migrants travel back and forth between home and host countries and engage in numerous daily activities related to homeland politics – discussions with relatives over the telephone, cultural immigrant organizations inviting their hometown mayor for special occasions..." (Mügge 2010).

Historically, there does appear to be a connection between spatial mobility and political regime change in a more inclusive, more open and even more democratic direction. In the 19th century, the migration of emerging political elites, artists and intellectuals that studied abroad in Paris, Berlin and Vienna, and then returned to their homelands, laid the foundations for the Spring of Nations. During the European Revolutions of 1848, over fifty countries rose against traditional, absolutist authority and foreign imperial dominance (e.g. the uprising by democratic forces against Prussia in Greater Poland; the Romanian liberal and Romantic nationalist uprising against the administration imposed by Imperial Russian authorities etc.), demanding more popular participation in politics, the extension of suffrage, equality, as well as a wide set of nationalist and republican ideals.

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In a series of historical observations about migration to the United States and its consequences in the development of democratic ideas and practices in migrant-sending countries between 1880 and 1914, Morawska (2001) argues that migration produced a significant demonstration effect on the migrants' countrymen, effect which materialized in series of democratic initiatives, increased participation, the construction of Peoples' houses for adult education, the emergence of organizations and trade unions, etc.

After World War II, the temporary labor migrations from Spain and Portugal in the 1960s and 1970s towards more advanced Western European democracies facilitated the Mediterranean countries' transition to democracy after the end of the Franco and the Salazar regimes (Bermeo 1987). Diffusion through migration and international demonstration effect played an important role in the collapse of communism in 1989. Central and Eastern Europeans from the most open communist countries (Poland, Yugoslavia etc.), who did not prohibit their citizens from going abroad, traveled to the West and came back with high expectations that the failing non-democratic regimes could not satisfy. Falling living standards and economic recession only amplified these popular frustrations in the 1980s, leading up to the massive political mobilization that triggered the end of the Cold War. More recently, Ukrainian labor migrations similarly fueled the discontent that led to the Orange Revolution, while Moldovan labor and study migrations set the foundation for the Twitter Revolution against the country's obstinate communist regime.

All these vignettes seem good news, suggesting that migration may contribute to regime change, democratic transitions and democratic consolidation. More recent ethnographic research on contemporary diasporas from other parts of the world has produced mixed findings. Glick Schiller's study of the transnational political attitudes of Haitians indicates that migrants have developed a discourse marked by the obsessive, primordialist idea of an indelible "blood"

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connection between émigrés and those in the homeland. The Haitian migration-dependent state creates and entertains a cult of the migrant as "national hero," a myth that is widespread among the population; in response, migrants develop a sense of obligation and responsibility not only towards their remittance-dependent family, but also towards their community of origin and country. Even though these people have resettled in another country, they still talk about the duty they have vis-à-vis the land they left behind. Here we are witnessing a peculiar type of transnational state-building in action: through its appeals, a weak homeland that still hosts the migrants' families manages to exploit migrants and turn them into its primary agents of development. The discourse in the country of origin is so strong that it ends up trumping the influence of the country of destination, where we would expect nationalist attitudes to dissolve and other identities to emerge.

Recently, political scientists have sought rigorous and systematic ways to test these intuitions. Contributions were modeled on the example of political economic research on remittances and development. For instance, in his work discussing the "new development mantra," Devesh Kapur noted: "Remittances are one of the most visible – and beneficial – aspects of how international migration is reshaping the countries of origin" (Kapur 2004). He emphasized that not just elites experience the effects of international mobility, but also social groups at the lower end of the social spectrum gain exposure to new ideas. Kapur signals this, without investigating in full detail; but Stefan Rother picks up the issue and attempts to uncover the effects of the less visible, non-quantifiable remittances and challenges the "implicit or explicit assumption" of scholarship on remittances, i.e. that work migrants come from nondemocratic countries of origin and seek work in consolidated democracies – this turns them into potential "agents of democratization" (Rother 2009). He shows that, in reality, there are numerous other scenarios, since migrants typically pick destinations that are more affluent and economically developed without necessarily tak-

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ing into consideration the nature of the political system in the receiving countries. In the case of Filipino workers, migratory flows started after the 1970s oil crisis. Men worked in construction, agriculture and other menial professions traveling to the Gulf States (Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates), while women worked as caretakers and housekeepers in Singapore, Hong Kong etc. (the 'globalization of domestic work'). Even migrations to democratic countries do not provide migrants with the actual exposure of living in and participating to the life of a democratic polity as citizens (irregular migrants, black market). Rother confirms the hypothesis that the nature of the migratory experience itself matters: "the political system of the destination as such seems to be a less decisive factor than the specific freedoms and restrictions experienced by migrants and a potential bias when selecting the destination" (Rother 2009). He also finds that the migratory experience can affect migrants' attitudes towards democracy, fostering the "diffuse support needed for democracies in the stage of consolidation" and leading migrants to adopt a more critical stance towards the political system in the country of origin.

While Perez-Armendariz and Crow (2010) find that transnational-migrant sending communities in Mexico are more democratic and tolerant than communities that do not experience this type of international commuting, Rother (2009) concludes that, for the case of the Philippines, some return migrants are more skeptical about democratic government performance than people who have not yet left the country, but are about to migrate. This suggests that migrants undergo indeed a second socialization in their country of destination: Mexican return migrants are more democratic after spending time in the United States (and remit these attitudes to their families and friends in communities of origin); while Filipinos, who have had enough of their own government's corruption and weakness, can't help but admire the iron fist of Sharia law and its ruthless enforcement by authorities in Saudi Arabia, the fact that the Saudi government cares for the poor and supports them, and the general absence of political turmoil. Despite this enhanced

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appreciation for the uncontested "rule of *a* law," be it intolerant and despotic, even Philippine returnees who worked in Saudi Arabia express high levels of support for democratic freedoms such as the right to criticize government, free speech, freedom of the press and freedom of association.

Nieswand's research on Ghana reveals a certain level of citizen disempowerment in contexts in which states dominate and control the politics of transnationalism, drastically limiting the migrants' free choice: "The widespread perception in Ghana that migration is a way to achieve wealth and upward mobility is distorting because it does not sufficiently reflect the loss of status and agency, which many migrants experience by being exposed to insecure migration routes, rigid immigration regimes, economic marginalization and racialization" (Nieswand 2011). Again,

This research project tests these hypotheses for the case of intra-EU migratory flows, i.e. in a set of circumstances that maximizes citizens' freedom of choice with respect to international mobility options. Immigration creates high incentives for migrants to adopt attitudes and behaviors that help them integrate in the receiving society. State-run mobility arrangements may render citizens more dependent on national governments. European citizenship creates a framework that reduces or eliminates many constraints to mobility.

Citizenship Recalibration: Theorizing the Political Effects of Free Movement

The study of political remittances includes and complements the study of transnational political activities, which have been defined as "direct cross-border participation in the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees (...) as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country" (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). This notion captures a

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small part of migrant influence in homeland politics. Unlike typical diasporas, when migrants work abroad, they only rarely participate directly in the politics of their homeland, usually on important occasions, such as voting in national elections. Since only a minority of those who work abroad end up settling down in their host country, highly mobile migrants are excluded by definition from indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country. Most highly mobile migrants come from new democracies or relatively open competitive authoritarian regimes, i.e. countries that do not prohibit citizens from returning home after living abroad for a while. In these types of regimes, political party attachments are fluid and weak. Often, the political party scene changes dramatically from one election to the next. As a result, an approach that evaluates the political impact of migration only by looking at electoral behaviors remains , since in these regimes voters themselves have trouble finding politicians and parties that adequately represent their interests. Voters express frustration with the inability to hold politicians accountable and with the systematic failures of the corrupt legal system. In many new democracies, after long experiences with dictatorship, forced participation in politics and mandatory displays of political support for a party-state, the realm of politics itself appears morally suspect to citizens. For these reasons, the analysis of electoral behaviors requires contextualization in the broader picture of state-citizen relations. Merely analyzing the way in which migrants vote and participate in politics does not take into account the particularities of political arenas in political systems that have recently democratized. Many analysts have argued that the problems of new democracies stem from the citizens' lack of trust in political parties, lack of participation, or cynicism about the prospects of building effective, democratic government institutions. However, this assumes that a trusting population would automatically strengthen the rule of law and eliminate corruption, which is implausible. One cannot blame citizens for being insufficiently gullible and well informed about political candidates or government officials, nor for remembering the past too viv-

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idly. Moreover, taking parties as benchmarks for understanding political orientations and preferences is problematic in non-consolidated political arenas. To get to the core of the issue, asking more specific questions is a more fruitful approach. For this project, I concentrate on one central question: "how does migration recalibrate the state-citizen relationship?" This question offers valuable insight on the way in which migrants think about freedoms, responsibilities and participation. It reveals how the migratory experience informs perceptions of self-efficacy, as well as priorities and political orientations. Finally, it captures the interplay between economic and political dimensions of the state-citizen relationship to offer a non-reductive representation of migrants as modernizing agents and key actors in the economic and political evolution of their communities and countries of origin.

There is considerable conceptual confusion in the relevant scholarship surrounding the notion of "transnationalism." Often, transnationalism, deterritorialization and post-nationalism are used interchangeably. Before turning to the case of intra-EU migration, it is important to clarify the meaning of these labels and classify migrant experiences accordingly. A fruitful way to group existing paradigms concerning the state-citizen relationship comes from a study of dual citizenship claims in Canada (Bloemraad 2004). In previous work, I adapt this framework to differentiate between ways in which migrants relate to their country of origin and destination in the course of their political resocialization (Paul 2013). Three types of connections between individual citizens and nation-states emerge: traditional, deterritorialized/transnational and postnational. The framework below explains and builds on that triad to reveal a new category of citizenship that captures the essence of new forms of international migration through the prism of the state-citizen relationship: the citizenship of the market.

The traditional model connects citizenship to the international system of sovereign states. In the 19th century, the dominant normative view held that the apparatus of government, i.e. the

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state, should overlap with a community of identity, i.e. the nation (Hobsbawm 1992). Migrants complicate the connection, but the issue is only temporary. People are thought to hold one primary identity; hence, immigrants are expected to naturalize and shed their homeland identity over time. As time goes by, migrants transfer objective and subjective attachments from their country of origin to their country of naturalization. As a result, dual citizenship claims are expected to drop, as immigrants become more and more detached from their country of birth.

In the transnational model, migrants follow the path of classical, unidirectional migration, exiting the country of origin and settling permanently in another country. However, discrimination in the country of destination prevents migrants from connecting with the nation-state in which they reside; as a result of that, even though migrants settle down in the receiving country and naturalize, they remain connected with the country of origin and form a strong diaspora. This model acknowledges that the immigrants' attempts to transfer allegiance to the country of destination may fail in a socio-political and economic context that discriminates against new citizens. A form of deterritorialized citizenship emerges, since the state of origin continues to be a point of reference for those who live abroad. Dual identities reflect attachments to both home and host countries, but even though *de jure* migrants naturalize, exclusion and marginalization in receiving societies keeps connections toward the homeland active. Orientations towards the country of origin materialize in remittances, entrepreneurial activities, as well as the desire to contribute to civil society, development initiatives and political life. Cross-border activity levels and feelings of belonging change over time and vary from one person to another. The costs of maintaining transnational connections have an important effect on how in synch diasporas are with the interests of citizens at home. There are significant risks of "citizenshipless participation" and "long-distance nationalism" (see references and full quotations above) in situations when immigrants rely on intermediaries to learn about the situation at home or develop under the im-

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munity from consequences that distance provides an uncompromising view on what decision-makers at home should do.

The postnational citizenship model transcends the nation-state paradigm, questioning the idea that *de facto* citizenship remains dependent on state membership. This perspective points out that the post-World War II human rights regime constitutes an engine of change in the current era of globalization. Citizenship privileges, like civil rights and social welfare, are now vested in individuals through 'personhood' (Bauböck 1994). Thus, while they are still mostly granted through one or several nation-states, these privileges and rights are not dependent on national citizenship status. According to international law, the human rights regime that the West created after WW II contains moral and legal standards representing the accepted normative framework when it comes to states' behavior towards individuals. It has become much harder to deny social and civil rights to incoming groups of people based on their citizenship (Soysal 1994). Analyzing the experience of non-EU nationals on EU territory, Soysal concludes that when supranational organizations like the European Union institutionalize the human rights regime, they boost the power of these universal, non-state-dependent moral and legal norms. Some variations of this model are stricter than others. In "strict postnationalism," which is a view that few scholars embrace (Bloemraad 2004), migrants' identities "transcend the trappings of citizenship" altogether. Since their rights do not derive from citizenship but rather from personhood, postnational migrants should not seek naturalization in the receiving country. Most scholars of migration and citizenship find a "weak postnationalist" perspective more helpful: this postulates that globalization boosts dual citizenship claims in the short run, but that the residence is becoming the universal basis for granting rights. Here, the approach to state-citizen relations gains strong aspirational and normative hues: it is argued that state-bound citizenship will wither away and that the state-citizen relationship will dissolve, rendering legal arrangements like dual citizenship unnecessary

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and obsolete. Soysal's analysis reveals that the non-EU migrants' discourse has been changing, and that their claims-making has increasingly been based on the universal human rights regime rather than on the law of the receiving country (Soysal, *idem supra*).

Given that the postnational model is the one that severs the umbilical chord between citizen and state, I considered the possibility of using it as a benchmark in understanding intra-EU migrations and their political consequences. The idea was to assess the degree to which intra-EU migrations produce a postnational mentality among migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. The observable implications of such a dynamic would have been migrants expressing the belief that their rights do not derive from particular countries anymore (and that countries have become less important in one's life), coupled with some familiarity with and orientation toward the global system and the associated human rights regime, in which rights come from one's personhood (individual rights that everyone in a multi-national or global system enjoys) rather than from citizenship (rights dependent on citizenship status). As Chapter II will show, citizens who practice freedom of movement thanks to European citizenship and the visa-free European travel regime do not invoke the human rights regime and personhood as bases for demanding protection or reporting violations. Unlike the non-EU migrants that Soysal analyzes, intra-EU migrants differentiate themselves from other migrant categories and ask for rights in virtue of their double status as citizens of their country of origin AND as European Union citizens. The first set of claims is directed towards government representatives of the home country abroad; the second set is oriented towards authorities in the receiving country, but justified by and predicated on European citizenship as an individual status. EU migrants do not disconnect from national institutions, but rather continue to make increasingly more informed claims towards them. They ask for protection and report instances in which they suspect their rights have been violated. In situa-

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tions in which encroachments of rights continue, they go on hunger strikes to draw the attention of both home and host state authorities.

Contrary to the view of state-citizen relations that emerges from conventional wisdom, in high-mobility contexts, the state does not have a well-defined, non-negotiable strategy for managing the state-citizen relationship from the get-go. In fact, the findings of this dissertation suggest that migrations shift the "balance of power" from government authorities to citizens, leading to a bottom-up process of policy-making whereby states often establish institutions to respond to their citizens' actions and demands. Free movement allows temporary exit to become a communication channel through which citizens can make their voices heard. In the case of post-communist countries, intra-EU migration has become an effective recuperation channel for three reasons: (1) it helps citizens to access resources that allow them to escape some of the negative consequences of poor state performance; (2) it gives citizens visibility and leverage both in their sending communities and in the eyes of government authorities and politicians, thus enhancing their voice; and (3) it respects the citizens' sustained loyalty towards the country of origin, thus shielding countries from the potentially negative effects of having the most quality-sensitive citizens exit.

For Central and Eastern Europeans, mobility in the European market establishes connections with various government authorities from a new perspective, one less dependent on nation-state structures. In many post-communist states, areas in the destitute and backward countryside are undergoing dramatic transformations not as a result of national development plans or central policies, but rather as a result of a bottom-up migration-led modernization process. Villas substitute old, dilapidated family houses. Most communities relying on migration display a striking co-existence and juxtaposition of old and new. Construction sites are mushrooming everywhere, in every migrant's garden. Social status markers have changed, and peer pressure towards displaying the material signs of prosperity sets the standard high, at levels that can only be reached with

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money from abroad. Conspicuous consumerism tells a story that everyone in the community can understand at a glance, even in the absence of the protagonist: successful migratory experiences help people climb the economic ladder quickly, producing affluence like no other job at home could. Necessity and luxury, emergency and whim, free movement in the European market provides a quick fix for everything. While the development story appears to be vastly positive, it requires additional inspection of socio-economic and political effects. After 1989, political evolutions in new post-communist democracies followed broad patterns determined by structural factors, historical legacies and temporal patterns of voting (Pop-Eleches 2010). However, the political convergences and divergences noted above do not conform to existing theories. Indeed, European citizenship practiced through free movement seems to play a significant role in shaping post-communist politics.

Beyond the analytical categories of the political transnationalism literature, scholarship on citizenship can provide further inspiration on how to evaluate the ways in which migration recalibrates the state-citizen relationship. In the current globalization era, as state boundaries become more porous, new forms of international migration recalibrate the state-citizen relationship. Supranational mobility transforms opportunity structures, shapes repertoires of strategies, expands the horizons of life experience and diversifies the contexts of interaction among people, parties and political systems. Scholars disaggregate citizenship along three dimensions: rights, obligations and compliance. The calibration of this triad's components determines different conceptions of citizenship.

The civic-republican view, also known as the classical notion of citizenship, emphasizes obligations and sets citizen duties at the core of a culture of participation (Aristotle, Rousseau). Individuals are expected to play an active role in political life, i.e. to exercise voice, and to prioritize the common good over particular interests. The extreme versions (e.g. socialist or communist

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regimes) have been criticized for politicizing all aspects of life, creating a "suffocating sense of responsibility" and denigrating the "value of private life" to the point of denying citizens the freedom not to be political and the freedom not to participate (Walzer).

The liberal-individualist vision emphasizes individual rights and liberties (Locke, Mill, T.H. Marshall) and argues that states should focus on defending the rule of law and maximizing individual horizons of choice, to create the greatest sphere of personal liberty possible that does not compromise other citizens' liberty (Mill). Excessive voice (participation) can compromise government efficiency (Hirschman), so the representative facet of the state-citizen relationship should moderate the participative facet. Laggard citizens are a necessary component of a healthy democracy (Walzer), so a certain degree of citizen disengagement from politics is desirable. The rights-centered calibration is criticized for allegedly reducing the citizen to a *homo economicus* that lacks public spirit and solidarity. Critics claim that it makes societies too market-like, encouraging individualism to the detriment of community spirit and political engagement (Constant).

A compliance-centered perspective prioritizes citizen obedience and demands that individuals act as subjects of political authority (Hobbes, Schmitt). This enhances government effectiveness by reducing opportunities for debate, contestation and resistance. Citizens choose leaders who have to consider the electorate's preferences; however, final political authority does not rest with citizens, but is surrendered to the state. The government has the duty to protect the population from internal and external enemies. It has been argued that both active and compliant/obedient facets of political culture are needed to keep democratic regimes functional (Almond and Verba). The compliance-centered calibration has been criticized for its vulnerability to power abuse, rights violations and authoritarianism. Given its security focus, it risks causing neuroticism, by making citizens obsess about survival, define politics in terms of permanent insecurity and sacrifice individual freedoms to unconditionally support authority (Karolewski).

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The dissertation applies these three perspectives on citizenship to analyze how migration recalibrates the state-citizen relationship in high-mobility contexts. In-depth interviews, participant observations and conversations with government representatives reveal that, as a result of their migratory life-experience, free movers embrace a rights-centered view of citizenship. Because of communist legacies, the compliance-heavy perspective that puts unquestioning loyalty first and typically accompanies political agendas at the authoritarian extremes of the political spectrum generally remains unpopular among people in high-mobility contexts, with the exception of a few non-migrant nostalgics who reminisce about the times when the state took care of every individual citizen and people did not have to travel so far to make a living. The migratory experience, with its diverse interactions with co-nationals and government representatives, also casts doubt on any received ideas about solidarity and imagined communities. Since migrants become especially resistant to state interference in their lives, they also want to engage with and contribute to their communities of origin on their own terms, without the interference of corrupt authorities. For that reason, the state-citizen perspective that emphasizes citizen obligations does not seem reasonable in the eyes of those who feel ignored and occasionally excluded by their own government. European citizenship offers opportunities without imposing burdensome duties: it emancipates and expands horizons of personal choice in the integrated continental market without trying to manipulate or deceive. This is the kind of contractual relationship that appeals to Europe's new citizens of the market.

By helping citizens satisfy their material needs and acquire the resources necessary to pursue higher socio-economic and professional status aspirations, European citizenship also erodes the foundation on which discourses promoting a compliance-based view of the state-citizen relationship would emerge. Since, as a result of their life experiences abroad, migrants come to perceive their homeland

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In the European Union, researchers estimated that about 4% of the total population moves across national boundaries to live and work outside their country of origin. Less than one in fifty Europeans lives outside their nation of origin (Recchi & Favell 2009). However, migration statistics often refer solely to the EU 15, excluding the enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, where participation in European mobility is far greater. In some CEE countries, the proportions of the phenomenon are massive: approximately 2 million Poles and 3 million Romanians (13-14% of the population) work abroad, send money home and periodically return to their country to visit families, build houses, buy land, start up businesses and consolidate networks. For that reason, one can expect that migration-related transformations do not stop at the micro-level, but rather influence political dynamics at higher levels of analysis.

Using a personally-compiled database and quantitative techniques, the dissertation examines whether causal mechanisms identified and examined at the micro level are also detectable in meso-level aggregates, for instance at the county-level – *judete* in Romania and *voivodships* in Poland. Regression analysis is used to compare economic development indicators and electorally expressed political orientations in counties with high levels of reliance on EU migrations and in counties where the migratory practice of European citizenship is less common. I expect regions with high levels of migration to favor pro-market, pro-integration political positions and to show little support for political agendas that favor economic and political demarcation of the nation-state from the European project. I expect these regions to support a reduction of the government's role in the economy, to lean towards center-right and right-wing economic agendas (market-liberal economics), and to have declining levels of support for communist-successor and nationalist parties.

At the macro level, states may react to their citizens' mobility in three different ways (Zuern 2003). Countries may:

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1. Passively await decline in migratory flows, implicitly encouraging citizens to use the exit option in their problem-solving (the free movement strategy that Romania currently uses);
2. Undergo fragmentative political restructuring: delegate responsibility to sub-regions, encouraging local authorities to autonomously deal with challenges and develop migration-management strategies (the free movement strategy that Poland has recently initiated); and
3. Resort to integrative political restructuring: try to regain control by establishing new transnational regimes, networks and institutions that manage the state-citizen relationship (a strategy that both Poland and Romania have implemented to a certain extent).

I expect migrant-sending states to go through several phases of this sequence, partially in attempts to manage the migratory flow, partially in response to citizens' demands. I track the institutional manifestations of this adaptation process and add insights from interviews with political elites. I also examine the ways in which political parties and candidates for office develop new strategies to reach out to extraterritorial citizens and migrant communities.

Concluding Remarks and Outline of the Three Empirical Chapters

The introductory chapter has presented the central argument of this dissertation: new forms of international mobility influence migrants' attitudes, their communities of origin and, more broadly, politics in the migrants' countries of origin in systematic ways by recalibrating the state-citizen relationship. More specifically, in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, in-

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tra-EU migrations foster the entrenchment of a rights-centered vision of citizenship. As a result of practicing European "citizenship of the market" at the supranational level, migrants adopt a liberal-individualist understanding of the state-citizen relationship with subsequent repercussions on the subnational and national scale. This manifests itself not only at the micro level (changes in individual life perspectives and preferences), but also at the meso level (voting at county level). Political remittances boost the electoral appeal of rights-focused, center-right pro-market parties and decrease support for parties embracing civic-republican visions of citizenship (communist-successor, left wing parties) or compliance-centered conceptions (nationalist parties).

Migration shapes the development of sending, receiving and return countries. While the effects of immigration and temporary migration on destination countries have been extensively studied, we know much less about the impact of highly mobile citizens on their countries of origin. Where research exists, it tends to focus primarily on economic remittances and development outcomes. This project examines the socio-political effects of intra-EU migrations, using quantitative and qualitative data from Romania and Poland, two of the EU's main migrant-sending countries. It focuses on political remittances at three levels of analysis: micro (individual), meso (county) and macro (national).

Chapter II presents the micro level, qualitative analysis and findings. Here, the project examines how people's worldviews, attitudes and behaviors are shaped by migratory life experiences that combine realities in the homeland with those in various workplaces abroad. Qualitative evidence from in-depth interviews explores differences between migrant and non-migrant citizens, as well as interactions between EU mobility and former repertoires of migratory strategies. Results show that citizens of the market become a power group that constantly generates political remittances and produces a new vision of state-citizen relations. Free movers are neither immigrants, nor diasporans, nor deterritorialized or denationalized migrants. They do not think

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of themselves as people who have exited their country of origin in a political, social or cultural sense. They report high levels of national sentiment, which does not however result in long-distance nationalism or support for nationalist political agendas. On the contrary, migrants prefer a minimalist state that has the capacity to protect the rule of law and individual rights. Even though they do not develop a dominant loyalty to the European Union as a geo-political entity, they trust it and rely on it for their economic issues and status mobility. European citizenship practiced as citizenship of the market (particularly of the labor market) liberates citizens from what would otherwise be a defective monopoly of the post-communist state.

Chapter III examines subnational patterns of variation. Using quantitative methods (regression analysis, GIS mapping and R data visualization techniques), the project compares economic preferences vis-à-vis the state's role in the economy and electorally expressed political preferences between counties with higher and lower levels of international mobility. It demonstrates that counties that rely on intra-EU migration develop a distinct profile in terms of electorally expressed political preferences and free-market orientation.

In Chapter IV, at the macro level, the dissertation examines the ways in which states and political parties adapt to citizens' mobility and electorate dispersion across national boundaries, setting contemporary developments against the ampler backdrop of historical-institutional patterns. I describe and analyze the structure of the transnational political sphere to show how political parties and candidates running for office try to win the migrants' vote. Politicians running for office treat migrants as a particularly important constituency. In recent years, major electoral campaigns had their kick-start events abroad, in migrant communities from new countries of destination (Italy and Spain for Romanian candidates; the UK for Polish politicians). The dissertation provides an overview of transnational political activities and communication channels: party platforms, candidate websites, press declarations and participant observations complement inter-

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views with politicians and diaspora party leaders (in the case of Romania, where this type of party exists).

Chapter V concludes by discussing the findings and the new research agenda that this dissertation advances in a comparative context, reflecting on the portability of concepts and the extent to which conclusions are generalizable to a broader universe of cases.

While the quantitative methodology will be described in more detail in the following chapters, a few general remarks are in order. The qualitative conclusions of this dissertation are based on three years of extensive qualitative data collection that involved several rounds of fieldwork between 2009 and 2011. I traveled to a migrant-sending country (Romania) and two of the main countries of destination for Romanian migrants (Italy and France) to conduct in-depth interviews with migrants (return migrants, as well as migrants abroad) and non-migrant citizens. Obviously, given that the dissertation asks questions about political change occurring at the micro-level, the most reliable method to apply would be to conduct a longitudinal study of individuals before, during and after migration. There are no available datasets with longitudinal individual data that I could rely on, so I had to collect original data for this ethnography. I had to rely on a cross-sectional research design and develop other solutions in order to address the possibility of selection effects and control for other sources of bias. To test for selection effects, i.e. for the possibility that people who decide to migrate might have different perspectives on citizenship from non-migrants prior to intra-EU migration, I conducted in-depth interviews with people who were getting ready for their first departure abroad, as well as with non-migrants of the same age, socio-economic background and education as migrants. I used semi-structured questionnaires to ensure that all conversations touched upon the same wide range of issues socio-economic, political, cultural and religious issues.

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After background questions, I asked interviewees questions about the nature of their migratory experience: duration and destinations, their reasons for leaving their country, their employment abroad and conditions at the workplace, questions about hardship and discrimination they may have suffered, about their interactions with the receiving country nationals, communication and interaction with family members and friends at home, interactions with other Romanian migrants (temporary or diaspora members), interactions with non-migrant members of sending communities during the time spent at home or after the migrants' return. Respondents also answered questions about their plans for the future, their intention to continue working abroad or to return home, their relationship with local and national authorities, their opinions about politics, politicians and political parties; their religious beliefs and church attendance. They also replied to questions about their views on immigration into their own homeland, their interaction with migrants from other countries while abroad, and their views on the Roma.

The semi-structured questionnaire was administered to Romanian migrants in the communities of origin in the following counties (*judete*): *judetul* Neamt (in the town of Targu Neamt); *judetul* Maramures (Viseul de Sus, Viseul de Jos, Salistea and Dragomiresti); and *judetul* Satu Mare (in the town of Negresti Oas and Certeze). Separate semi-structured questionnaires were administered to non-migrant family members from migrant households and to non-migrants in communities with high levels of intra-EU migration. I conducted 30 interviews in each of the three counties (*judete*) above.

I interviewed 20 interviews in each of two migrant-receiving countries (Italy and France). In Italy, I conducted interviews and participant observations in Treviso, Rome and Venice. In France, I studied the Romanian communities from Paris and Strasbourg, and I observed events preceding and during the presidential elections of 2009 in Paris (two rounds of voting that led to the reelection of the incumbent candidate of the Democratic Liberal Party (Partidul Democrat

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Liberal – PDL). All the above interviews were meant to capture the realities of the state-citizen relationship from the point of view of the average migrant or non-migrant, with an emphasis on political attitudes, behaviors and remittances.

To assess the top-down perspective, I also interviewed local authority officials in high-mobility communities in Romania (mayors, vice-mayors, town-hall secretaries, legal experts) and national-level government officials who were directly involved in the state's management of its relationship with citizens abroad (at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Department for Romanians Abroad, since renamed Department of Policies for the Relationship with Romanians Abroad – Departamentul Politici pentru Relatia cu Romanii de Pretutindeni). I had conversations with politicians who dedicated a part of their career to representing the interests of Romanian diasporas, as well as to politicians who campaigned and ran for the Senator seats allotted to electoral colleges for Romanian migrants in Europe. In the communities of destination, I interviewed a variety of informants and public figures familiar with the everyday life and history of the Romanian community: I interviewed government officials at the embassies and consulates, church leaders and priests from local parishes, NGO leaders and executive board members, cultural emissaries of the Romanian state working at the Romanian Cultural Institutes in Paris and Venice, the leadership of the Party of Romanian Identity in Italy – a Romanian political party registered abroad (Partidul Identitatea Romaneasca – Partidul Romanilor din Italia) etc. I spoke to researchers, academic and policy experts (at the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme – Paris; the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales – Paris; the Servizio Immigrazione – Comune di Venezia, the Immigration Bureau of the City of Venice; and at the research cell of *Caritas Migrantes* – Rome), as well as government authorities from the migrants' receiving countries and NGO workers. The selection of these two destinations had as a goal to explore migratory experiences to France (an older country of destination for Romanian émigrés, political refugees and

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migrants, with a long tradition as a *pays d'accueil* and an established pre-EU diaspora) with newer mobility trends to Italy (a highly popular but relatively recent Romanian migrant destination following the collapse of the communist regime and the country's first steps towards EU accession).

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Chapter II. Citizens of the Market: Faraway, So Close

> "Work as if you were going to live forever; pray as if you were going to die tomorrow." (Vice-Mayor of Certeze, jud. Satu Mare, entrepreneur and former migrant, whose son, daughter and son-in-law are still working in Paris)

> "Here is what I've achieved: the house, the car... The house is almost ready. At our wedding, we had hundreds of guests. We drank *horinca* [local homemade liquor] out of Eiffel Tower-shaped bottles. We both work in Paris." (Ion, 29, construction worker, Certeze)

> "If the Italians came here and saw how we live, they'd say they're the ones who should clean our houses, not the other way around." (Maria, 37, migrant caretaker, Targu Neamt, jud. Neamt)

> "This is what Europe wants. Our children are the pioneers of the new European construction." (The President of the Romanian Center of Strasbourg, France)

> "Do you think people leave because they have everything they need? What can they do here: die of hunger? The Romanian state does nothing for them. They have to make a living, send their children to school, build a house... With what money?" (Ana, 55, non-migrant housewife, Salistea, jud. Maramures, whose daughter and son-in-law work in Italy)

Of Fences and Borders

"That fence is quite something,' sighed the fifty-year-old Mrs. Iancu[7] as she sipped her espresso, shielded from the afternoon sun by a motley parasol on the terrace of the family villa. Without turning her head, the housewife could feel her husband's gaze fixed on the same irresist-

[7] All migrant names have been modified to ensure anonymity in accordance to IRB requirements.

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ible magnet: the neighbor's house across the street. For the past months, the street side of Apetrei's garden had been covered in piles of river stone, wrought iron and mounds of sand. Workers had toiled from morning till evening for days, but now, what a sight! The fence surrounding the Iancu residence, while fashionable and freshly painted, was no match. There was no doubt about it: Apetrei had raised the bar. The small Romanian town of Targu Neamt now had a new standard for fancy fences. There was only one way to keep up. Even though Mr. Iancu and his sons are known as skilled electricians in Targu Neamt and all neighboring villages, their earnings would not suffice. Even the additional money coming from the youngest son's profitable cell phone repair business would be of little help. As she tied her apron to cook dinner, Mrs. Iancu told her husband: 'I'm going back to Italy next month.' Mr. Iancu nodded and stepped into the backyard to water the cucumbers, onions, tomatoes and the three young cherry trees.

There is nothing exceptional about Mrs. Iancu's repeated journeys to Italy, neither for her family, nor for anybody else in town. This trip is neither the first, nor the last. Three houses up the street, an older couple supervises the construction of a new villa from the *cerdac* (traditional porch) of the old family house. Since it's late July, the grandchildren are impatiently counting the days until their parents – both working in agriculture – come back from abroad. Next door, a middle-aged widow, whose daughter is starting junior year of high school in the fall, is also planning her next trip to Italy: the money from the last trip has almost run out after the older son's wedding and some home improvements. Now she needs to save money to send her daughter to a private university: "My son was the first one to go to college in the family; my daughter has better grades than he used to get in school, so of course she has to go to college as well," she adds in a proud voice. Further down the street, a dilapidated house hides in the outgrown vegetation of a large garden. The retired schoolteacher couple living in the adjacent house tells me that the own-

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er is a fellow whose wife left a long time ago to work in Italy as a caretaker. At first, she was sending money home every month to him and their sons, but he used it all for drinking and gambling. What's more, when she returned during holidays to see the family, he treated her badly ("he used to beat her and the children whenever he got drunk," the neighbors informs me). Eventually, she stopped sending him money and, when the children grew up a little bit, she invited them to come visit her in Italy. For the older ones, she managed to find work, and for the youngest, she persuaded her husband to "sign the papers and give her custody." She divorced and is rebuilding her life with an Italian fiancé. The two oldest sons got married to Romanian women they met while working abroad. Both couples bought apartments in town. The youngest son sends money to his father regularly and visits from time to time.

Most families in the region, prosperous and poor, have one or several members regularly working abroad. Some travel to Spain, others to Italy, others to Germany. Men usually work in agriculture, construction, plumbing, transport or the hotel industry. Women find jobs as caretakers for the elderly, housekeepers, babysitters, vegetable and fruit pickers, and workers in the retail sector or restaurant industry. Migrants spend anywhere from a few months to a few years away from home, often working in harsh conditions to save what becomes a substantial financial foundation upon their return. Mrs. Iancu's earnings from her first trips helped the family move out of the crammed three-room apartment on the fourth floor of a grey Communist-era block. With that money they bought land and built a sumptuous villa in the old residential neighborhood, up on the hill, close to the fir tree forest. "There are no words for me to describe how difficult our life was before I left; we had no money, we had to borrow. For two years we lived without heating in the house," confessed Mrs. Iancu. The now affluent Iancus ventured into entrepreneurship, starting a couple of small, yet lucrative businesses. After other trips to Italy, the family purchased two cars (the newest has leather-covered steering wheel and bi-zone AC), central heating

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for the house, two desktop computers and flat-screen TVs for the living room and bedrooms. Mrs. Iancu's earnings are also helping pay for the college education of the family's youngest son, the first in the family to enroll in university education (and the first to afford private education).

Despite the fact that she already has a five-year-old granddaughter, Mrs. Iancu does not look her age: her face is luminous, tanned and fresh. She insists it's the time she spends outside helping her husband in the garden, but her non-migrant neighbors do not seem to get the same glow from the fresh air of the mountains. "It's hard to work abroad, to be away from home. There were times when I thought I could not take it anymore. But then I'd think about my family and plans for the future. Thinking about the family makes work bearable, worthwhile... Thinking about the fact that you're working for your family makes you strong, you know? It makes you so strong," Mrs. Iancu smiles wiping a tear from the corner of her eye. She daintily adjusts her hair and briefly checks her hands adorned with golden jewelry for mascara traces. "After working in Italy for a year, I came home and told my friends that I'm never leaving again. But, it doesn't work that way, you see? The need pushes you. You have to go; otherwise you cannot get by. My oldest son is married, but soon enough it will be my youngest son's turn. You need money for everything," she sighs.

The Iancus' sons have set up an Internet connection, the first on the hill, and advise less knowledgeable neighbors on what computers to buy and how to connect to the World Wide Web. They are also the first in the neighborhood to have gym memberships. The part of town where they live abounds in stark contrasts, with streets on which old one-level houses with flower beds, vegetable gardens, chicken coops and barns alternate with pastel-painted villas with paved alleys, terraces and balconies, garages, trimmed lawns, elaborate staircases and several levels. Two worlds in unexpected juxtaposition: shiny A6 Audis scare off the placid cows that graze by the unpaved road. In high-mobility communities, like Targu Neamt or Certeze, each garden tells

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a story about its inhabitants. The traditional houses belong to non-migrants, retirees and families whose young have moved out of the village and into the city, and visit from time to time. The new villas belong to migrant citizens, a mobility-reliant emerging middle class eager to assert itself like any group of *nouveaux riches*. The more extravagant the house and the car parked in front of it, the more successful is the family inside. Family histories reveal themselves to any stranger walking down the street in architectural manifestations of socio-economic accomplishment or decline.

In the small town of Targu Neamt, for families like the Iancus, as for their equivalents throughout Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), prosperity flows down the recently opened migration routes towards the Southern and Western parts of the continent. As the European Union's internal borders are progressively dismantled, in post-communist countries like Poland and Romania an increasing part of the destitute and backwards countryside is now replaced by lavish neighborhoods resembling Northern Italy or Southern France. Villas substitute dilapidated family houses. Construction sites are mushrooming everywhere. Electricity, water pipes and paved roads are extending under the pressure (and with the money of) increasingly more exigent mobile citizens. "Politicians keep promising, but little gets done. We keep asking; sometimes we have to take care of things ourselves. We cannot live like this, with no running water or running water that works one hour in the morning and one hour in the evening, with toilets outside..." (Mihai, 34, Negresti-Oas, jud. Satu Mare). Migrants come back accustomed to new standards of living that they emulate in their own home. Frictions emerge when newly revised expectations clash with realities at home, revealing the inability of local authorities to adapt. "Look, I have full modern bathrooms in my new house, bathtub, new installations and all. But I cannot use them when there is no water. Only two hours a day. See? When we're here, we have to put water in buckets in the morning to have throughout the day," complains Narcisa, 27, from Viseul de Sus,

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jud. Maramures, pushing aside the containers and bottles that crowd her impeccably clean bathroom floor. "When we come home in August, we break our cars driving around here, with all the potholes and unpaved roads," sighs Aurel, 47, from Targu Neamt, jud. Neamt. "These guys [politicians] court us when they need us. They promise the moon in the sky when they stop by during the electoral campaign. When I'm away, they send their cars over to help [my] Mom and Dad go vote on election day. That is nice and thoughtful of them; they listen to my dad's requests," says Neculai, 44, from Targu Neamt, who works for a trucking company. On the streets, grandparents and grandchildren breathe the new air of affluence, waiting for migratory parents and older siblings to return from foreign lands. Necessity and luxury, emergency and whim, free movement on EU territory provides a quick fix for all. Increasingly, Eastern Europeans turn their eyes to Europe when it comes to solving problems at home. The losers of post-1989 transitions have become the winners of European integration.

The *nouvelle vague* of European mobility plays a key role in post-communist liberal and democratic consolidation by changing citizens' livelihood strategies (White 2009), reshaping socio-economic hierarchies, opening new avenues for entrepreneurship and challenging the legacies of a non-democratic past. These transformations empower migrant individuals and turn them into agents of development in sending communities. In EU high-mobility contexts, the most important questions about the political, social, economic and cultural effects of European integration on citizens remain unanswered. Are EU-associated practices of supranational citizenship leading to the crystallization of a European society or to the emergence of solidarities across borders? As the citizens' economic dependence shifts from the country of origin to the integrated European market, do loyalties and attachments transfer from the state level to the supranational governance level? Are EU mobility experiences reviving old nationalisms that have been dormant for decades or strategically incorporated into the ideological fabric of communist prop-

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aganda? Are they deepening political apathy or triggering populist backlash on the background of pre-existing democratic fatigue (Rupnik 2007)?

Scholarship has yet to tackle the broader societal processes that have recently emerged in the European Union (Favell & Guiraudon 2011). Europeanization research has mostly focused on the consequences of EU policy implementation on national bureaucratic structures and legal frameworks (Olsen 2002). Studies concentrate on legal compliance and usually examine the ways in which policy makers and institutions in EU member states respond and adapt to EU pressures (Risse & Börzel 2003). More recently, scholars have drawn attention to other effects. European integration triggers a reconfiguration of the social field more massive than trickle-down processes from European to national elites: "It redistributes power and resources, it reorganizes knowledge and information, and it reshapes collective identities. The question, then, is how European integration stabilizes distinctively new norms, routines and practices" (Trenz 2001).

There is already a good number of qualitative studies on migration to Poland (Ryan 2010; Ryan et al. 2009; Svasek 2009; Eade et al. 2007; Burrell 2009b; Galasinska & Kozlowska 2009). But given the fact that the findings concern patterns of socio-economic, political and cultural development in only one country, it is difficult to determine whether Poland is *sui generis* or part of a broader trend of changes associated with new forms of international migration.

This chapter examines the micro-level effects of new international migrations for Romania. It presents qualitative empirical evidence from both sending and receiving communities to capture migratory life-experiences in their ensemble and produces a comprehensive picture of their impact on migrants, but also their families, friends, acquaintances, as well as on non-migrant citizens. "Accounts which include both migrants and their non-migrant counterparts tend to be more informative about the process than those which consider only migrants" (Byron 1994). This chapter focuses on the effects of intra-EU mobility on communities of origin in three

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Romanian counties: *judetele* Maramures, Satu Mare and Neamt. The former two are from Tara Oasului, a part of Transylvania, in Northwestern Romania, that has a long tradition of internal migration and labor mobility established before EU accession, and where post-1989 migratory networks emerged soon after the fall of communism. Migrants from Maramures and Satu Mare initially worked in France (especially in the Paris region), but have since diversified their destinations (Italy, Spain etc.). Judetul Neamt is located in Moldova, a region in Northeastern Romania where mass-scale migration has recently developed, largely as a result of opportunities that European citizenship has created. Previously existing migratory traditions were generally limited to short range intra-regional mobility. Most migrants from judetul Neamt work in Italy, but also in Spain, Germany, France and the UK.

The chapter explores individual and collective migratory experiences in communities that rely heavily on intra-EU migration, with particular emphasis on how integrated market participation changes the migrants' attitudes and behaviors at the workplace (views about work discipline, self-reliance, independence, merit, earnings, professional development); attitudes towards society at home and abroad (in particular relations with mobile and sedentary citizens, connections with the sending and receiving communities, solidarity and identity); and perspectives on the state-citizen relationship (views about law, authority, politics, economic preferences, political party platforms etc.). The chapter also addresses everyday life, in particular traditional ties versus cosmopolitan attachments, evolving socio-economic hierarchies, status symbols, conspicuous consumption, professional accomplishment and education.

The analysis reveals how mobility emancipates migrants from need (material and cognitive), how it leads to the emergence of a new work ethic, how it emboldens migrants to build ambitious life plans and, in some cases, how it erodes traditional ties – emancipation from "the tyranny of cousins" (Gellner 1994). It confirms that political remittances travel through communica-

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tion networks, generating strong diffusion effects from migrants to non-migrant relatives and friends in high-mobility contexts. It supports the hypothesis that European citizenship and the associated professional opportunities it offers facilitate the emancipation from state-dependence of individual and households. The presentation of qualitative empirical data culminates with a discussion of political attitudes and preferences, economic preferences, relationship with authorities at home and abroad, isolationism vs. cosmopolitanism, and national sentiment vs. EU attachment. In terms of examining the state-citizen relationship, the chapter uncovers one side of the coin, i.e. how practicing the citizenship of the market changes the way migrants view themselves as citizens and how they perceive the state (officials, authorities, politicians). I also address the reverse angle take and show how the local and state officials see migrants to explain the frictions that the state's adaptation to free movement causes.

The chapter reveals that, for migrants, free movement triggers a reengineering of the self at the workplace and at home, where they invest the economic capital they acquire abroad into advancing their socio-economic status. Citizenship of the market allows free movers to use inequalities between old and new EU Member-States to their advantage, in both directions. Migrants undergo downward socio-economic mobility abroad in order to take advantage of more lucrative employment opportunities. They invest resulting resources in socio-economic and prestige advancement at home. This "status paradox" strategy enables mobile citizens to focus exclusively on work and economic payoffs abroad, while improving social standing and maintaining political loyalty. Mobile citizens develop a pragmatic, work-centered lifestyle, in which diligence, self-reliance, merit and frugality constitute the main pillars. Migrants learn to sacrifice short-term comfort for long-term investments in family prosperity and prestige.

As a result of participating in European migratory flows, migrants adopt a liberal-individualist, rights-centered view of the state-citizen relationship that favors a minimalist state

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that neither intervenes in and distorts the market, nor creates unreasonable obligations that limit its citizens' freedoms and their advancement in socio-economic status hierarchies. Free movement helps migrants maintain their constant connection with the sending community, thus preventing their detachment from realities at home. Hence, migrants do not become susceptible to political extremism or anti-democratic, Euro-skeptic nationalist agendas. At the same time, migration does not interfere with the preservation of national identity, sentiment and loyalty in cultural terms. Unlike other forms of migration in which maximizing the benefits of economic exit entails exiting politically and shedding loyalties, taking part in the European market does not cause denationalization or uprootedness, in the classical sense. Migrants value the employment opportunities European integration brings, but they do not self-identify primarily as citizens of the EU as a geo-political entity. Even though migration represents the gate towards the only viable employment opportunities, migrants do not idealize the Union, since free movement reliance involves realistic assessments of pros and cons of international mobility. Mobile citizens value integration positively from an economic and legal perspective; they trust European institutions more than the state, but they maintain their political and cultural attachment to the country of origin. The interviews reveal the presence of high levels of solidarity within migrant communities, despite omnipresent warnings about the need to keep one's eyes open and not assume that all migrants are honest and good. Results support findings from previous studies by suggesting that, while skeptical when it comes to politics, migrants tend to be more tolerant, are more optimistic about the future and have higher levels of social trust than non-migrants (Badescu et al. 2007). Migrants remark that they have not changed their citizenship, that they have rights that homeland authorities should protect. In contrast, many state officials and representatives abroad present migrant claims as exaggerated and, often, unreasonable (interviews with consulate officials in Rome and Paris). Migrants exercise voice and demand state protection in virtue of their demon-

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strated loyalty. They signal, for example, cases in which their rights as European citizens are encroached upon. Yet, under the pressure of limited financial and human resources, state officials adopt an obsolete approach, casting migrants as individuals who have already exited the state and, thus, cannot claim the same level of protection as other citizens.

While the material and non-material consequences of immigration and transnationalism have been extensively analyzed in the scholarship, conclusions have limited applicability in the case of high-mobility contexts, in which economic exit is decoupled from political attachment. The case of free movement in the EU signals the emergence of a new migratory form that can be theoretically encapsulated by introducing a new concept, that of "citizenship of the market." By allowing migrants to exercise temporary economic exit while preserving and reshaping political loyalty intact, market citizenship enables mobile citizens to avoid immigration (permanent political exit) and exercise voice (acquire material and non-material resources that boost their visibility and influence in sending communities). Free movement leads to the emergence of a new political power group of citizens that participate in the polity at home and in the integrated market abroad. In Hirschmanian terms, citizenship of the market generates a good, if unprecedented, mix of exit, voice and loyalty that provides an effective state recuperation mechanism. In other words, the most quality-sensitive citizens end up not being the first ones to permanently leave (like in the famous Nigerian rail system example), but rather the ones who can stay (since they become over time materially insulated from the economic problems in the homeland) and pressure policy-makers.

Yet, in another way, the qualitative evidence presented below supports the conclusions of research on labor migrations in other Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland. Despite fact that European integration empowers mobile citizens by giving them more freedom in deciding the circumstances of their migratory projects, the line between chosen and forced mi-

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gration remains blurred. In migration typologies, labor migration is differentiated from forced displacement caused by wars, political persecutions or environmental disasters. However, in situations in which 'push' factors are strong (e.g. a very limited range of alternatives available to make a living in the country of origin), the imbalance between the absence of opportunities at home and abroad "forces" citizens to rely on migration as a livelihood strategy (White 2009). Migrant and non-migrants, Polish and Romanian, talk about migration as an unavoidable sacrifice that they had to make for their family, due to material needs and the impossibility to rely solely on resources available at home (White 2009; Svasek 2009).

A short chronology of post-1989 Romanian migration is useful before moving on to comparing the effects of migratory experiences on mobile citizens, their dependents and non-migrants in high-mobility contexts. A synthesis on the basis of accounts from local authorities in migrant-sending communities, state representatives abroad (embassy officials, religious leaders, consulate employees from Rome and Paris), and civil society leaders (from Treviso, Rome, Paris and Strasbourg) generates the following chronology of post-Cold War intra-EU migration that comprises four phases. The first occurred right after the collapse of the communist regime, and included political asylum seekers fleeing to Western Europe; "suitcase" commerce, short-range migrants crossing the border into neighboring Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, or traveling to Turkey and Greece to import new products for their boutiques; highly educated professionals; and tourists. Most migrants engaged in irregular work and trade activities, taking advantage of the general post-Cold War confusion to either emigrate or make a profit. The second phase covered the mid-late 1990s and comprised people who sought employment abroad in Western and Southern Europe (France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Germany), fleeing the economic recession at home. These migrants often left the country on tourist visas and overstayed to work and send money home. Since most of them worked without a contract, they could not visit their family and

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remained in the host country for many years. Some migrants – in Italy and Spain – benefited from the occasional massive regularization campaigns, but many were stuck in their countries of destination until the introduction of visa-free travel to Schengen countries in January 2002. Visa-free travel ushered in the third phase of migration that allowed people to move more easily across national borders. The last phase began with Romania's EU accession in January 2007. (For an extensive discussion and contextualization of Polish and Romanian migratory histories, see Chapter IV).

Many informants offered fascinating insider perspectives on the growth of migratory flows from Romania to old EU Member-States. A particularly illuminating conversation was the one I had with Metropolitan Iosif (in the summer of 2010) in Limours, France, at the headquarters of the Romanian Orthodox Metropolitan Church of Western and Southern Europe, an institution that includes all the main destination countries of Romanian intra-EU migrants: France, Italy, Spain, the UK etc. The Romanian Orthodox Church occupies a privileged position when it comes to estimating the level of migratory presence abroad and tracking the trajectories of Romanian workers in their host countries. Through its parishes and the demands it receives for the establishment of new parishes wherever Romanians live, by participating to the quotidian life of the community and being called upon regularly to help migrants with personal problems, the Church has always had a better sense of the migrants' number and life-experiences than state authorities. As Consul Ioan Novac informed me during our conversation in Paris, a protocol for collaboration exists between the Romanian state and the church. Priests end up offering assistance with everything: juridical assistance, counseling, signaling problems to Romanian government representatives abroad (embassies, consulates) etc. The church is much more widespread than the representatives of the Romanian state and is closer to the realities of migrants' life. "The state cannot establish one hundred consulates in another country; that's just not possible." Ro-

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manian parishes have also provided migrants with venues to congregate, socialize and network. Metropolitan Iosif was appointed Archbishop of Western and Southern Europe in 1998 and then Metropolitan in 2001. As a result, he is one of the most knowledgeable diaspora personalities that I had the privilege to interview for this dissertation. In his capacity as church leader in the busiest period in history for Romanian churches abroad, Metropolitan Iosif worked with Romanian communities from nine countries in 1998: England, Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, while also supervising communities in Iceland, France's other territories (*Outre Mer*). After he was appointed, the Church added two Bishops, one in Italy, another in Spain, due to the fact that Romanian communities surpassed 1 million people in each country.

Metropolitan Iosif described the expansion of the Romanian Orthodox Church, a process that followed the evolving relationship between Romania and the European Union, responding to the dramatic increases in the numbers of Romanian migrants abroad. The introduction of visa-free travel and the post-accession period in particular led to unprecedented inflows of Romanian citizens. In Italy, from seven communities in 1998, the Romanian presence grew so much that 120 parishes had to be established. In Spain, from one Romanian parish in 1998, the increasing number of Romanian migrants led to the founding of over 70 parishes (until the date of the interview). Between 1998 and 2010, for the Romanian Orthodox Metropolitan of Western and Southern Europe in its ensemble, the number of parishes increased from 30 to 300. These numbers provide a good measure of the phenomenon's magnitude.

In the 1998-2001 phase, many migrants traveled to France on invitations from family or friends who had already settled here. Many worked on the black market, focusing on economic needs and survival. Very few had documents that permitted them to work legally. Relatives formed groups to rent together houses or apartments. Neo-protestant communities managed to

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mobilize religious networks (Baptist, Adventist, Pentecostal, Jehova's Witnesses) to secure invitation letters and work. The Orthodox left on the basis of personal or family connections. The church provided a venue for making contacts in the community and finding job offers. Migrants faced multiple issues: the need to find work and housing, to adjust to the host societies, learn the language and customs, mobilize resources in the Romanian community, identify helpers etc. These migrants generally traveled and arrived alone, without bringing family members along, leaving someone in charge of child care at home, while they worked to earn and remit money. They lacked the possibility to return home due to their illegal status, at least until 2002. "I often witnessed and lived together with migrants real dramas. This led to many family separations with children left behind, inter-generational tensions, divorce etc. Three-four years of absence led to separations and much suffering. Many young people who met and wanted to start a family could not get married because they had clandestine status and they lacked the necessary documents," remembered Metropolitan Iosif.

Since 2002, free movement brought about major changes in the migrants' life experiences. Returning home for vacations became normal; migrants could come and go as they pleased. "Return was not a sign of failure anymore, not to the extent that it had been before. If migrants could not find work, they could now go back without undergoing the same psychological pressures from peers, family and the community." Before staying abroad was a matter of pride, staying until they achieved their objectives. Returning without money was not an option, particularly since crossing the border illegally used to cost a lot of money that families had to set aside. People wanted to succeed, whatever the price, and refused to go back empty handed. With the normalization of transnational movement, migrants had more choices and control over their lives. They could send money home through safer channels. Many returned with some material success: a car, the money to start building a family house, funds for sending children to school etc. Students

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usually travelled to France and England, while labor migrants went to Italy and Spain, but also Germany. "The West became a long-term solution, a safe solution," concluded Metropolitan Iosif.

From 2002 onwards, conversations with informants all note a marked change in people's behaviors due to the shift in migratory regime. The migrants' lives became more settled, less precarious: "fewer people lived in abandoned houses, fewer people were on the edge of despair – more Romanians had the opportunity to move from one country to another and experience a wide range of cultures (Anglo-Saxon versus Mediterranean, for instance) before deciding where to settle down." After 2007, when Romania joined the EU, even more changes occurred. More people started being on their own feet and have initiatives. Romanian embassies and other state authorities report that many migrants became entrepreneurs, starting their own companies and firms. There were over 50 000 Romanian-owned companies, firms, businesses in Italy and 20 000 - 30 000 in Spain. There were also increasing numbers of new, highly successful firms (in the thousands) in France and Belgium. Romanian embassies in Rome and Paris reported – for the post-2002 and especially for the post-accession migratory periods – significant increases in the numbers of registered civil society organizations in the diaspora, a couple of dozens to hundreds across the two countries. The state-citizen relationship as seen through the eyes of local and state government authorities at home and abroad will be investigated in more detail in Chapter IV.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it summarizes the migrants' perspective on work and attitudes towards the workplace. Second, it overviews their perspective on society and relations with other people: non-migrant family members and friends at home, co-national migrants abroad and citizens of the host countries. Third, it presents the migrants' views about the state, politics and authorities, in general, and discusses the qualitative data in ensemble, linking the analysis to the theoretical landmark of the state-citizen relationship. It focuses on material and

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non-material remittances, political remittances in particular, and shows how they justify introducing the idea of citizenship of the market. The fifth section draws parallels between the qualitative evidence about Romanian migrations and the scholarship on Polish EU migrants, while casting light on the effects of historical legacies and the interaction between new and old migratory repertoires.

Effects of Free Movement on Attitudes Toward Work and the Workplace

An eighty-three year-old retired schoolteacher from Targu Neamt exclaimed when I asked for his opinion about the labor force exodus towards Italy: "How things have changed! When I was young, people would not leave the place where they were born. They wouldn't even marry in another village." Indeed, in high-mobility contexts, large proportions of the active labor force participate in European migratory flows. The mayors of the surveyed villages and towns in Maramures, Satu Mare and Neamt reported that high percentages of inhabitants work in the EU. In the commune Certeze (in the Satu Mare county), 40% of inhabitants engage in transnational migration.[8] In Dragomiresti and Salistea de Sus (Maramures), one in three and, respectively, one in five inhabitants works abroad.[9] In small cities and towns, officially reported numbers are lower (e.g. approximately 16.5% of the local voting age population of Targu Neamt works abroad),[10] as a result of local economies that do not rely exclusively on European free movement, but give citizens an ampler range of domestic options. The Romanian Ambassador estimates that

[8] Interview with the vice-mayor of Certeze (July 2009).

[9] Interviews with the mayor of Dragomiresti and the mayor of Salistea de Sus. (July 2009).

[10] Interview with the mayor of Targu Neamt.

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there are about 1.2 – 1.3 million Romanians working in Italy.[11] Reports based on national surveys indicate that around 2.8 million Romanians work in other European countries, with Italy and Spain being the main destinations (Abraham & Stufaru 2009).

> We are witnessing the emergence of a parallel economy founded on mobility, on precarious and changing solidarities, whose actors are these women and men always ready to leave, indifferent to borders and distances. They get used to a life temporarily divided between their "home sweet home" and a nomadic dimension which takes up a large part of their life. They preserve this availability for mobility and resettlement somewhere else, because this is the only guarantee of survival for a majority of them, the guarantee of a better life quality and, for a small number of people, this ensures the accumulation of capital.[12]

Surveys find that the primary reasons for Eastern European engagement in transnational mobility are economic (see the CBOS surveys of Polish migrants,[13] Soros Open Foundation surveys of Romanian migrants (Sandu 2006),[14] the CURS survey of Romanian migrants in Spain and Italy – Social Conditions, Values, Expectations[15] etc.). Without exception, the migrants, family members from migrant households and non-migrants I interviewed identified economic motivations as being the most important factor driving people to seek employment abroad, in other EU countries. Lack of opportunity is at the heart of the problem: "we want to work, but there's

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[11] Interview with Romania's Ambassador to Italy – Rome, Italy.

[12] Morokvasic-Müller, M., 1999, "La mobilité transnationale comme resource: le cas des migrants de l'Europe de l'Est," Cultures & Conflits, 33-34, pp. 105-122 (article accessed online). My translation. "On voit resurgir une économie parallèle fondée sur la mobilité, sur des solidarités précaires et changeantes, dont les acteurs sont ces femmes et ces hommes toujours prêts à partir, indifférents aux frontières et aux distances. Ils s'accommodent d'une vie temporairement éclatée entre leur « chez soi » et leur itinérance qui remplit une bonne partie de leur vie. Ils conservent cette disponibilité à la mobilité voire à la réinstallation ailleurs, car elle est actuellement la seule garante de la survie pour la majorité d'entre eux, d'une meilleure qualité de vie et, pour un petit nombre elle assure l'accumulation du capital."

[13] CBOS Opinion Survey – December 2010 → Poles Working Abroad; CBOS Opinion Surveys – November 2009; October 2008; March 2007; December 2006; CBOS – April 2005; November 2006: The Work of the Poles in EU countries; CBOS May 2001 → Looking for Work in the European Union?

[14] Open Society Foundation, *Locuirea temporara in strainatate – Migratia economica a romanilor 1990-2006*, Bucharest, November 2006; OSF, *Raport de cercetare pe tema migratiei fortei de munca. Aspecte sociale si institutionale ale fenomenului*, Raport de analiza calitativa si cantitativa, Bucharest 2005.

[15] A CURS opinion poll requested by the Agency for Governmental Strategies (Agentia pentru Strategii Guvernamentale – ASG; conducted in Spain (March-April 2008) and Italy (November-December 2007).

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not much to do here, not to mention that nobody gives you a decent pay for what you do," said Sofica, 42, from Negresti, who is now working in Italy for the fourth time in her life. "Once you go abroad, you see how money is made and saved. It's at a level beyond anything imaginable here. Once you realize that, it's hard to see salaries at home as more than what they are: a mockery, something you cannot live on..." she added to explain why she still works abroad. With a few exceptions among highly educated migrants, the accounts surrounding first departures all revolve around the theme of ensuring subsistence and solving pressing economic needs rather than preference or personal inclination. "Do you think people leave because they have everything they need? What can they do here: die of hunger? The Romanian state does nothing for them. They have to make a living, send their children to school, build a house... With what money?" asks emphatically Ana, 55, non-migrant housewife from Salistea, jud. Maramures, whose daughter and son-in-law work in Italy. The starting point is basic: "I want to help my parents renovate their house or, if I'm lucky, I'd like to build a new, bigger house for us all," says Tudor, 25, from Viseul de Sus. "It depends on whether I find a good job or not. If I find something good, with contract, something legal that I can go back to, I would also like to buy myself a new car to replace my father's. We'll see how it goes."

The wage differential is considerable and so is the satisfaction of earning honest money. According to the Romanian Consul in Paris, Ioan Novac, migrants who could make 300-400 Euro in Romania have, for the same skills, a starting salary of 2000-3000 Euro in France. As migration demonstrates its effectiveness as a strategy, mobile citizens revise their migratory projects, adding new socio-economic objectives. The experience of life in the receiving country, with higher living standards and much more comfort, inspires migrants to revise their expectations and attain a similar level of prosperity at home: "They like luxury. They like living in affluence. This is what they saw abroad. This is what they saw in the West. 70% of them are gone there, so after

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seeing how people live over there, they want to do the same for themselves at home. They like luxury and they like work, first and foremost," acknowledges understandingly Petru, 53, Certeze. "That's the thing: if you don't like work, you don't get anything done."

To avoid returning to the uncertain and unsatisfying economic situation at home, migrants rely increasingly on their work abroad. They develop a unique type of individualism that has self-reliance at its center and prioritizes the family. Abroad, by being productive, self-managing and dedicated, transnational migrants legitimize gaining inclusion into the labor market and accessing some forms of social membership. "I began as a strawberry-picker, working in agriculture. Then, I found a job in construction. It was hard work, all day long, and we lived 7-10 guys in a small apartment to save money on rent. I did my best, I worked extra hours… The Italian boss liked that. By the end of the year, I had my own team to supervise," said 27 year-old Ioan from Viseu, Maramures. The same view of the workplace as a meritocratic environment that allows one to climb up the social ladder emerges from many other conversations I had with transnational migrants both at home and abroad. 47 years-old Mila who worked as a caretaker in Southern Italy recalls:

> My [Italian] family was surprised at how much I knew, how well I worked and how fast I learned. They could not believe their eyes. I always wanted to impress them and gain their trust. So I always tried to do better. In return, they did whatever they could to make my life beautiful: took me to the beach, asked me to accompany them on trips… on weekends, we'd always do something. It's true that the old guy was a little crazy, but he was not hard to take care of. He listened to me more than he listened to them. But, you see? That's all a matter of individual. I learn that if you are honest and correct and hardworking, you will be rewarded. If not, no wonder you get stuck between a rock and a hard place. Then you don't get recommended to other families, you don't make enough money, you cannot accomplish what you had in mind... If you're not strong enough, you're through. They test you at work. And once you lose their trust, that's it.

The migrants' patterns of conspicuous consumption are often seen as a contribution to the overall quality of life and the beauty of the living environment in the sending community. Many non-migrants recognize the opulent villas as a way in which hard-working families reward themselves after a long effort. "They work hard, they are diligent and *gospodari* ("good managers,

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thrifty"). This is their pleasure, to build beautiful things for themselves, to build beautiful and big houses," says Sorin, returned migrant, 58, from Certeze (daughter and son still work abroad in Paris and wanted to take him there; he did not like France very much, so he decided to come back home and use the professional experience he acquired while working in constructions abroad to start a firm at home; he himself lives in a relatively modest home, judging by village standards). Lina, 65, from Certeze, non-migrant, echoes the same view, but with an emphasis on the way in which migrants, even in accomplishing the most extravagant aspirations, remain somewhat economical: "They just want to have at home palaces like the ones they built for others. They build them on the land of their parents, often using family teams for the work. Overall, these villas cost much less that you would expect." Sorin estimates that the building cost for a villa is around one hundred thousand or even over one hundred thousand Euro, but admits that nobody simply buys the whole thing and pays the full cost; the process is more complicated since migrants themselves get involved in the building project to a higher or lesser extent. "In Certeze, someone with a house surface of less than 500 sq meters [approx. 5300 sq ft] cannot pass for someone who is well off." While conforming to the tradition, some complain under its weight and adopt a fatalist tone while lamenting the requirements of signaling socio-economic success at home: "We are cursed to bury our money in concrete" (Vasile, young construction worker, 26, who works in Paris). Migrants seem to have a contagious fixation with home improvements: adding something to the house, for example another level, a balcony, a staircase; changing the façade; making an alpinarium in the garden, changing the fence, adding a sidewalk in front of the house and paved paths in the garden etc. New architectural ideas get imported from each visit abroad. "Just last year the fashion of attics and penthouses came from abroad; so even those who had just finished their villas all decided to break the roofs and rebuild them to add a *mansarda*," giggles Oana from Moiseni, who worked in Italy once, taking care of an old lady, in order to help

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add a second floor to her parents' house. "We did not care about this; there wasn't enough money to change the plan for the house anyway."

Apart from the size of the house, socio-economic prestige also results from the original decorative elements in the garden surrounding the house. In Maramures, potted palm trees, alpinarium gardens (i.e. gardens representing alpine landscapes on a small scale), artificial waterfalls, pavilions and even swimming pools are highly fashionable. In Neamt, artificial wells and ornate fences provide such additional markers of affluence. The family or personal automobile, imported and bearing a foreign license plate, is yet another indicator of a successful migrant: BMW, Mercedes, Audi, Porsche, Ferrari even, the more expensive, the better... In August, non-migrants complain with considerable pride that the roads of Maramures and Satu Mare become completely full, with multiple traffic jams caused by the inflow of cars with French, Italian and Spanish license plates from across the border. Those "gone over there" or "gone across" (*cei plecati dincolo*) come back from work for vacations, with their shiny new cars bursting with presents for everyone at home.

Since migration as a life experience revolves around work, mobile citizens become highly work-focused. "They work like robots," says Smaranda, 55, from Targu Neamt about her son and daughter-in-law who work in Italy. "When they come back, they just cannot sit still. They always find something to do, some work, all the time." Migrants note the transformations as well: "When I got to Paris and I saw how the money was made, I started working like a crazy man. I worked over time, I worked on weekends... It paid off, but it also changed my way of thinking about my time and what I can do with it," says Tinu, 30, who specializes in ironwork. "I don't like wasting time or sticking around at home with nothing to do." For many, the fortune accrued rapidly, leading many non-migrants to notice in frustration the rise of the *nouveau riches*, a migrant middle class that they cannot keep up with: "Over night they went from horse-drawn carts to

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sports cars and convertibles," sighs Tatiana, 67, from Moisei. Some migrants became successful entrepreneurs in Paris, particularly in the construction industry. Despite their newly acquired affluence, they still apply the first lessons migration taught them: "In the first five years of life in Paris, we worked like crazy, neglected our children, because we saw how the money could be made." It is said that some entrepreneurs' fortunes are evaluated at a million Euro. Despite that, even the richest migrants are so used to working and making money that they continue to work with their teams of workers, while their wives still work as housecleaners and make 2000 Euro per month.

Conspicuous consumption marks the migrants' presence in the sending community and captures professionally demonstrated individual worth and success. It is a simple, unquestionable testimony that all can understand: migrants and non-migrants, co-nationals and foreigners. In the traditional village from Tara Oasului, the houses of the most prominent citizens have always been larger and more imposing than those of others; but now, those measures of social standing have become a moving target, as migrants invest constantly in updating their personal house-image in the community of origin. "I built myself a house larger than the church," smiles a man from Certeze who has been working in Paris for 11 years. "If the Italians came here and saw how we live, they'd say they're the ones who should clean our houses, not the other way around" (Maria, 37, migrant caretaker, Targu Neamt). A 53 years old former migrant, now the owner of a metal work firm that specializes in stainless steel ornaments (fences, staircase and window decorations etc.) and vice-mayor of Certeze, has a golden rule of work that he shares with his family members and employees: "Work as if you were going to live forever; pray as if you were going to die tomorrow." He adds: "Over there [i.e. abroad] exigencies are very high, so Romanian workers have a lot to learn." But they learn quickly, and the more they learn, the better they become and the more they get paid. "They work 10, 12, 14 hours a day and *fura meserie* ("steal the trade,"

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i.e. learn by seeing what others do and imitating them like apprentices, without being formally taught). They change in no time, due to the atmosphere at the workplace and due to the manner in which they are paid. That motivates them, because they clearly see the fruits of their labor." Abroad, at the time the interviews were conducted, construction workers reported making 100-150 Euro per day; caretakers reported making between 700 and 800 Euro per month, with the advantage of not having to worry about accommodation or food, for those staying at their employers' houses.

In Satu Mare and Maramures, respondents all invoked the long tradition of worker mobility and rapid socio-economic status improvement. "People around here are used to hard work. I speak from personal experience here, too. When I was growing up, teenagers after they reached 14, 15 years of age, worked as lumberjacks over summer break, clearing out land for agriculture, construction and industrial projects. By the time school started again, they'd earn 50 Lei. At that time, it was the equivalent of the salaries of CEOs," remembers Dumitru. Of course, this lucrative internal migratory strategy worked later in life as well: "Our people went to work on the toughest construction sites in the country, taking the jobs that nobody else wanted. So this is an old community idea... 'making so that your place is more beautiful than someone else's', this competition in the community among neighbors to have more beautiful houses than their relatives and friends..."

In France, those who left before the free movement had a very difficult time making money and finding jobs. A man from Botiza who currently works as a house painter in Île-de-France remembers the early days of post-communism when migrants crossed the border illegally and lived in extreme poverty, relying on the charity of host-country natives. He contrasts the mobility experience in absence of European citizenship with the opportunities available in the context of free movement:

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> Right after 1990s, nobody hired you. They did not know who you were, where you were from and what you really wanted from them. We had language problems, since few of us spoke the language. We couldn't tell them what we could do. Nobody accepted you as tenant. We lived in improvised homes, in mobile homes, in abandoned buildings... The French had a big heart, though: they saw we were poor and tried to help us out. They told us that, in order not to beg, we could sell street newspapers in front of big department stores of in busy intersections. It was still a kind of begging, but what else could we do? We all did this at first. Whoever says it's not true is lying. And the French bought the newspapers from us, not that they really cared about the paper itself, but because they wanted to help us out. Each day we'd make 40-50 Euro, some made more, others made less. There are still some out there who still sell newspapers. But whoever is, not that I want to insult them or anything, but they're probably not too keen on actually working. We, back when it all started, we did not have a choice. Now it's very different. French people give us work because they know us and they know we work hard and do a great job at whatever they hire us to do. People from Oas are good craftsmen. Constructions, plumbing, electrical installations, painting, metal work... Everything is top quality. Now they seek us out."

Even after achieving their economic objectives, migrants keep working. Even in the case of those from older generations, work becomes a habit. "I started a business after returning," says the Mayor. "I came back after I got everyone all set at home. People in our community said I should run for office at the town hall, because I was a good manager." He laughs: "They also saw I had everything I needed, they knew I was an honest man, so they knew I was not going to use politics to get rich or something." Like other politicians who have migrant work experience abroad, the mayor thinks that his mobility showed everyone he was a citizen like any other. "I ran and I got elected. But now, after I work all day long in the office, at 4 o'clock I get home, change the suit for work clothes and go work side-by-side with my workers. I cannot stay still."

In this context, even the most recent economic crisis became an opportunity for those abroad to return home for a while and put their own properties in order. While waiting for the construction sector to recover, migrants worked on their own houses, finalized building projects, supervised the operation of the businesses they opened at home and so on. It was a great time for those who wanted to have new villas build since some excellent professionals returned home for a few months from France and Italy: while business was suffering abroad, they made money building villas for fellow migrants at home. For those who had more savings and resources, the crisis

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provided opportunities to stock up on construction materials that were sold by liquidating companies at only a fraction of their actual cost. Construction entrepreneurs in high-mobility contexts thus benefited fully from the huge drop in prices that followed the crisis.

For non-migrants in the high-mobility communities, just getting by requires a lot creative combinations of various kinds of work. Many work in services, but jobs do not pay well. Some supplement their revenues with subsistence agriculture: they sell fruit, vegetables and animal products (milk, eggs, meat) on the market or to neighbors. The collapse of local industries and state-supported companies (in the Maramures/Satu Mare region: Tricotex – clothing; Union – metallurgy; Integrata – linen; Contim – meat industry; in Targu Neamt: Volvatir – textiles) gave employees the opportunity to capitalize on some of the equipment that was no longer used, either by taking over or by selling it. Constructions flourish as a result of increasing demand for villas and house decorations from migrants who currently work abroad. Most non-migrants are pessimistic about local work opportunities and disappointed about the pay they receive. Some declare seriously considering going abroad to acquire a financial basis on which to pursue their ambitions: "I would like to start a business and be my own boss. I even tried to open a small business by the market, but it did not work. The start-up costs, fees and regulations all cost a fortune. One needs a solid material base to launch into business. Acquiring that here, with honest money, without anything else, you know, it can't be done," concludes Adrian, 29, from Targu Neamt. "You can work here all your life, at these levels of pay, it's difficult to have a decent life, not to mention set something aside."

Work may be dangerous or demeaning, but its results provide redemption at home and promotion at the workplace. Some migrants present their first work experience abroad as a coincidence, an experiment among friends or an accident. They talk about the first job as it had not

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been a part of their plan when they left the country. Elena, 33, from Viseul de Jos, presents her first trip to Italy in an account that reveals fully the fluid nature of her personal migratory project:

> The first time I left, I went... well, not for work. I went on vacation, in an excursion during the summer of 2003 to visit a friend in Milano. I stayed for two-three weeks, during our summer holidays. We visited, but not too much, Romana di Lombardia, Brescia, Treviglio, Milano, Torino. My friend used to work as a secretary at our *fabrica* (Elena works in a medicine factory), but then she decided to move to Italy together with her husband. So they left, and we kept in touch.
>
> In the summer of 2004, after I finished my second university degree, I went again on vacation to visit my friend, but then, from vacation, it turned out to be... (she giggles) a longer vacation. I was not very sure. But I thought I would give it a try. At first, when I started working, I was taking care of an old lady (*batranica*) in Arquata Scrivia (Alessandria), a smallish town, 30 km away from Genoa. I was hoping that I'd be able to get my documents in order and translate my diploma in chemistry.
>
> I was at my friend's, and a cousin of mine called me, a cousin who lived in the building across the street from the building in which the old lady lived. And she wanted to bring someone. So the first time I went like that, temporarily, while they were waiting for someone else from the country (i.e. from Romania) to arrive. And they all said, "come on, if you are already here, for a couple of weeks, until the other person gets here..."

Work often has a direct civilizational component, as migrant have exposure to new standards of civilization, in a painful separation from the backwardness of familiar sending communities:

> My siblings and I grew up without our parents. I stayed home to take care of my younger sister, when they went to work abroad. They took me along to work when I was 16, when they were not living in abandoned houses anymore. They were already renting a house when I arrived in Paris (Saint Denis). I felt lucky. I had to learn housecleaning from my mom, so she took me to work everyday. It was so hard! I had never been in a bathroom before, had never even seen one in my whole life. Our toilet at home had always been a pit toilet in the backyard. So I was very scared the moment I walked into a bathroom. I did not know how to turn the water on. When my mother handed me a pile of cleaning supplies, I got sick because of the smell of the substances and disinfectants. The smell was very hard to get used to: it made me throw up. (29 years old, Ana from Certeze)

There are, of course, many who object to the realities of the status paradox and to the uneasy simultaneity of downward social mobility in one context with socio-economic status advancement in another. "Those who go away work as servants and then come back and brag with the money they make; they act as if they are the big deal here and show off their cars and expensive clothes and all," says Nicu, 56, non-migrant from Targu Neamt. "But where does the money

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come from?" Some non-migrants and non-migrant family members confess that they would not be able to work abroad. Lucica, 49, from Targu Neamt, whose daughter and son-in-law work in Italy admits: "It's very difficult over there. I'd rather stay here, at home. You know? As they say: *fie painea cat de rea, tot mai buna-n tara ta*" (which translates as: "as bad as the bread may be, it's still better in your country" – meaning as hard as making a living can get, as difficult as life may get, it's still better for one to be in their own country). This saying echoed like a leitmotiv of undivided loyalty in many conversations with non-migrants and with older generations of non-migrant family members from migrant households.

Among migrants, return migrants and those preparing to leave for the first time, many do not fit the profile of the stereotypical foreign worker from classical migration literature. In both Transylvania and Moldova, several respondents were highly educated; many had a job in the community of origin, but resorted to migration to supplement their income and build a savings base that would shield them from uncertainty in the domestic economy. Some were schoolteachers, others nurses, others accountants... Some migrated to pay for university tuition for themselves. Others migrated to build a house, others to start a family. Some are retirees or housewives who have the opportunity to contribute decisively to household expenses, despite the fact hat they are excluded from the labor market at home. Those who are leaving for the first time are hopeful and anxious about the future; already after a couple of "trips to work," they acquire confidence and the material security that allows them to contemplate more ambitious personal and family projects. "First, I was asking myself: 'why doesn't the government do more?' But I realized, after going abroad, that there is no way they could provide what you can achieve outside with some serious work. Not with these thieves in power, who only pursue their own interest and are corrupt to the bone. Living *de azi pe maine* ("from one day to the next," i.e. barely subsisting,

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with no security for the future) is not a solution," says Mariuca, 47, from Moisei, who works for a medical firm but goes to work in Italy during the summer.

A high number of migrants mentioned working legally, with contract, "*in regula*" ("according to the rule, in order") as a marker of social prestige and professional achievement. "I worked hard and, after a few months, my employer submitted the paperwork for me, to get me in order," says Danuta, 45, from Targu Neamt. "The family could tell that I was serious and hard working; they liked how I took care of the house and of their aging parents... Soon, I became like a family member, so of course they did not want me to worry about anything." Although European free movement allows migrants to seek employment abroad, often employers prefer hiring on the black market to reduce associated expenses and obligations. For all migrant who work in the shadow economy, transitioning from irregular to legal work represents an ambition and an obsession. The stress associated with not having a work contract is particularly high in places where authorities in the host state regularly conduct inspections. While waiting at the Romanian consulate for an interview, I met a woman who spoke Romanian with a Maramures accent. She was in her mid 30s, simple and honest, still young but visibly tired, with her long hair starting to grey prematurely, accompanied by her older daughter, 12 years old, beautiful and silent, with a heavy, intelligent gaze. The woman came to the consulate to renew a *titre de voyage* to travel to Romania and renew an expired passport (cheaper to get it reissued in Romania). She eagerly shared her story: her husband had died of a sudden heart attack. He was 41, with no prior history of heart problems. "He died on a Sunday morning while we were having tea together. He left me alone with two daughters. He came to France first, and we followed him in 2006." The wife blamed work-related stress for the tragedy: he worked six days a week in highly stressful conditions because he was not hired on a legal contract. "He had a special cell phone on which he

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would receive warning calls from his boss who would tell him when to go hide to avoid the control teams sent in by authorities to inspect the construction site."

Since migrants care deeply about their legal status abroad, they learn a lot about how to navigate the labor market. They are more aware of their rights and the institutions that are responsible for providing legal protection. During lunch breaks, migrants share tips about what to say to foreign employers in response to work contract violations or how to effectively threaten use of legal action to demand better work conditions or compensation. Migrants learn from others where they can report employers for breaking the law. Indeed, Romanian migrants become so knowledgeable that they instruct migrants from the Republic of Moldova on how to get better jobs and how to apply for Romanian citizenship or regularization. Work-related legal matters are, after workplace anecdotes and stories from back home, one of the most common conversation topics in migrant get-togethers. This legal focus distinguishes mobile citizens from non-migrants who rarely discuss legal matters, law provisions, legal remedies, rights or the relationship with authorities amongst themselves.

Informants point out that the relationship between Romanian citizens and the West changed over time with the post-Cold War East-West rapprochement and, especially, in the years after Romania joined the EU. "Romanians learned a lot and gave a lot in their contact with Western civilization," remarked Metropolitan Iosif. "They worked in all fields; there was a diversification of professions according to what they could find... Romanians always said they could do whatever was needed or required of them. They approached each task with increased attention and concentration." The migrants' professional self-assessments mirror those of non-migrant family members and Romanian authorities (local, national, diaspora representative), all emphasizing how migration changed the mobile citizens' mentality and they way of working. "Mobility fostered their perfectionism. They say to me: 'I want to make something as good as

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possible, something that is perfect, so that I can stand out, be considered and chosen for this particular job," said Metropolitan Iosif. Romanian state representatives abroad (in both Italy and France), as well as local authorities in the migrants communities of origin note that migrants are highly adaptable and quick learners, adjusting as they go and responding well to the increase in exigency and levels of competition at the workplace. Migrants want to work at high standards of quality abroad and in Romania: "they stop accepting products that are subpar; after living here, they apply higher standards for everything from construction to products and services. They know how to ask for high quality work, they can have better assessment standards, but they apply higher standards to evaluating their own work, as well as everyone else's. They want everyone to do their job, in fact," smiles Metropolitan Iosif.

The Romanian priest from Strasbourg also notices the same dynamic among Romanians in his parish: "In the first years, the Romanians' only preoccupation... or their top three priorities... are how to gain material stability, to consolidate one's professional situation. They are changed by their life abroad... Life in the West does make people better." Professional life and the migratory experience play a crucial role in this transformation of otherwise deeply ingrained characteristics:

> We, Romanians, have many qualities, but also many shortcomings... One of our defects is a certain degree of superficiality. So people have to transform here. One of the main transformations is a certain rigor, punctuality, with the way in which one fulfills his duty. And here Romanians are very adaptable, the French consider them as the most adaptable. They adjust perfectly and they do a very good job. There are a few construction sites around here where Romanians work. Do you know how well they work and how many engagements they have? They're exceptional. I have not been able to get them to do something here for our church, that's how busy they are. Now I'll have to ask them to help me out around the time of their summer break and hope they'll accept. They get orders when nobody else does any business. They work very well, they are very careful with details, they have artistic spirit, imagination, so the French like this a lot.

In parallel with work opportunities, free movement allows migrants to develop stronger connections with their home country than before. They cultivate a sense of nostalgia for the places where they were born and keep in touch with parents and relatives. The desire to return mani-

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fests itself as real-estate loyalty, a solid commitment to come back to the place where they are building a house and a better future for themselves and for their family. Some returned to Romania to seek employment. If they do not manage to find any attractive jobs, which is often the case, they return, either to the same country or move to other countries: England, Ireland – even though the labor markets there are saturated with workers from Poland and the Baltic countries.

Effects of Free Movement on Views about Society: "Over Here," "Over There" and In Between

How do migratory life-experience influence the mobile citizens' attitudes towards society? How do their perspectives shift in receiving countries? How do migrants interact with fellow co-nationals and other migrants abroad? How do they perceive nationals of the receiving country? Does migration change relations with dependent non-migrant family members or friends? Does migration trigger the emergence of a cleavage between migrants and non-migrants at home?

One of the most striking elements of interviewing migrants and non-migrants in high-mobility contexts is listening to the way they speak about mobility and working abroad. Migrants present their time away from home in very careful words, almost without mentioning the fact that they left their homeland for an extended period of time. The expressions they use emphasize the continuity of their links to the community of origin and the temporary nature of their exit from national territory. The economic exit never marks an exit from the home community and is, therefore, described accordingly: migrants talk about "going to work" (*a pleca la lucru*), "working over there," "going out" (*a pleca afara*), expressions that non-migrants use as well when talking about those working abroad: such-and-such "*lucreaza dincolo*" (works on the other side [of the border]) or "*lucreaza afara*" (works outside). Neither migrants, nor their non-migrant counterparts use

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words that semantically denote an actual separation or permanent exit from the sending community.

While this language reduces the distance between mobile and sedentary citizens, another equally striking aspect of migrant vocabulary does the exact opposite, differentiating the migrants from sedentary citizens and emphasizing their connection to another culture, other realities and another country. Migrants who spend a long time among host-country citizens, especially women, end up speaking Romanian with a more or less pronounced foreign accent (Italian or French, depending on the country where they work). This reflects an advanced status of inclusion in the host-country labor market, an inclusion beyond, say, the level of irregular agricultural work (a job referred to as *capsunar/capsunari,* strawberry picker(s), which represents the lowest rung of the migrant occupational hierarchy; referring to a migrant as *capsunar* has derogative connotations, especially if they do not work in agriculture). Speaking with an accent reflects a high level of socio-economic and civilizational separation achieved from the "backward" realities and material need at home. It indicates that the speaker has access to higher societal levels, where migrants interact with autochthonous groups on a quotidian basis, societal levels that are beyond the reach of migrants in the lowest socio-economic positions who usually spend most of their time among co-nationals. Migrants borrow the intonation, melody and phrases of the host-country language to signal cosmopolitanism and a "higher level of civilization." They use foreign words in their everyday conversations, translate word for word idioms or expressions into Romanian or integrate foreign words into their mother tongue by adding Romanian suffixes to them, often producing exotic, slightly comical combinations. For instance, French migrants talk about working *la fix* (a word for word translation of the expression "au fixe," meaning for a fixed salary). Mobile citizens working in Italy count afternoons at work as "pomerigi" (e.g. *am lucrat doi pomerigi saptamana asta*, meaning "I have worked two afternoons this week" – from the Italian *pomeriggio, pl. pomeriggi*). Like

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the houses built at home, language and accent tells a story and signals a position in the hierarchy of mobility.

In the home communities, Romanian migrants use language (especially a foreign accent) as a marker of cosmopolitanism. Abroad, they resort to speaking the language of the host country to shield themselves against discrimination and abuse. Since migrants learn Romance foreign languages like Italian or Spanish very quickly due to their similarity to Romanian, they can subsequently rely on this linguistic competence while abroad to automatically differentiate themselves in the migrant hierarchy from low-skilled, destitute or illegal migrants who have connections with transnational crime networks. Speaking a foreign language is empowering, while sticking out as a "Romanian worker" puts them in a vulnerable position, due to the negative media coverage that triggered the general association of all migrant elements with the Roma populations. To avoid stereotypes, migrants have developed a new type of pragmatic individualism that they eagerly express on any occasion. They generally play down their national identity, especially when interacting with host country nationals, and emphasize their skills, competencies and professional ethic. They rely on their work-dependent identity and on their status as "citizens of the market" (intra-EU migrants) to ward off prejudiced attacks. In public settings, migrants sometimes use the language of the receiving country even amongst themselves, to avoid unwanted, instantaneous identification by co-nationals who do not appear trustworthy or respectable. Migrants want to blend in and avoid trouble; for that reason, they do not want to draw the attention of foreign authorities by associating with groups involved in criminal activities or being approached by irregular migrants engaged in socially abhorrent high-visibility activities like begging. Since the Romanian community resulting from new forms of international migration is so diverse, migrants prefer to err on the side of caution. Language demonstrates competence, professionalism and reliability. For that reason, and especially in occupations that require a high lev-

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el of interaction with host-country nationals, migrants dedicate a lot of time to learning the language as quickly as possible. Several migrants reported staying up late at night to study Italian or French. “I’d wake up in the middle of the night because of a nightmare in which I could not remember this or that word,” laughs Mrs. Iancu. “I slept with the dictionary under my pillow,” says a 39 year-old caretaker from Viseu who works in Venice. “When I had some time to spare in the afternoon or evening, I’d study the conversation guides I had brought from home.” Migrants figure out quickly the benefits of learning the language and mastering elementary grammar: “I had the language courses with me and practiced every day because I knew it made a huge difference. I learned to speak grammatically correct, and this made a big difference in the relationship with the employer,” recalls Diana, 41, from Negresti, who took a leave of absence from her job as a schoolteacher to work in Spain.

Others just count on the fact that they work in teams with other migrants who speak the language and that they can leave their work speak for them, instead. These are generally older migrants who do not seek interactions with members of the host society. Older construction team workers often don’t even bother learning the language of their destination country, despite the fact that they’ve been working there for years. The high concentrations of Romanian migrants around Paris or Rome give them enough social life, without distracting them from their economic goals. In Saint Denis, Île-de-France, entire buildings are occupied by tenants from the same Romanian village. Sometimes, migrants even renovate the dilapidated buildings themselves. Older workers bring their children, who often set up their small companies in constructions, plumbing, metal work or electrical installations. They want to work enough to secure a retirement pension from France, in accordance to EU regulations. “What gave me the strength to go on was my dream of going back home for good,” says Gheorghe, 57.

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Performance at the workplace is also a strategy deployed against discrimination. "Hard work shuts everyone's mouth," laughs Floarea from Certeze. Migrants work hard and often isolate themselves from co-ethnics for fear of being associated with the questionable, morally dubious elements in their communities associated with criminal activities, alcoholism or street violence. "As long as you focus on your job, you're fine," said Gina. "People are not going to discriminate against you when they see you work harder than everyone else. If you work twice as hard as an Italian, they will want to hire you." Migrants believe that merit and dedication can trump negative images and prejudices that people in the receiving country may have about them. "If you make a good impression, you'll be promoted. If you work hard, you'll make more money. That's all. Each with his own problems. I don't hang out with Romanians in metro stations or with those who gather in squares at night," says Tudor, a 33 years-old construction worker who lives in Rome, "I just mind my own business. I have my job and my family at home who is waiting for me. I hang out with other Romanians who work and make honest money abroad, who are serious like me."

For a complete stranger newly arrived in an Italian city, finding Romanian co-nationals is relatively easy and does not require knowledge of the Italian language. In Venice, on the way from the Rialto Bridge to the San Marco Basilica, on a very busy corner, a pizzeria displays in the store window the Romanian and Italian flags, side by side, above a pyramid of Nutella jars. The owner of the prosperous business is a Romanian migrant, an energetic woman who gracefully presides over crêpes, ice cream tubs and calzones, managing waiters and coping with a relentless flow of customers. Merely hanging out during early afternoon around benches in public squares or parks offers opportunities to meet Romanian migrants. In Venice, in Campo Santissimi Apostoli, every day around noon, small groups of women congregate around the benches on the square. When the benches get completely occupied, the others just stand around, chatting.

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All are dressed comfortably, in inconspicuous tones, blending in among the groups of tourists with their white summer pants, gray sleeveless tops, discrete short-sleeve shirts, sandals or flip flops. Most of them are middle-aged women, some are younger, and a couple of them bring along older women in wheelchairs (their Italian employers) and set them next to the benches, in the shade. They join in the conversation of the bigger group, while the older women quietly contemplate the constant stirring of the pigeons next to the cathedral or engage in a conversation of their own. Groups of tourists hang out, cameras in hand, around the bridge at the gallery of the Antico Doge, where lavishly decorated gondolas draw potential customers with their ostentatious black wood, red cushions and abundant gold-painted ornaments. In the non-touristy corner of the square, in front of the awkwardly juxtaposed Impresa Funebre (funeral business), dog shop and pizza-kebab bar, the conversation among Romanian migrants starts as a fast murmur and intensifies quickly. At Giardini, in the parks surrounding the Biennale di Venezia pavilions, the late afternoon brings out the elderly and their caretakers, migrants from Romania and Moldova. As if in a carefully choreographed ballet, wheelchairs roll down the shaded alleys lined up, side by side, in rows of four, five or six, that advance like a parade in slow motion. This configuration allows for two conversations to happen simultaneously: one in Italian between the old women in the wheelchairs, another in Romanian, right above the employers' heads, among the Romanian and Moldovan caretakers. Romanian Orthodox parishes, like the one at Cappella Santa Maria Alle Stiore, in Treviso (Piazzale Pistoia), offer more reliable networking opportunities.

In Rome, the concentration of the Romanian community is evident around the metro stops at Tiburtina, Anagnina, as well as in the EUR region. Large bazaars and open-air markets with clothes and trinkets offer opportunities for migrants to gather. Many such businesses seem to be set up without authorization on empty public spaces: under highway bridges, in parks, near parking lots, at the exits of metro stations. Folding tables and cardboard boxes provide the sup-

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port for displaying merchandise. Nearby, groups of migrants gather around a game of *table* on a few pieces of cardboard set on the sidewalk, in the shade. Next to the bazaars, store and restaurant windows attest to the Romanian presence and gastronomic preferences. An "Istanbul Kebab" business posts its menu specialties in red bold letters, across the glass façade. The combination of Italian and Romanian would most likely confuse anyone who is not familiar with a traditionally Romanian restaurant menu that includes comfort-food dishes and some fast-food-inspired twists: Pizza "Doner" Kebab (Turkish fast food and pizza grew quickly in popularity as to-go street food in Romania in the 1990s, partially thanks to the first waves of migrants who returned from abroad), Fagioli (beans), Fegato di Pollo (chicken livers), Sarmale (a traditional, often festive Romanian meat dish), Insalata (salad), Ciorba de Burta (a Romanian soup, cow-stomach based), Purè (*sic!* mashed potatoes)...

Posters, ads and announcements in Romanian cover the walls. Many handwritten posts offer rooms for rent to Romanians. The colorful, printed posters advertise travel offers. One of the companies advertising here provides direct transportation by bus from Italy to Romania, three different lines that all enter Romanian territory at Oradea, stop in Cluj-Napoca (a city in North-Western Romania – and Romania's second most populous city – historically considered the unofficial capital of the Transylvanian region) and then cross Transylvania and Moldova, passing through different cities and towns. Line #1 goes through southern Transylvania and central Moldova slightly veering southeast to reach its final destination, Galati, Romania's largest port on the Danube. Line #2 goes northeast, through Vatra Dornei, Suceava, Botosani and Dorohoi, on its way to Darabani, Romania's northernmost town, located on the border between Romania and Ukraine. Line #3 goes to Targu Neamt and other towns and cities in the area between Targu Neamt and the Ukrainian border. Tickets can be purchased online and by phone up to 24 hours before the departure date, which offers significantly more flexibility than plane

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tickets. Founded in 1993, the company has its headquarters in Botosani. The list of possible destinations for Italy includes over 250 cities, towns and villages. The list of departure points includes all judete in Romania, but the company has offices in 14 cities and towns in northeast and northwest Romania. Often transport companies embrace a flexible system to adapt to their customers needs and demands. The company also offers a service of package pickup from Rome and surrounding area and delivery to Romanian destinations. Other ads, all in Romanian, offer various services: decoding of Romanian TV channels, PC repairs, phone repairs, legal services for Moldavians who want to apply for Romanian citizenship (two months) etc.

Romanians even have their own ethnic commercial and cultural center, called La Strada, that includes a Romanian supermarket with food from back home, a money transfer center, a pastry shop that promises cakes and sweets just the way you remember them from your visits to your grandparents ("La bunici"), the headquarters of *Actualitatea Romaneasca*, a newspaper of Romanians wherever they may be, a bookstore/newsstand, a bridal store, an insurance firm, a transportation company and travel agency that offers plane and bus tickets, package delivery services, a consulting firm... The supermarket looks exactly like any of its equivalents from a Romanian town. Prominently displayed are Romanian candy and snacks (napolitane, Eugenii, pufuleti – which any Romanian, myself included, associates with childhood and growing up back home), Romanian salami, sausages and pastrami, canned Romanian paté, Romanian beers, cheeses... A steady stream of customers keeps the cashiers busy.

The Commercial and Social Center occupies a large building on Via Circonvallazione Nomentana, next to the metro station Tiburtina. The relatively austere interior is decorated with Romanian crafts objects (pottery, woodwork, textiles), religious objects, as well as decorations that commemorate key events in Romanian history (150 years after the unification of Romanian principalities, 1859-2009). The space inside and outside the center stirs up the nostalgia in other

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ways, including replicas of road signs and road markers from Romania, street-name plates, indicators, maps, paintings, flags. The pastry shop, with Italian and Romanian flags, boasts bilingually its "Prajituri"/ "Dolci tipici rumeni" (Romanian sweets and cakes). Posters with the blue, yellow and red Romanian flag as background advertise a collaboration project to promote Romanian language, culture and spirituality, a pilot project organized by the Commercial and Social Center *La Strada* in partnership with the Romanian Orthodox Bishop's Office in Italy in the summer of 2009, between June 1 and July 31. The schedule obviously took into account the fact that Romanian migrants have summer holidays in August and that children would not be around during in late summer. The weekly schedule included the one thematic session per day of the week, mostly scheduled in the evening, each session having a target audience indicated by age. Priests from several parishes, NGO workers or members of the *La Strada* center led each of the sessions. Mondays, "Let's sing together" explored Romanian folk songs and religious music for children and young people. Tuesday sessions provided opportunities for studying Romanian language and literature in two sessions for 6-8 year-olds and 8-14 year-olds, under the title "Let's speak Romanian." Wednesdays were reserved for get-togethers for Romanian youth, 15-25 years old, while Thursdays invited Romanian migrants of any age to join in for "Heart-to-heart conversations... with the *badante* [i.e. caretakers] and not only." Fridays, the evenings were dedicated to catechesis for children and young people, Saturday mornings to reading from Holy Texts, Saturday evenings to watching films about Romania ("Let's get to know our country") for people of all ages, while Sunday afternoons aimed at bringing together the entire "*La Strada* Romanian Family" to hang out together. All events were free of charge.

Assessments of relationships with co-nationals tend to be pragmatic, even opportunistic. Any informal get-together usually includes considerable levels of professional pitching and networking, some discussion of job opportunities or projects, and some demand for work-related

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favors or recommendations. In interacting with members of the Romanian community abroad, national identity offers a basis for solidarity and mutual assistance in a work environment that is often difficult to navigate. Sunday services at Romanian parishes provide excellent opportunities around Europe for meeting co-nationals and relying on national identity to secure some support and guidance, to learn from others' experiences and avoid isolation. Romanian churches in both France and Italy provide venues for reconnecting with the community, overcoming the feelings of longing and uprootedness, and transcending distance through spirituality in rituals and prayers for those at home. Churches also represent an excellent pragmatic site for career networking and information gathering. Large crowds gather outside churches to chat, discuss politics and create connections.

Romanians that have the similar professional backgrounds get together on a frequent basis. Professional identity tends to provide a more reliable basis for association in the migrants' eyes. In Italy, Romanian caretakers gather spontaneously and informally in the piazzas of Rome or Venice to share their experiences during their two-three hour-long lunch/afternoon breaks. They meet other caretakers, find out about work opportunities for family members and friends who are still at home, exchange stories about hardship, talk about legal changes that affect migrants from Romania or neighboring Moldova etc.

Acting on national solidarity to help another migrant has many drawbacks and adds vulnerability to one's position, since migrants who recommend co-nationals are held accountable for the actions of the person they recommend. In Italy, the caretakers (*badante*) from Romania help one another with finding jobs, sometimes in exchange for money, other times just as a favor. "Sometimes, there are disputes about money. There are arguments," says Elena from Viseu. "I was afraid of problems and never wanted to be a part of such arguments, especially since they usually draw the employer's attention. I did not have documents either, so I did not want any

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trouble. I just asked everyone not to implicate me in any way in their disputes. Particularly if I did not know them before hand, I stayed out of it. Romanians tend to get in this kind of situations." Other migrants complained about envy, lack of solidarity, and selfishness of many conationals.

Stories about what happens to those who are not protective enough of their reputation travel quickly by word of mouth. In the Romanian community in Strasbourg, where the diaspora and new highly-educated migrant community (students, European institution employees, doctors etc.) maintain a high level of prudence vis-à-vis certain groups of new comers, the priest at the local Romanian church recalls how events led to increase skepticism, as new migrants of all occupations and skill levels started to pour in from across the border after 1989:

> I have been here in Strasbourg for 27 years. There have been many different phases in the community, not necessarily in progression, but changes and ruptures as well as continuities. The Romanian community in Strasbourg is unique or maybe present in few other cities: a city that is eminently university-centered, European city. This excludes from the get-go a certain majority of Romanians, those that you find in Spain or Italy who seek work in ordinary work and lack competencies. Here in Strasbourg you find people who come here precisely due to their competencies, to assert themselves in their precise field. Before 1989 many university professors arrived. After 1989, many students came, also many European professionals (diplomats, officials at European institutions), many doctors that started to appear here from the early 1990, and a few that work in construction, industries etc. (...)

The priest recalls that the small Romanian community in Strasbourg received him with considerable skepticism when he arrived from Romania in 1984, in the last years of the communist regime, as people were afraid that he had connections with the Securitate (the Secret Police of the regime) and that he was going to report on them.

> [After the fall of communism in 1989] from Romania started to appear dozens, hundreds, thousands of people. When a country is invaded, it does not know what to do, a country that's organized like France, and a region like Alsace. In Romania, it was as if a barrage had broken; and this torrent kept flooding in, unstoppable. In Strasbourg, where could I have possibly hosted them all? It was said that the Romanian community should find the structures and resources to receive their Romanian "brothers." What structures, when there were just some twenty old people who were frightened, hiding in their houses? So I was left alone, exposed to this phenomenon. The phenomenon was not limited to Strasbourg, they showed up everywhere in France and other Western European countries. But here, there were thousands of Romanians who showed up.

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What kind of Romanians? Well, you were afraid just looking at them, they were the fierce kind, criminals... Those were the first ones to leave Romania. As a priest you don't pay attention to these things, but as any human being you are still afraid, I can assure you of that! I went everywhere, where they found shelter. They were sleeping in abandoned buildings, slept on the floor or on the ground wherever they found some space, fifty or sixty people together... During the daytime, when they went outside in the streets, they stole, destroyed things, ate whatever bird they could catch in the parks or public gardens... That's right: that is not a legend. But conflicts emerged between them, as well. Since the groups were mixed – both men and women – there emerged jealousies and crimes for women... This happens in promiscuity.

There were people who went to the Prefect's Office to ask for rights. When one guy was not granted rights, he set himself on fire, he died. So we witnessed the entire horror of an overwhelming, unstoppable phenomenon. Meanwhile, we kept holding our religious services as usual, and on Sunday at church, instead of the 50 people who could normally be inside, some two-three hundred people showed up. They stayed outside, and drank, smoked, discussed, shouted... The phenomenon posed an enormous risk for us, because the city hall decided to evacuate us from that church, because some unprecedented thefts occurred in the region.

(The priest suspects the authors of the thefts enrolled secret-service trained young people, who had experience entering people's houses in Romania, who had lost their jobs and knew everything about alarm systems and so on. The thieves operated in groups of ten people or so that included a specialist in alarms, a driver, car thieves, plus other people for other tasks. They stole the huge safes from banks and department stores. They entered through the ceiling, where the rays of the alarm system did not cross the space, attach a strong cable to the strongbox and, with a stolen bulldozer, they would pull the safe out of the building. They stole about one hundred safes, including the one in the store where the priest was working: "It had inside both money and checks – later, I found the checks again, since they just left them behind, they only wanted the cash. They would take the safe boxes into the forest and cut them. They had in place an entire system.")

When the French authorities caught them and put them on trial, they concluded that these thefts were planned at the Romanian church. We were holding mass inside, and outside these guys were planning the next big hit. I was called by the local authorities and they said: "Watch out, Father! You are in danger of being accused of leading the Romanian mafia, it seems." Those guys could not explain properly, so they made it sound like everything was planned at church. Of course, I was not exposed to any official humiliation, but the investigation continued permanently. It all ended with the fact that the thieves were arrested and we requested the protection of local authorities against these thieves; we asked them to protect our church since we are nothing but a group of correct people who worship in church and who do not have control over what happens outside,

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> on public terrain. That belongs to the city hall. I went to the mayor and he said: "*mon père*, this is very embarrassing for me; the easiest would be for you to move to some other place" since for him he was concerned that the voters saw everything and would not reelect him. But in the end, France solved the problem through laws and investigations. This is how these people end up in prison.
>
> Meanwhile some serious people started to come: Romanian representatives, European officials, embassy personnel, people who worked at the Court of Human Rights... Well, how do you receive these people? Some of them stopped coming to church, when they saw that phenomenon; we lost a lot of them then. For a simple reason: Some came to church and went outside and chatted with whoever happened to be there, thinking they were just another community member, without knowing that the police were around, in civilian clothes, taking pictures and identifying people for their investigations. One man got arrested, for instance, and they got interrogated as suspect in one of the thefts. They told him: "you are an accomplice." He said: "I have no idea what you are talking about." They said: "oh yeah? You know very well. And you're lying. Do you know such and such?" He said: "no, I don't." They said: "you're lying." And showed him a photo in which he was side-by-side, talking to the thief. So, he had to explain everything, that he did not know him. Even if eventually they figured out what had happened, there was already a shock wave going around as a result of that event.

Some migrants took more extreme measures to shield themselves from projections of nationality-associated prejudice that could have damaged their reputation: "I did not go out at all, especially not all by myself. It was before I was *in regula* (i.e. had all the documents), so I was afraid of the *Carabinieri* (Italian police)," remembers Raluca who worked as an elderly caretaker in Southern Italy. "I just stayed inside during the day. I went out with the family on weekends. And I generally avoided other Romanians. Once, my employer had some reparations done to her house and one of the guys on the team was Romanian. The lady told me: 'Hey, that man is Romanian too'. I just shrugged and kept working. I had nothing to do with him." While citizens of the market show high levels of mutual cooperation (chain migration, exchanges of information and resources etc.), interviews revealed high levels of suspicion and criticism towards co-ethnics. Migrants learn not to treat nationality as the reliable basis for trust:

> Some are bad people. You never know what to expect. They always want something from you. Often, they will ask for help. They will ask for favors. They will ask you to recommend them for various jobs, to find work for them. Sometimes, they are decent people, but other times it gets more complicated. What if they go to their new employer after you gave your word, and then they steal something or get drunk? Who knows? Then you have to suffer and you can be held responsible. It's very important to know the people you recommend, to know them really well. (Sanda, 51 years old, Targu-Neamt)

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Migrants also react strongly, when they can, to behaviors they perceive as negatively affecting the image or the reputation of the community as a whole. They mind in particular Roma migrants who beg and harass people at crossroads or in public transportation means, because this is the one of the most visible and irritating side of the migrant community for host-country natives. "I saw one Roma boy on a train, and he was begging. He was about thirteen years old and was walking around with a sign asking for help because he's sick. He came to me to ask for money, and I told him: 'You know what? Go work. Go work and stop bringing shame upon us over here.' He left right away" (Tatiana, 35, from Viseul de Jos).

Given higher vulnerabilities, suspicions were higher before the introduction of free movement. Illegal status deprived many of their rights and made them dependent on unreliable and self-interested middlemen for planning the trip abroad. Some of the early migrants were only able to return to the country for the first time after the international travel restrictions were lifted. After the introduction of visa-free travel, migrants started returning much more frequently. "I fled the country in 1995. My son was three and my baby girl was only two months old. Next time I saw her, she was seven years old" (Ana, Negresti, housekeeper in Paris).

In January 2002, Romanians gained visa-free access to the Schengen area. This triggered the 'democratization' and diversification of migratory flows, contributing to a relaxation of some tensions between co-ethnics. "Back in the day, going abroad to find a job was a very costly and risky business. People took out many loans for all sorts of banks to pay for it all: getting there was expensive, the papers were expensive, the guys who found your job and who put you in contact with the employer had to be paid an arm and a leg… I would not have been able to afford it back then. Now it's much easier and you can just travel with your ID card. Everyone goes. It's like taking the train into the city or something," says 35 year-old Mihai, who has been working abroad as a truck driver for the last three years. "There are local buses that run twice a week. A

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rather long trip, that's for sure, but take you directly to your workplace in Italy or France or Spain," says 47 year-old Daniel who has worked in agriculture, "You can send packages home through drivers. Your family can visit. You don't have to hide anymore. You have dignity as a human being. You are respected. You don't have that fear lingering over your head." Of course, most migrants buy their own cars abroad, but for those who cannot drive, for grannies who visit their grandchildren, or for children who visit their parents for holidays, buses and mini-vans services, as well as low-cost flights, represent a convenient alternative.

In a nutshell, free movement migration inspires citizens of the market to become more individualistic, cautious, ambitious, highly pragmatic and independent. Family welfare and socio-economic status represent key priorities. Contacts with other migrants and host-country nationals are generally evaluated through a professional lens in terms of their advantages and disadvantages. While superficial downward mobility is acceptable abroad – a certain degree of self-sacrifice, even asceticism, is almost expected – at home, interactions between migrants and non-migrants provide opportunities for updating socio-economic status perceptions. Conspicuous consumption plays its part in settling temporarily various local rivalries, particularly in places that have a long history of migration (e.g. Maramures, Satu Mare, Suceava – in the village of Cajvana). Coming back and investing earnings in visible socio-economic status markers is a legacy associated with the development dynamics of the traditional community and the family. In some cases, several generations contribute to the same migratory project; thus, migration contributes to the reproduction of traditional ties. Some projects are more serious than others. Many of the spacious, three-floor houses were built allegedly as a result of bets with friends or challenges (dares) coming from family members. "My cousin said I would not be able to build a bigger house than his. There you go: turns out he was wrong. He lost the bet," says half-jokingly Ion, 41, concrete worker from Tarsolt. This kind of playful, albeit impressive, display of wealth be-

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comes a reason for local pride: "This is how we, the people of Oas, are (*noi, osenii*): we cannot help ourselves. If we see that the neighbor has a house with three floors, we've got to build one with four floors for ourselves" (Petre, 25 years old, Maramures). For others, migration-related projects are no joking matter, but rather serve to keep families together across generations:

> I was born here, in this wooden house. And this is where I plan to die. We were nine children in the family. I lived here my entire life. Now my grandson has gone to France. I've allowed him to build this house here, on my land, next to the old house. It's better for everyone that way. In the winter, we stay here, in the old house to save money on heating. In the summer, we sleep over there: the concrete keeps the air cooler inside. They built a duplex so that both grandsons can live in it when it's finished (Marcu, 83, Bixad).

Not all migratory experiences go smoothly, to be sure. A Romanian artist that I interviewed in Venice opened up about his highly unsuccessful attempt to make some money abroad, in the UK, in a camp for young agricultural workers. After trying to keep up with others, Liviu was overcome by health problems. "I was used to working in the field and to agricultural work in the country side. But this place was like a labor camp. I suffered from hernia, so it was very difficult for me. When I worked on the potato crop, it was exhausting. I had to buy a special belt because I was having aches." Work conditions were brutal, and he faced the competition of teams of young men used to hard work in the fields. He recalled needing money for a second degree, as well as wanting to help his family out: "My family asked me to bring home money, like my cousin did. And I wanted to do that too, both for them, but also for myself, but I was simply unable to do it. I had reached the limits of my strength. I knew that my family would be disappointed when I would get back home. I could not give them what they wanted." He had chosen to go to the UK because he had always liked the country and thought it would make the experience more pleasant. But he admits being deeply mistaken: "I simply was not resilient enough. I came home with 400 pounds, my cousin came back with 5000 pounds and bought a house." He remembers the other Romanians in the work camp: all were studying agronomy in college. "There was a

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huge gap separating us – I had my own prejudices, they rejected me because I was reading books from the local library... They had their prejudices as well. All they talked about was what they were going to do with the money: buy a house, a car. They were happy because they have accomplished their goals and I had not. I had to borrow money for the plane ticket and now I had to return the money and had no idea how to do that."

Since family houses weigh so heavily in the determination of social status in communities that traditionally rely on migration, families work abroad to build together an ideal, spacious family house, engaging in projects spanning decades. The cost of building a villa is estimated at 60 000 Euro for the house itself, but finishing details can more than double the overall cost, depending on how much the family is willing to spend. In Huta Certeze, in the garden of an unfinished house, a return migrant contemplates what her son and daughter-in-law now yet to complete: "They have plenty of time, they're still young." When I ask about whether or not they were consulted in the decision to commit to this house-building project, she chuckles: "Ha! As if they had a choice... " Community pressure plays a significant role in determining spending decisions in places that have relied on migration traditionally, even though European free movement generates new opportunities. Competition continues beyond the house and car. Kitchen appliances, home entertainment systems, flat-screen TVs also play a role as status markers.

"The effects of migration manifest themselves at the level of individual actors, mainly on households, as investment projects, and through cultural changes" (Anghel 2009). Since the migrants' lives and work have become much more predictable thanks to market citizenship, they can afford to think about the future and plan ahead. The precariousness of their irregular condition abroad in the past has been replaced by the certainty of European citizenship, giving them a new sense of dignity. As time horizons have expanded, the hierarchies of values have changed accordingly. New houses are built everywhere – villages and *communes* have been expanding to

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accommodate the demand for construction space. New small businesses open (restaurants, pizzerias, tourism agencies, clothing shops). Migrants purchase land and apartments; experienced migrants make more significant investments (even borrowing money from banks). Sometimes they make investments in both their country of origin and their country of destination: they set up transnational businesses that reinforce the simultaneity of their lives. "Investments are not mutually exclusive," a new transnational businessman from Negresti told me. "I started my business after the regularization of my status in Italy."

The typical migrant work experience still involves hardships, discrimination and alienation. It is a self-chosen temporary exile that the individual assumes to acquire the resources (usually economic) that subsequently enable him/her to achieve personal or family goals: "When you set up a goal in life, something you are fighting for, you put up with everything. That's life! You cannot do otherwise. You would give anything to be able to stay home with your family and achieve your dreams without having to go elsewhere. But that is simply impossible," sighed Mrs. Iancu. Connections with the homeland remain strong despite the long periods spent abroad. Many EU migrants only return to Romania once or twice per year: in August for the summer vacation and in December for Christmas; however, they keep in touch daily via cell phone, email and Skype with non-migrants relatives and friends. "We call three, four, five times a day," says Maria, 37, Targu Neamt, when asked about how she keeps in touch with her non-migrant family and children. "I ask them about school; we talk about everything." Particularly in the early days of illegal migration, mobile citizens tried to protect non-migrant family members from the realities of life abroad: "I'd never tell them when things were hard. I just wanted to hear their voices, say "hi" to the kids, ask them how school is going. It's hard to be a long-distance mom. But it is what it is," says Olguta from Vanatori. Some people report having unbearable work experiences abroad that they had to put up with, at least until they were able to find a better job:

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> For three months, I was working for two old people and I had a terrible experience. I was crying every day. Seven hours of work per day. I felt humiliated. I had to put the food on the table for them, but then was not allowed to eat at the same table. Knowing that I had left here, from my job as a teacher, where I had taught 17 years, where I had students with intellectual parents, where as a teacher you were always invited over for special occasions as a guest of honor, to go there and see that you are nothing but a servant and treated like a dog... It was very tough and I suffered very much. (Sofica)

Practicing market citizenship challenges traditional values and triggers family reorganizations. Many migrant respondents, particularly in towns with recently developed reliance on mobility (Targu Neamt, Viseu, Negresti etc.), prioritized they children's education with particular emphasis on the importance of college degrees. At the time of the interview, around half of the women I interviewed worked abroad to invest in their children's education – it was one of the main reasons for seeking employment in another country. These findings confirm results from other studies showing that migration supports human capital formation in migrants' countries of origin (the population invests in its own education (Ferro 2004); migration encourages people to accumulate skills and diplomas, developing their human capital to increase their chances of migrating (Stark et al. 1998)). "I want them to have a better life, and without good qualifications, one cannot have a good life," says Ileana, 45, from Targu Neamt.

Even when it is managed through family networks, migration allows people to escape physically and psychologically the 'tyranny of cousins', i.e. break the traditional power relations that previously structured life in their home communities. My research in the regions of Neamt, Maramures and Satu Mare supports Vlase's conclusions about the societal restructuring effects of migration, particularly in connection with gender roles. Citizenship of the market migration empowers women by giving them the position of key income earner in the house. Mrs. Iancu is one such example of empowered woman: her family depends on her earnings for house improvement as well as for the college education of the two sons. Analyses of a chain of female migration from Vulturu (Vrancea) to Rome showed how, even though women started off with a lower migrant

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capital than men, they redefined their position within the community of origin and of domestic groups. Economic emancipation brought dramatic change in gender roles, generating new family models as well as change in social expectations (Vlase 2006; Vlase 2004).

Since they spend most time working in their employers' homes, caretakers have a daily exposure to patterns of interaction between Italian and French family members. Many women confessed that they were extremely surprised by how independent their foreign counterparts are and how much spare time they have even though they are married. A former caretaker (*badante*) who worked in Bari exclaimed: "Lucky and lazy, that's what they are! In the morning, women wake up and, if they don't drink coffee at home (which they generally do not!), they go out to have coffee and a pastry at a bar before heading to work. For lunch, they make a bit of pasta with some boiled greens; it's all very simple and it's ready in no time. In the afternoon, they meet up with their best girlfriends: they hang out, have an *espresso* in a coffee shop or go to the hairdresser's. Nothing like the life of a married woman here in Romania, where men expect you to cook all day long and to always be at home when you are not working." The completely non time-consuming cooking came up repeatedly in my interviews with the *badante*: "I did not have much to do there all day long anyway. I did not have to work all day long. Cooking is very easy over there; preparation takes no time. It's not like here: first course, second course, third course. It's just pasta and all you have to do is switch the sauce you serve it with... done!"

Women who work as caretakers also learn a lot about self-respect and living a good life even in old age. Many admit learning a lot about how to take the time and pamper themselves from their much older employers. They are surprised to see how the elderly enjoy life and are not mocked for doing so despite their old age. "They know how to live differently over there. They keep everything in order, neatly arranged... They plan ahead, no matter how old they are; they take such good care of themselves. *Batranica mea* (my old lady)," said Elena from Viseu, "was a bit

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senile, she was 89. You wouldn't have given her that age. She did not look 89; she looked wonderful. She could get by fine, otherwise, all by herself... *La noi* (over here) when women are 60 years old, they say: 'that's it. All done now: she's lived her life'. At 89, *batranica* went to the hair salon, took good care of herself. She always made sure she had her hair beautifully combed and styled. And she used anti-wrinkle creams to help her skin stay beautiful. She'd have me call to make appointments for her at the salon for hair treatments, to help her hair grow more nicely; each cost over one hundred Euro." Others were excited to share the pampering with their employers: "*Signora* bought new creams for me, just as she bought for herself," said Sanda from Targu Neamt. "We'd go to the beach together, and she'd always share the sun lotion with me. She always made sure I was treated like family. She gave me presents and extra money so I would not lack anything." Some women even talked about their trips abroad as pleasant breaks away from home: "When I came back, people remarked: 'Oh, you did not lose weight!' They were surprised. I replied: Why would I have lost weight there? There nobody stressed me out. For me, it was relaxing. After I started to speak Italian, it was great," says Elena.

Women also noticed and praised the Italians' frugality. Some even judge it as excessive: "What's the use of being that stingy? What's the point of gathering and saving when you don't know if you're going to make it until next year or not? At that age, they still save everything," says Marta who works in Treviso. "This old woman was 82. She had a pair of high heel shoes and she was keeping them in a box. I asked her: 'Well, it's fall now. Why don't you wear these shoes?' And she replied that she does not want to wear them because she's planning to wear them the following year. She was 82 and making plans about the shoes she would wear next year!"

Other surprising aspects of family relations abroad concerned the amount of privacy that parents give their children. Danuta from Targu Neamt confessed: "now I give my daughter the space she needs. We are very good friends, so I understand that she needs privacy. In Italy, I was

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so struck by how much privacy my *signora*'s children had. Then I though: 'this makes a lot of sense…' I remembered my own childhood and then realized how nice this different way of treating kids actually is," the *badante* said in a Romanian spiced with the characteristic Italian accent of experienced migrants. Women also noticed the differences in dietary habits and imported them into their home. Italian cuisine is lighter and requires less preparation time. Several told me that, upon their return, they introduced elements of Italian diet in their home. "We eat more healthily," confessed a thirty-four year-old caretaker from Viseu who works in Italy. "More fruit, more walnuts... less fatty foods… It turns out that so many traditional dishes in Romania are actually not that good for you."

Relations with natives in the host country are also the opportunity for various jokes and comparisons between sending and receiving societies, as evident from this quote from an interview with a migrant in Strasbourg:

> You know, there is a joke that goes like this: "How to become rich in France? You buy a Frenchman at what they are worth, and sell them at the value that they think they are worth." This is not at all nice to say..., but it's true. They have a great opinion about themselves and love to give lessons to others. This is their frailty. But they have exceptional qualities: welcoming, refined taste, they help others – almost naive. But they never forgive: if you have an issue with a Frenchman, they'll never forgive you. Romanians forgive; French people never do.

Migrants reported transformations on a much deeper level as well, with "settling in mobility" functioning as a rite of passage, a gateway towards un *âge de la raison*, freed from dependence, illusion and naïveté. "I see things differently; I take people as they are. Such experiences mark you, they change you; you become wiser. If you live in a rose-colored world, you remain a child. You see that there are people who can hurt you, people who don't have your interest at heart," explains Diana from Negresti. "I have become meaner," jokes Mrs. Iancu. "By that I want to say tougher. When I left for the first time, I felt overwhelmed and helpless. I was really foolish and trusted people. After working abroad for a while, I saw that I could adjust easily and

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work well anywhere. I also realized that I need to be cautious in dealing with others to stay out of trouble." Women, especially, indicated dramatic changes of perspective and attitude in interacting with others. Many became more outspoken and confident in their self-efficacy. Many discovered themselves in a new position as household breadwinner, financially independent and more powerful than the men of the house.

> I started seeing things differently. I saw that I could get by all by myself. When I came back, I did not care anymore – I just expressed my point of view. I could speak up. I just said what I had to say, what was on my mind... Before going, I would not say anything, I would shut up... Sometimes not speaking up can even make you cry. But after going there, I realized that wherever I am, I can be just fine and figure out things. I can start everything from scratch, if needed. After all, why would I stay here to put up with all this? The majority of colleagues, those of us who were younger especially, would just pick up and go somewhere else. It's only fair for us to demand to be treated well, for our work to be appreciated at its just value... (Elena, Viseul de Jos)

Most migrants echo a message related to rights and a conception of what is just. They celebrate work environments and societies in which merit determines pay, and social prestige comes from the willingness to work hard, not from connections or cheating:

> Will things get better? I think so. It depends on us. Romanians who return from the West come back with another mentality: they understand that you must work in order to have. I actually had the experience of hiring construction workers at home who had not gone out of the country, who work superficially, who don't do anything but drag their feet and pretend they're working. Whereas workers who have experience working in the West, who were used to working in the Union, and who came back with the same work habits and standards: they work cleanly, carefully, they put heart in what they are doing, they work quickly and understand that the more they work, the more money they make. They come back with a different mentality, which is a great advantage. Not to mention the money they are bringing back after all that hard work and life. That is helpful, of course. (Diana)

Despite their status as European citizens and their professional reputation, Romanians confront themselves with discrimination, particularly those who work below their level of qualification or hold manual jobs. Even highly trained, highly educated migrants have to answer prejudiced questions about the connection between Romanians and the Roma. Mihaela, a 35 year-old IT specialist, former President and founding member of the Association des étudiants roumains de Strasbourg (ADERS) shares her view on prejudice against Romanian work migrants:

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> All professional categories face discrimination to a more or less pronounced degree – doctors, law professionals, construction workers, psychologists, sociologists – usually due to issues related to the Roma presence. There was great debate surrounding, for example, a joke made about Romanians in a French satirical TV show that presented a person begging and said that it was this is the gesture for a Romanian greeting, instead of a handshake. It was a joke due to the large presence of Roma beggars in Paris, but Romanian workers were understandably upset. Romanians are stigmatized... When hiring, employees often discriminate.

Other migrants (mobile citizens) and diaspora members (immigrants) said that they never felt that they were victims of discrimination. "Italians respect you. I have only very good opinions about them. If they see you are a good person, they don't create any sort of problem. They do not discriminate against decent people or marginalize them in any way," said Elena. "I met a few Albanians who had a construction firms, they were friends with my cousin's sons. We all went out together, with a few Marocchini (i.e. Moroccan; the word is altered following the Italian word)... The other migrants I met were all people who respected their contracts," she added. Again the emphasis on legality and contracts is evident even in response to questions that did not concern any legal aspect, but rather diversity at the workplace and interactions with migrants from other countries.

For work migrants, insulting comments often pop up in everyday life. Take the case of Dana, 35, who works in agriculture in Italy: "One day, my seven-year-old son who was visiting me for summer break went to the bakery to buy some bread. The people there figured out he was Romanian and started him: 'Ah, you're Romanian: have you killed anybody yet? Have you stolen something?' This happened right after the media covered the Mailat case" [in which a Roma man of Romanian nationality was tried and sentenced to life in prison for allegedly robbing, assaulting and murdering an Italian woman – Italian authorities admitted that the investigation suffered from serious errors but upheld the verdict]. "Had my boy done anything to them? No. He had no idea about the murder or anything else. He came home very frightened." These personal experiences with discrimination alert migrants to two things: (a) the heterogeneity of migra-

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tory flows originating in Romania and (b) the injustice of negative stereotyping and exclusion based on nationality. The first is yet another warning that nationality as a collective identification does not provide a reliable basis for association; the second makes migrants feel marginalized in the host country, which stimulates investments in social status at home. If professionally inclusion can be achieved to a certain degree, some migrants notice that exclusion affects non-professional, informal interactions even more systematically: "Spanish people accept you up to a certain point, but I don't think they'd accept you beyond that," says Tudor, 27, from Targu Neamt.

Non-migrant attitudes about migration are divided. On the one hand, non-migrants appreciate the migrants' contribution to improving and embellishing their community. Some non-migrants emulate the migrants' consumerism and keep up with the standards they import to reassure themselves that they can match the mobile citizens' lifestyles. Migrants, thus, set the bar for demonstrated success and rapid ascension in socio-economic hierarchies. On the other hand, older non-migrants deplore deserted villages and the abundance of imposing, but uninhabited villas. "Everyone has gone to work abroad, there's nothing left here, nobody left to work in the fields; they just build huge houses. I'm not moving away from my old house. Even thought they are building this new one, I'll stay here. I'll die in the old house. We die together" (Ioana, 79 years old, from Ieud).

While migrants may change their lifestyles following the example of Western Europeans, they remain culturally attached to traditions, particularly when it comes to ceremonies, rituals and local customs when they are at home. Every summer and winter, migrants and non-migrants participate together in activities at home and catch up. They pick fruit, make *horinca*, go to church and spend time sharing stories about their life away from home. In mobility-reliant communities from Satu Mare and Maramures, where old and new migratory repertoires intermingle, tradition requires that individuals celebrate the main moments in life together with the entire

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community, not "outside, among strangers." As a result, apart from houses, cars, clothes and other visible possessions, migrants also invest huge sums of money in the rites of passage, celebrated with much pomp during the summer, when the entire community – migrants and non-migrants – comes together. These are moments in which the unity and solidarity of the home community is reasserted and strengthened. Ceremonies and community feasts also provide status-confirming occasions to demonstrate and generously share socio-economic success, yet another way to update one's position in local hierarchies. Funerals and weddings always happen at home, in the community. Everyone has to attend everyone else's wedding ceremonies in Maramures and Satu Mare, so the month of August is largely filled with community commitments for migrants who come back home for their summer vacation.

Contemporary wedding rituals include interesting combination of local custom and Western status-marking elements: for instance, the bride and groom still wear the heavy, very uncomfortable and very expensive traditional wedding costumes (typical for Tara Oasului), but the horse-drawn carts in the wedding convoy have been replaced by convertible cars and limousines. Spacious wedding houses that can accommodate hundreds of guests have been built, some big enough to welcome the entire village community. Catering firms take care of the food, since migrants lack the time and energy to cook and prepare elaborate wedding menus. In August, all hair salons are completely booked; customers call in from abroad to schedule their appointments ahead of time. A typical wedding costs around 50 000 Euro, but – if all the guests show up – the happy couple gathers much more than that in monetary wedding gifts.

In the past, while fulfilling the same role of gathering the village together at festive times, community weddings were much cheaper; the bride and groom wore simple traditional outfits made in the family. However, under the desire to demonstrate affluence, ceremonies have become increasingly sumptuous. Traditional elements are revamped, so as to add as much opu-

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lence as possible. Great pomp accompanies today's migrant weddings, even when the bride works as a housemaid and the groom as a construction worker. Investments for social prestige include dozens of maids of honor and groomsmen, a huge banquet and expensive outfits. A part of the celebration and/or the dinner itself often take place at the newly built villa, even though the construction is not always finished. A new symbol of success for newly weds working in France is serving the local homemade *horinca* in Eiffel Tour shaped crystal bottles. In Tara Oasului, communities follow strict traditions: the bride and groom are often from the same village and parents have a big say in the decision. The wedding dress and outfit of the bride from Oas weighs between 40 and 50 pounds and costs anywhere between 3000 and 10000 Euro, depending on the number and quality of the precious stones used for adornments. For a fancy touch, some migrants have started using Swarovski crystals. Brides also wear very elaborate hair styles that require a special traditional braiding with a crown-like head piece attached: the braiding process takes two days, and the bride has to sleep with the crown partially attached over night in a fixed position. The few women who still know how to prepare the traditional braiding make around 9000-10000 Euro per summer only from braiding (they usually work abroad as housekeepers the rest of the year).

Even though they celebrate their success with the entire community, migrants become very exigent when it comes to assessing services and products in the homeland. They start resenting the "business as usual" approach when it includes corruption and nepotism. After experiencing services abroad and witnessing the efficiency of employees who do not expect any special bribe for doing their job, migrants have a hard time readjusting to the environment at home upon return:

> We, the public, are guilty for everything that happens, because we accept and tolerate what happens. In Spain, when you go to the hospital or clinic, I cannot tell you how well they treat you. All the girls kept going to the hospital to get tests because it was completely free and you received

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> amazing treatment. I went there too, and could not believe my eyes. They made an appointment, then at that precise time I could walk into the cabinet, right on time. The doctor scheduled me for blood work for 8 o'clock and that is exactly when I was invited in. They do not expect anything from you [i.e. bribes, money or presents]. Here they look to see [her accent suddenly changes to a local drawl to comically imitate the voice and intonation of the nurses]: 'where did you put your purse? What did you bring? Where is the bag? Is the purse near enough so you can take the money out promptly?' I cannot put up with this nonsense anymore. What can be done about it? Well, I could go to the doctor and not give them anything [i.e. not bribe them] and have them do their job without any other expectations. But then everyone going should do the same, in order for my action to be meaningful and effective. I don't expect anything from parents, just because they have a kid in my class. (Diana, 41, Negresti)

The information exchange between migrants and non-migrant family members constitutes a valued source of knowledge that is generously shared with relatives and friends on a regular basis. In their community of origin, migrants are perceived as the fortunate ones who have had the privilege to travel and see what life is like elsewhere. Their migratory life-experience is treated as a window towards previously inaccessible realities. In many circles, migrants have become the focus of attention, offering insight based on the example of more developed countries and societies.

Effects of Free Movement on Political Attitudes and Orientations Towards the State and the Market

Citizens of the market partially and temporarily exit the national labor market, while maintaining political loyalty and exercising voice in the country of origin. Indeed, they are aware of the fact that access to the European integrated market can only be secured through the state; however, mobile citizens do not connect the benefits they derive from migration with their country of origin, but rather with their own efforts at the workplace in a non-national labor market. As a result, new migratory experiences erode the deeply ingrained perception that citizens depend on a nation-state monopoly when it comes to the provision of economic opportunity and protection. The interviewed migrants' exposure to the economic and political realities of the Eu-

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ropean integration project ranges from a few months to 10-15 years. While the specifics of destination countries shape the migrants' economic and political orientations, the EU-associated migratory experience seems to foster more convergence than difference in the migrants' views concerning the state, the market and politics, broadly understood.

As evident from the previous sections, contrasts between the tempo of migrant-demanded, migrant-led development, on the one hand, and the incapacity of local and national authorities to eliminate economic backwardness at the local level, on the other hand, invite cross-national comparisons of state capacity and responsiveness levels. After migration, mobile citizens mind the characteristics of their living environment that interfere directly with the life project they want to implement: deteriorating infrastructure, absence of central plumbing, limited schedules for running water provision (morning and evening), unpaved roads covered in mud, pit toilets, lack of medical care or the abysmal performance of insanitary, poorly-equipped medical units etc. all jeopardize – or, at the very least, cast a shadow – on their vision of a bright future. People are afraid to go to the local hospitals because they are persuaded that "you come out more ill than when you went in" (Tatiana, Viseul de Jos).

> The roads are crap. We buy a decent car and drive it home in the summer, and what do we run into here, in the village? Potholes in the pavement, unpaved roads and rocks, boulders... We wreck our cars coming home for the summer. It bothers us so much that we end up paving the roads ourselves. Local authorities only know how to tax us, but they never get anything done. They've promised to pave the streets and fix the water so we have tap water all day long. Just words, nothing got done... We still get one hour of cold water in the morning and a couple in the evening. Nothing for the entire rest of the day... (Octavian, 49, from Viseu)

Many government officials and representatives of local authorities emphasized the positive consequences of migration: migrants become "civilized"; they are the most cosmopolitan members of their village community; they have "traveled and seen the world outside"; they have permanent access to a foreign language, culture and civilization. They bring back from abroad the marks of a lifestyle that was unconceivable only a couple of decades ago: the democracy-

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associated material and non-material remittances that *Homo Sovieticus* was not even allowed to dream about. During the time they regularly spend abroad, migrants have access to resource-rich and institutionally efficient environments. "Whenever I go back, I experience a certain kind of shock. I suddenly find myself in an "under-civilized" environment. Then I start thinking about ways in which I can change things to replicate at home what I saw abroad," says a college student who studied in the UK on an Erasmus scholarship, worked as a bartender in a British pub and traveled around Europe.

Migrants differentiate economic circumstances and state capacity from national sentiment. Most assert that they would have preferred not to travel abroad, had that been actually possible: "I had no choice but to leave. There was not a job here in the village. They turned us into a town [the mayor's office applied for the commune to get town status] in order for them to tax us on our houses, but we have no paved roads, we have no water, we have no sewer system, we have no medical cabinet whatsoever. This is the situation at home. Now tell me how I could have stayed, how I could have lived here and gotten by without working outside" (Iulia, agricultural worker, in Italy). After having experienced life in a Western European country, however, the standard of living from abroad becomes the normal kind of reality and level of performance that citizens expect:

> I spent four years working in France. I travelled back and forth a lot. My grandchildren were already there. I got hired as a housekeeper and baby sitter in Paris. The city was wonderful, and all I had to do is take care of the family's children: pick them up from school, give them some food, make sure the old one did her homework, then go for walks in the beautiful parks and gardens. I had worked as an accountant before going outside. I really enjoyed myself in France. After six months, when I returned to the village, it was as if I had entered hell (secretary from the vice-mayor's office, 54).

European mobility shows migrants that arbiter institutions and regulations protect the value of work from any sorts of interference abroad. At home, many remember the difficulties of navigating a workplace in which nepotism was the norm and priority was given to the "old

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guard": "Over there, the generation gap, the generation conflict is much less pronounced. Here, they would just undermine you, criticized you behind your back, say that young people don't work as well etc. They just want to put you in a bad light in the boss' eyes," recalls Elena.

Mobile citizens see political authorities and bureaucrats as corrupt; while before living abroad, they tolerated inefficiencies and accepted omnipresent bribe requests as a fact of life, after returning they do not cope with such abuses as easily. Moreover, migrants often report feeling targeted by authorities who assume they have higher resources than others and, consequently, try to milk them much more and extract whatever benefit they can. Mircea, 25, from Borsa, accused police patrols of stopping or harassing cars with foreign license plates: "They stop cars with Italian license plates, because they know people come home after a year of work and they want to get "their share"... That's what they call it. So they stop the car and give the driver a hard time, until they get some money, and then they let them go. This is what Romania does for Romanians who work abroad."

Migrants contrast the predictable, transparent legal environment abroad, in which authorities do their job properly and enforce the law, with the corruption of the legal system at home and the government's failure to enforce the rule of law. They also resent the fact that, due to poor state management of the economy, their skills and work are not rewarded at their just value. "You should know that abroad one's value is really, truly recognized, it's acknowledged much more than in your own country," says Ioan. In other words, while the integrated market rewards hard work adequately, the national level market does not. The obstacle that migrants feel that they need to leave behind in the integrated labor market is their nationality. "Our reputation as a group is far from great. In Italy and in Spain, employers put you to the test. You have to gain their trust. They all start from the idea 'this person is Romanian' and this is a handicap automatically that you need to overcome. You need to prove that you are different from the

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Romanians they know. But they are right to do so," says Vasile. For migrants who manage to prove their professional value abroad, the path has its difficulties: "There are many Romanians who go there [i.e. abroad] just to make money, and those have to make huge sacrifices. If you want to set money aside, you have to make great sacrifices. They eat no matter what, live four-five in the same room, they get by however they can, because over there rent is very high. 250 Euros per room, for instance. One room, shared bathroom and kitchen, shared with everyone else," explains Diana. "When people make that kind of sacrifice, they want to take full advantage of their earnings without having to bribe anyone or pay high fees or taxes..." Migrants see themselves as development agents in their home communities; since they do not feel adequately protected by homeland authorities, they do not find it fair to be asked to bare the burden of obligations and to be constantly reminded of the duties they have toward their country. They reject the obedience-based view of the state-citizen relationship, which they associate with communism, and assess their connection with the homeland in more critical terms. Furthermore, they see themselves as already fulfilling their duty towards the country of origin, without receiving anything in return. For that reason, they do not resonate with state appeals to embrace an obligation-driven vision of citizenship, at least not before they have some guarantee that the country will respect their rights and stop treating them as second-tier citizens. Most have negative experiences with Romanian representatives or politicians abroad, and generally feel neglected by their country despite the fact that they maintain their political loyalty. In a nutshell, migrants favor a rights-centered calibration of the state-citizen relationship.

Migration puts mobile citizens in the situation to interact with representatives of their homeland abroad. Many of them have more institutional interaction with the state after leaving national territory than they ever had before working abroad. Such interactions are most of the time a source of profound disappointment. Mobile citizens recall countless occasions in which

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government representatives took no interest in their fate and left at the mercy of abusive foreign employers or of biased host-country authorities. Gina says: "I know some examples of bad treatment of employees – people who would treat you as if you were their slave, just because you got paid; one employer refused to pay a caretaker and said 'if you want to complain, go to the police' (knowing fully well that migrant could not report, since she are in irregular situation)." Others reported not being allowed to take any food from the fridge ("I do not pay you to eat, I pay you to work"). Mobile citizens hold the state responsible for not taking their part or protecting them against abuses by employers and authorities of the receiving countries.

When confronted with abuse and prejudice, migrants often attempted to draw the attention of government representatives. In some cases, they resorted to extreme actions, setting themselves on fire (the case that the Romanian priest recalled) or going on hunger strike to protest the violation of their rights. When state authorities mentioned these incidents, they usually cited them as examples of how unreasonable migrants are, given available resources and their position abroad. Embassy and consulate officials in both France and Italy claimed that migrants were "abusing the rights discourse" and "accusing rights encroachments left and right, usually excessively and without an actual basis." The migrants focus on legal procedure and their desire to make sure they exhaust any potential path in the system has even led to bizarre situations at a contemporary art exhibition opened in the small gallery of the Romanian Cultural Institute (ICR – Institutul Cultural Roman) in Venice. The curator of the exhibition recalled that, on several occasions, migrants came in to attempt to secure the support or legal advice of some representative of the Romanian state: "Once there was a bartender, aged 29-30, who told me he did not want to go back to Romania because he could not make a living there... But he was having trouble making enough money in Italy as well. Another time there was a caretaker woman who had already gone to request support in a legal action against her employer to demand better work

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conditions. She talked about the fact that she attempted to petition but noticed that Italians always are biased against non-Italians..."

While non-migrants tend to look back at the political and economic realities of the past somewhat nostalgically, remembering the communist era as a time of prosperity, migrants gradually shed that view, as they notice the state's lack of capacity. Whenever possible, they resort to institutional channels to voice their demands and uphold their rights. Since the integrated European market gives them the fastest avenues for social mobility, they embrace a minimalist state that does not interfere in their economic affairs or create boundaries to development. As a result of their migratory experiences, mobile citizens favor political parties that support European integration, free market policies and a state focused on fostering a reliable legal and business environment, one in which the rule of law is guaranteed. Romanian citizens abroad voted overwhelmingly in favor of the center-right, pro-market PDL (*Partidul Democrat Liberal*), and many of the migrants I interviewed supported President Basescu and his party. In Paris, despite the freezing cold, windy and wet weather, migrants sacrificed an entire Sunday to stand in line for four-five hours to cast a vote to re-elect the PDL incumbent. Even if their political sympathies initially leaned towards the political left or towards platforms with nation-focused, obedience-centered messages, mobile citizens now feel anchored to the destiny of the European project through their connection as citizens of the market. They depend on it for their economic needs and for securing socioeconomic mobility.

When asked about whether Romania's accession to the EU is a good thing, the strong and cheerful Anca, 52, from Targu Neamt replies:

> Thank God it happened! This place was dead. There was nothing to do, no work to find in town. Just problems and poverty everywhere. We needed a way out and nobody was helping us in any way. So we did it ourselves. We rolled up our sleeves. We went to work. We did what we had to do for ourselves and our families. Those guys in Bucharest are too busy filling up their pockets, stealing and such. What do they care about us? Now, at least, we have a chance. It's not the easi-

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> est thing in the world, leaving everything behind, going in the unknown to make some money and have a decent life here, once you're back. But we're proud of what we have achieved! We leave something behind for the younger ones: we're sending them to school, making sure they don't lack a thing... At least they will have a better life.

However, migrants assess realistically the advantages and disadvantages of the European integration project. While they favor free movement and the associated rights, they acknowledge the fact that there are tradeoffs: "In life, there's a price to pay for everything you get," says Diana. "Indeed, it's great that the borders are open, that you can go elsewhere and see so many things, that you are not limited anymore, that people have different perspectives. We are also seen differently, Romanians and Bulgarians – things will change for the better. For a young person to be able to go legally and work, make money, it's wonderful. And all that is thanks to the European Union." In particular, migrants think about the financial burden that supporting candidates in future rounds of enlargement or less developed states may entail for Romania. "The fact that we have to align ourselves to civilization is a great thing. We were and still are assisted by developed countries; perhaps the time will come for us to help others..." Migrants point out the constraints that the European Union imposes on businesses at home, by upholding standards that are hard to achieve and end up eliminating firms from the market. "I cannot say that joining the EU was very advantageous for us in the medical industry. It was not. They have been working for years on certain standards. They have very advanced, high performance equipment. In order to get to that level, you need a few decades, let's say. So you cannot compete on the market, you cannot resist to that kind of competition, no matter if your product is very good... You have to align to their standards," said Elena.

While there is quasi-unanimous agreement among migrants that EU accession was the thing to do for Romania as a country, mobile citizens do not self-identify as European citizens or transfer their attachments to the EU in non-economic matters. Non-migrant family members

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from migrant-dependent households also report becoming increasingly favorable to the EU over time. Non-migrant respondents who did not have connections with citizens of the market were also the most skeptical about participation in the European project as a whole. Immigrants who were a part of previous "classical" mobility waves (to both France and Italy) were among the most skeptical: they expressed doubts about the value of EU accession for the country they left and blamed what they saw as "unusually harsh austerity programs" and reforms, as well as the drop in quality of life on the European project:

> Accession to the EU? For students, life is much better now since the *carte de séjour* simplifies procedures... but I don't know how beneficial it was for Romania as a country. There is a visible devaluation of life over there: with a state employee salary, one cannot get by. I know because my sister works in the state sector. There are many difficulties. Romania is better known in certain circles: Romanian doctors have been able to gain recognition and make good careers, but personally, I myself cannot say that I was changed by the fact that Romania joined the European Union. (Mihaela)

With respect to loyalties, despite their disappointment vis-à-vis the nation-state and national political elites, Eastern European migrants remain attached to their countries of origin. None seemed to embrace a post-national citizenship; yet, their attitudes towards their country of origin did change in consistent ways. Migrants reported becoming less tolerant of corruption, more bothered by government inefficiencies, less supportive of state intervention (which they perceive as ineffective). Even though they do not spontaneously identify as EU citizens, migrants strongly support the European Union's presence in their life, as a main provider of opportunities, and express high levels of trust in the integrated market. The in-depth interviews did not reveal "long-distance nationalism" à la Benedict Anderson, however, they showed that migrants preserve political loyalty to the country of origin, in many case accompanied by national sentiment and the intention to exercise voice or make a difference in the sending community.

> My hopes for the future in Romania? Well, let me relate to workplace issues, yes? I hope that there will be a different type of relationship, one that emphasizes the promotion young generations, one that acknowledges that we need the youth, that more opportunities should be given to young generations. And that young people be paid adequately, so they can afford to live here and

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> not have to go abroad. I don't think that someone who were paid decently here and managed to have everything they needed would leave to go somewhere else. But now, if you think about it, what perspectives do you have? What would you return to? Nobody offers you anything here. And when there's one person who is younger and arrives in the workplace better prepared, then they are afraid that you want to replace them and take their job. And they finish you. (Elena)

Due to their work-revolving take on societal realities, migrants do not trust politicians who promise too much and do too little. "I am very disappointed with the political class. They mock average people, that's what they do. When people live in poverty and die of hunger, they splurge, buy all sorts of fancy cars, houses, air conditioning and so on. I know a politician who is a great person, who is intelligent and has managed to climb up the hierarchy. But I don't know how long he will last," said Diana. By default, migrants generally declare themselves not to be interested in politics to avoid trouble or labels; however, upon further probing, it becomes obvious that what they mean is that they despise the current kind of politics that they associate with the self-serving power and money games politicians play at home. "To make a political career, you cannot be an honest person," sighs Maria from Targu Neamt. In response to the politicians' promises, migrants adopt the same pragmatic approach that they apply to assessing any kind of work: "I don't want this long list of promises, just these two things here. Tell me that you'll get two things done, not the full list. If you cannot do that with certainty, how can anyone trust what you are promising," recalls Mihai a conversation with a politician who came to Italy for his electoral campaign to mobilize the diaspora vote. "Present day politicians are all opportunistic. I try to vote for the least bad option. Romania is quite homogeneous towards the bad side," says Petre.

More recently, political parties from Romania have started investing resources in creating a transnational presence by opening branches in the communities where mobile citizens live or, at the very least, by organizing electoral campaign tours in host countries. (This strategic line of behavior will be analyzed in Chapter IV in more detail.) Romanian immigrants have organized

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themselves and entered politics either through political parties in the host country (running as candidates in local council elections, for instance) or as independent Romanian parties (in Italy and Spain). The Romanian diaspora has not organized itself into a political party in France; in more recent host countries that receive migrants from new European mobilities, however, the push towards voice and political action has been significant. The (immigrant) leaders of parties based on national solidarity registered abroad complain about the lack of interest among Romanian new migrants who are focused on economic goals to the detriment of politics. "They do not have time for meetings or demonstrations against discrimination," said the Secretary of the Romanian Party in Italy – Romanian Identity Party (Partidul *"Identitatea Romaneasca*," PIR, headquarters in Rome). The presence of more familiar political parties from Romania in the receiving countries poses other challenges for newly established Romanian parties in the diaspora. PIR condemns the transnational activities of Romanian-based political parties as illegal and demands that Romanian migrants, "who had to leave due to the incompetence of the Romanian political class," finally be left alone by manipulative politicians. Some leaders of Romanian migrant and diaspora associations report being confident that, if people with migratory experience enter politics, reform and radical political cultural transformation may be possible:

> Profession has a great impact on people's appreciation of the opportunities the freedom of movement creates; the general impact affects us all, we can all travel. For business opportunities, only some will make the most of them. On the economic level, take the example of the person who works as a doctor in a neighborhood, that person is less affected. On a personal level, every one of us is affected. Everyone can move in a greater space. (...) European integration has positive effects for everyone.
>
> On joining the Union, good or bad: "I'll answer with a question: is the internet a good thing? The possibility to communicate? It's an openness that can only be beneficial. Beyond any debate. Especially there are major effects in terms of civilization or culture-civilization.
>
> My teams of technicians work on the big construction sites in my domain, side by side with Germany teams; I watch this as if it were a movie... Work starts, the German team shows up, mimetic effects play their role: after three hours, my workers work at the same pace as their German counterparts. My productivity goes up very much, my profit increases, satisfaction with the quality of the work...

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> Let us not forget that, if we talk about migration and the impact of people's mobility and of multicultural contact, let us not forget that Romania is administrated by people who have not migrated, people who did not go get impregnated with new models, that remain opaque to new models that others would like to introduce in Romania... Romania is governed anachronistically. Politics and administrations fall behind when compared to the economic dynamics I mentioned previously. (President of the Romanian Center of Strasbourg, France, entrepreneur)

The phenomenon of return migrants going into politics is relatively common, in fact. Out of the local elected officials I interviewed, five had migratory experiences and several had family members working abroad at the time of the interview. One of the mayors had gone apple picking in Italy together with other employees from the town hall, while in office. Some local officials that I interviewed in migrant sending communities had migratory work experiences before starting their political career. They subsequently ran as center-right PDL candidates. One mayor said: "I realized that, through all that hard work, I had finally achieved everything I wanted for myself and my family. We were all set. Then I though to myself: it's now time to do something for the community itself. I have a responsibility towards it. I realized I could make a difference. So that's how I got into politics." Other ex-migrants, now-politicians told me that non-migrant people in their communities gave them the idea to run for office. "You are a good manager. You know how to get things done. Why don't you run for office? they asked," remembers the Mayor of Salistea de Sus, Maramures, who went to Italy to pick apples. "I thought it would be a good idea. I guess people trust you more when they see you made it. Right? If you already have everything you need, it's less likely that you will ask them for bribes and what not."

Other migrants I interviewed had received offers from political parties upon returning home. Some said they were still considering a political career at some point. Others said they turned down the recruitment offers because of the current nature of politics in Romania:

> When I came back, I had offers from various political parties who wanted me to get involved, to participate more actively. They said: "Come on, you speak well." But I said: "Sorry, I cannot do it, because I cannot lie. And to be there, one has to lie. You can write all you want down on paper, I won't say it out loud when I know that it's not going to happen, when I know it's not going to actually get done. Not a chance!" And they said: "You'll be persuasive, you can persuade peo-

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> ple, come on." And I said: "I cannot manipulate people. When elections come around, the biggest lies get told. Poor people: they go, they hope, and what are they left with at the end? Nothing." (Diana)

An interesting effect is the female migrants' urge to invest in human capital, by sending their children to private colleges and universities, teaching them to work hard and guiding them towards learning foreign languages. Migrants often adopt a didactic tone, speaking from experience, while sharing with non-migrant community members the lessons of European mobility. Such "lessons" typically involve an educational component that has to do with respecting laws and working hard, without getting discouraged upon noticing injustice or the fortunes of people who are not "making honest money":

> Since I've returned, I've been trying to pass some ideas onto people. First, do everything possible to get your children to learn foreign languages. It's a great service to oneself, but also to others, since they can help. Teach them to work hard, diligently, because things will change and in time their value will be recognized. It's tough. People know what is going on, especially in a small community, everyone knows who finished where, with what grades, with what help from whom etc. That can be discouraging since people say: "Why should I keep studying? Look at the guy who barely completed six school grades and look how he now owns a multi-million business. And look what his cars he drives around, while I have completed three university specializations and am waiting for the maxi-taxi in the bus stop, so it can take me to work. (Diana)

Unlike immigrants who confess identifying home with both their sending and their receiving country, citizens of the market only declare an identity connection with the country of origin. Politically, they support forces that promote – or, at least, do not interfere – with their project of expanding individual rights and liberties, and diversifying one's range of available market choices. Migrants follow economic and political news on television and via internet. They remain in touch constantly with non-migrant relatives and friends from home. As a result, their national sentiment remains moderated by access to current political realities, which prevents any idealization or nostalgia that opportunistic politicians could manipulate for electoral gain. Some hope that European integration will somehow provide a solution to what they perceive as a crisis of the political class:

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> The educational *acquis* is essential here, that's where serious work needs to get done. It's very complicated. Who can bring solutions? Perhaps Europe can. This brings me back to what we were discussing earlier: economic integration boosts the chances that the nation can educate itself more quickly. Europe offers good models to emulate. (President of the Romanian Center of Strasbourg, entrepreneur)

At the individual level, Romanians who work abroad do their best to participate in political decisions that affect the homeland. They vote in elections and discuss politics with families and in their close circles of friends. Even though they are initially reserved when asked to state their political stance, they have strong opinions and they are much less reluctant to share them than non-migrant members of the community. While the numbers indicate relatively low levels of electoral participation among Romanians who work abroad, participant observations in migrant-receiving communities suggest that decontextualized statistics do not convey an accurate image of political realities. At the last presidential elections, in 2009, there were interminable lines at the Romanian embassy on Rue de l'Exposition, near the Tour Eiffel in Paris. Thousands of people waited in the rain for four hours (on average) to vote. Only five voting stamps were available inside the embassy, but people were willing to sacrifice their Sunday afternoon to make their voice heard. I talked to many of the migrants who were waiting in line: all expressed their excitement to vote for the incumbent president, Traian Basescu, the candidate of the center-right liberal-democratic party (PDL), and to make sure that his opponent, Mircea Geoana, of the Social-Democrat communist-successor party, does not win.

In Italy, similar organizational problems prevent Romanians from voting. Even so, mobile citizens want to have a say, especially in major elections. In the countries with large migrant communities, Romanians overwhelmingly supported Traian Basescu and the center-right party (who won 81% of the vote in Spain, 79% of the vote in France and 78% of the diaspora vote in Italy). Politicians are aware that, since migrants are the breadwinners, their views have significant impact on families left at home. As the Romanian Consul Ion Calciu said, "those back in Roma-

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nia ask: 'Whom should we vote for?' And then relatives wait for the signal from the migrants who support the entire family financially. Unsurprisingly, Romanian politicians now travel abroad during their campaigns and talk to migrants in Italy." Indeed, both in the Romanian case, as well as in the Polish case, many politicians, but especially those representing center-right parties and those who have the highest positions in government (Romanian President Traian Basescu, Polish Prime-Minister Donald Tusk) have cultivated their relationship with established diaspora and migrant communities. Both Basescu and Tusk spent considerable time campaigning abroad (and, after winning the elections, thanking migrants for their support).

While older, more established and more diverse Romanian diasporas, like the one in France, are characterized by a proliferation of civil society associations, newer diasporas in Italy and Spain develop not only in the NGO realm but also in the political arena. Right after Romania's accession to the EU, two political parties were formed: PIR (the Romanian Identity Party or the Party of Romanians in Italy) and then PIRUM (the Party of Romanians in Spain – Partido Iberico de los Rumanos). Both parties were established by diaspora members who are highly educated and want to make a political career for themselves in the receiving country by capitalizing on the frustrations associated with the transnational migratory experience. The primary strategy of both parties is entering alliances with established parties from the receiving countries, as well as entering local and regional elections with candidates. They have a strong pro-European stance, and emphasize their separation from the "corrupt" political elites at home. However, in their desire to put Romanian identity at the center of their message, these political parties distance themselves from the position of many migrants who are much more reserved when it comes to expressing feelings of national pride. There is a disconnect between the migratory experience of these emerging diaspora party leaders, who have settled down in the receiving country,

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who are highly-educated and shielded from discrimination, who can celebrate their Romanian identity much more overtly than the migrant who holds an uncertain job and distrusts co-ethnics.

Most migrants told me that they don't have the physical time for an active involvement in political life. However, they do follow politics on the internet (read newspapers online, discuss politics using online forums) and watch Romanian TV when they have time. There are hundred of discussion lists and websites dedicated to the Romanian transnational migrant community in Italy, France, Spain, Germany, the UK etc., as well as broad umbrella forums and virtual newsletters targeting transnational migrants from all across the EU. These online resources help migrants share experiences and information, discuss articles or videos posted online by Romanian mass media, chat about political developments at home and abroad etc. The qualitative evidence presented in this dissertation shows that that the "connected migrant" (Diminescu 2008) is not only connected to the society, but also to political realities back home.

Traditional, Transnational or Post-National? The Effects of Mobility on the State-Citizen Relationship

Migrants acquire new skills and adopt the higher professional standards of the receiving Italian society. These are transformations that even the highest-ranking Romanian government officials in Italy (the Romanian Ambassador to Italy and the Romanian Consul in Rome) have noted as a factor of positive change. They also remarked the changes in mentality triggered by increasing financial prosperity and the availability of savings. One of the Romanian Orthodox priests in Veneto actually complained that migrants start emulating the Italian lifestyle (in particular, the Italians' passion for shopping) and work hard only to later spend money on pricey purchases. He added that migratory experiences have positive effects on migrants because they put

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Romanians in contact with a “new reality of political life,” one in which they are foreigners, abandoned, with nobody really interested in their wellbeing, a situation in which the Romanian state is absent. These circumstances have a paradoxically positive impact because force migrants to reflect more on their situation without taking anything for granted.

Elements of the traditional and transnational models of identity and loyalty emerge with a twist: unlike in classical migratory situations, wandering EUropeans do not transfer their loyalties from their country of origin to their receiving country. They assess Italian society as external observers and then learn from it without a simultaneous “emotional rapprochement.” Indeed, the reports of *Caritas* indicate that Romanians (like all other wandering EUropeans, for that matter) have relatively low rates of naturalization in Italy. Basically, even those living abroad for extended periods of time as legal residents choose to keep the citizenship of their country of origin instead of switching. Communication with family members and friends from home (via cell phone, Skype or email) reinforce the transnational community.

The desire to return is indeed so great that in the Romanian community of about 10,000 people that are affiliated to the Christian Orthodox Romanian parish of Treviso, there have been only four or five funerals since the current priest started his pastoral activity in 1998. “The rest wanted to be buried back home, in the communities where they come from. In general, Romanians feel connected to their country and they keep the traditions. The church has provided a focal point. It helps them identify with Romania and it stimulates their solidarity as a community.” Father M. arrived in Italy as a theology student on a scholarship, and was asked to stay as a priest. In this capacity, he witnessed the expansion of the Orthodox Church from the Northern

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regions to the ensemble of the Italian territory, as waves of Romanian migrants arrived.[16] Even though about half of the wandering EUropeans have purchased some property in Italy (apartments, cars), this is all just the bare minimum, some strictly necessary possessions for living and working in Italy. By no means should these be considered as indicative of a desire to settle down, Father M. said.

Although emotional and cultural connections with the country of origin persist, there is a pronounced disillusionment of wandering EUropeans with respect to the performance of Romanian authorities back home and in Italy. If anything, the time abroad reinforces the mistrust and frustration that migrants developed in Romania during the decades of communism and the uncertain post-1989 transitional times. There are two versions of the story: one coming from the Romanian diaspora and its organizations (migrants and diaspora leadership), another coming from representatives of the Romanian government in the receiving society (Consulate and Embassy officials).

On the one hand, wandering EUropeans express a sense of abandonment *vis-à-vis* institutions of the Romanian state on Italian soil and Romanian political parties. Migrants and diaspora representatives often complained that consulates failed to provide help and officials did not show enough interest in their situation. Specifically, respondents referred to the bureaucratic inefficiencies that force people to stand in line, night and day, in front of consulates in order to translate documents like birth certificates or driver licenses. "There is a certain animosity and mistrust that Romanians who live here feel towards the Romanian institutions in Italy," a key informant in Treviso said. Many political parties visit the diaspora only during electoral campaigns to ask

[16] Orthodox churches in Italy play not only a religious role; they also got involved in moral, social and paperwork issues, to facilitate Romanians' integration in Italian communities. To formally distinguish religious matters from other spheres of activity, the church established socio-cultural associations also run by church personnel.

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for votes. As a result, Romanian wandering EUropeans feel abandoned politically and socially, doubly excluded abroad and at home.

On the other hand, consulate and embassy representatives affirm their unwavering commitment to assisting Romanians abroad in a wide range of situations. However, they underscore the fact that Romanians in Italy have unreasonably high expectations about what the Romanian state can do for them outside the country's territory. The Romanian Consul in Rome[17] said that consulates help Romanians abroad with documents and translations. They inform Romanian citizens about their rights and duties related to integration after they become residents and support citizens by providing details about pay rights. The consulate network also assists Romanians who get arrested in Italy. The Consul underscored that consulates cannot intervene in criminal cases (penal law), which constantly leads to disappointments when unaware Romanians involved in such cases abroad contact the consulate to request help. Many Romanians contact consuls to report alleged violations of their rights. Some use the phrase "I do not have a fair trial" as a standard formula; once they are asked more specific questions, they cannot say in what specific aspects their trial is not fair.

Romania's Ambassador to Italy remarked that the presence of 3 million Romanian citizens abroad is an "unprecedented experience for the Romanian state."[18] In the last years, the number of Romanian associations has skyrocketed from 18 registered associations on the embassy website to over 80 associations in 2009. Inevitably, available resources have been spread thin. To respond to exponentially increasing demands, the state has developed a system of assistance connecting migrants to their homeland (summer camps for the migrants' children, Romanian

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[17] Interview with the Consul of Romania – Romanian Consulate, Rome, August 2009.

[18] Interview with Romania's Ambassador to Italy – Rome, August 2009.

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book donations, a program that sends Romanian teachers in schools that have over 10 Romanian students to teach the Romanian language, literature, culture and civilization, geography). The Ambassador pointed out, despite governmental efforts, Romanian migrants are still dissatisfied. "Paternalism persists as an attitude despite the intervening detachment… Romanians in Italy still ask "what does the state do for me?" even though it is they who initiated the detachment in the first place."

Romanian authorities misunderstand the rights-focused view of the state-citizen relationship that migrants embrace, express and demand. They mistake the migrants' rights-centered discourse for "paternalism," without acknowledging that migrants actually demand a less pronounced state presence at home, which contradicts the paternalism argument. Even though they do not gauge how profound the migrants' transformation is, local officials appear to have a better grasp of the migrants' initial set of objectives and preferences. Government representatives abroad, while in a better position to observe the manifestations of migration-triggered changes, have troubles decoding the meaning of migrant demands and expectations toward the state, seeing the migrants as people who exercise exit without being ready to accept that exit entails loss of state protection. Migrants insist that they are still citizens entitled to the protection of homeland institutions and representatives.

Distrust towards politicians and parties was widespread among migrants, migrant family members and non-migrants alike. Interestingly, however, migrants expressed high levels of support for democracy as a political system and European integration, confirming the fact that, in a still defective, emerging democracy, the people may be rightfully critical of the way the system works without questioning the fundamental values of democracy (high levels of diffuse support are compatible with low levels of specific support). A higher number of non-migrants expressed some degree of nostalgia towards the communist past and the presence of a strong state that took

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care of every aspect of life, so that families could live together, not dispersed. In contrast, migrants were more likely to blame current problems on the communist legacy and to compare the situation in Romania with realities they had experienced in the West. Some moderate expressions of national sentiment came associated with a preference for law-and-order political platforms, reflecting a desire for rule of law and anti-corruption measures. Non-migrant family members mentioned information they had heard from migrant breadwinners to justify their economic and political preferences; their political orientations and electoral options resembled more closely those of migrants than those of non-migrant counterparts of the same age, education level and socio-economic status.

When asked to comment on the rise of migration into Romania of workers from other parts of the world (Asia, Africa), citizens of the market embrace a tolerant, cosmopolitan and open view. They agree that this is normal in our time, and conclude that economic need pushes people towards migration all over the world. "They have to make a living. They come here because they think it's better," said a former migrant from Targu Neamt. "Poor things!" exclaimed Mrs. Iancu. "They come here because they don't know just how badly things are going in Romania."

Comparing the Migratory Experiences of Polish and Romanian Migrants

There is already a significant amount of literature on the free movement of Polish migrants. In this section, I review some of the main contributions to that literature and compare the findings with my own results about Romanian high-mobility migrants.

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Polish migrants benefited from more developed support networks that existed in Western European countries of destination as a result of previous immigration waves, like the post-WW II generations of immigrants. The majority of Polish temporary or seasonal migrants relied "in one way or another on ties to and the assistance provided by previous migrants of the same or earlier cohort" (Düvell & Garapich 2011; Eade et al. 2007). While Romanian migrants helped one another, there was much more solidarity within migratory generations than across groups, due to the interruptions in migrant flows imposed during communism. As Chapter IV will show in the macro-level analysis, this feature of the Polish migrant communities plays a role in determining the strategy the governments select for free movement management.

Both Polish and Romanian-owned construction companies rely on steady flows of highly mobile migrants. Caretakers also recruit one another through informal networks. New information and communication technologies enable Polish and Romanian employers or networks to recruit workers from the sending country in a matter of days (Düvell & Garapich 2011; Diminescu 2008). Sending communities are, in general, heavily reliant on intra-EU mobility and citizenship of the market for their prosperity and development.

Migrants split their lives between sending and receiving countries (Burrell 2009a). Like the Romanian migrants that I interviewed, Polish migrants "participate in activities and are simultaneously attached to" their homeland and their workplace country. They "operate in social networks and markets that are rooted in and connect both countries." They maintain constant communication with family and friends at home, and visit frequently. A large 2007 survey by Garapich and Osipovic reported that 25% of migrant respondents had daily contact with families and friends back home via internet, mobile or landline phone calls, text messages etc.; 43% maintained contact several times per week (Düvell & Garapich 2011). The same survey showed that Polish migrants hey keep in touch with social, economic, political and cultural realities at

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home through media, entertainment and consumption of Polish goods even while abroad. 52% used Polish Internet websites and 28% reported watching Polish television channels either daily or several times per week.

Polish migrants seem to travel home more frequently than their Romanian counterparts. The large-scale survey found that 20% of migrants visited their country of origin four times per year, and 40% visited twice a year. In another study, in-depth interviews with 50 migrants revealed that, out of the sample, 40 people visited Poland very frequently (between three and ten times a year), 35 maintained strong economic and life interest in their home community by pursuing training or education, maintaining businesses, engaging in political participation by voting in Polish elections etc. (Eade et al. 2007; Düvell & Garapich 2011).

Some migrants are low skilled, but many possess relatively high levels of education, even though many end up working in low-paying jobs (Drinkwater et al. 2009). As is the case with Romanian work migrants in Italy and France, a large proportion of Polish migrants in the UK expect to continue working abroad for a relatively long time, even though they do not intend to settle down permanently in the country where they work (Eade et al. 2007; Drinkwater et al. 2009). All want to climb up the social ladder at home and to improve their socio-economic position. For that reason, they do not seek comfort in the receiving country. High-mobility migrants value work ethic, professionalism and discipline at the workplace (Eade et al. 2007; Düvell & Garapich 2011)

Out of all contemporary Polish migrants from pre- and post-accession migrant cohorts, only about a fifth have plans for long-term settlement abroad (Eade et al. 2007). Even among these respondents, many migrants do not exclude the possibility of eventually moving back to Poland for retirement or after their children complete their education. Like Romanian migrants, Poles enjoy the flexibility that European citizenship provides: in large numbers, they declare hav-

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ing an open-ended, still undecided migratory project, with plans for the future that may change as a function of future economic and political evolutions. Citizens of the market, whether Polish or Romanian, like to keep their options open and enjoy the freedom of choice that the integrated labor market offers. This flexibility allows highly mobile citizens to adapt much more easily to evolutions in supranational labor markets and avoid some of the risks associated with the current world economy (Düvell & Garapich 2011). The open-ended nature of migratory projects comes at a cost: some workers "get stuck in the secondary labor market," some never manage to secure long-term financial stability, and others experience family breakdown, homelessness, violations of workplace standards, lack of employment rights and other vulnerabilities (idem supra). While some Polish migrants report occasionally facing discrimination, most are satisfied with their situation. They enjoy upward mobility, higher returns for their labor and an improved social status, and do not report suffering as a result of alienation, uprootedness or de-skilling. Most report gaining money and important professional experience as a result of working abroad (Düvell & Garapich 2011).

All in all, there is considerable empirical evidence supporting the idea that intra-EU migrations, in particular Polish and Romanian migratory flows to Western European countries, share several socio-economic and political characteristics. As a result, one can hypothesize that they will have relatively similar transformative effects on migrant-sending communities and regions from a political perspective. The next chapter examines regional differences in electorally-expressed political attitudes driven by high-mobility migration in Poland and Romania.

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Chapter III. Political Effects of Migration: Individual and Subnational Level Variation in Political and Economic Preferences

The micro-level analysis in Chapter II revealed that intra-EU migrations have substantial political, economic and general lifestyle effects on individual migrants, their families, friends and acquaintances. The migrants' different life experiences transform their perspectives, preferences and behaviors, as well as inform their perceptions of government authorities and their expectations as citizens vis-à-vis the home country. The transformative power of migratory experiences does not limit itself to people who are directly engaged in intra-EU mobility, making it more difficult to identify a clear migrant-sedentary political cleavage. Those who "go out to work" (i.e. work abroad) are not uprooted from sending communities and societies, as was the case with many exiting migrants from the past; rather, they become the "actors of a culture of bonds" and use the latest information and communication technologies to maintain "remote relations typical of relations of proximity" and "activate them on a daily basis." These "connected migrants" (Diminescu 2008) become socialization agents for non-migrant household and family members, as well as close friends. This translates into striking diffusion effects and considerable contrasts at the local level. But just how far do the bottom-up effects of labor market migration extend? Does their intensity and geographic concentration make them discernible at a higher subnational level of analysis?

Given the magnitude of intra-EU migrations and their non-uniform geographic distribution across national territories (Martin & Radu 2012), this chapter attempts to determine whether the trends found in the micro-level analysis are also detectable in meso-level aggregates. Is the massive presence of market migrants associated with some socio-political and economic prefer-

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ences in the regions that rely on European citizenship and mobility to a significant extent? Is there a certain "typical" attitudinal and voting preference profile that distinguishes counties whose inhabitants witness or participate in intra-EU migrations more intensely and frequently? Adopting a meso-level unit of analysis, i.e. voivodships for Poland and judete for Romania, the dissertation compares counties with higher levels of intra-EU migration and those with lower levels of participation in new European mobilities to examine their position on economic and political axes.

Theoretical Benchmarks and Meso-Level Hypotheses

Ethnographic studies of migration-associated socio-economic and cultural transformation concentrate on a few localities or small subsets of counties (Massey et al. 1987; Levitt 1998; Levitt 2001; Bădescu et al. 2009); (Bădescu et al. 2009). As a result, they do not provide a reliable basis for understanding how migrations alter the state-citizen relationship or transform national and subnational political spaces. On the other hand, studies that examine trends at the national-level (Faist & Sieveking 2011; Black et al. 2003; Iskander 2010; Glick Schiller & G. Fouron 2001; Lafleur 2011) do not capture differences between regions in which migration constitutes a *modus vivendi* and main engine of development and those in which mobility does not feature among key strategies of making a living. By supplementing the in-depth analysis of original micro-level data with a thorough examination of meso-level variation at subnational county level, this dissertation offers a nuanced take on the vastly unexplored relation between migratory flows and politics in the migrants' countries of origin.

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Scholarly literature on the effects of European integration and globalization on the character of political competition at the national level offers some guidance in thinking about how the EU's influence reshapes politics in old and new member-states (Kriesi et al. 2006; Vachudova & Hooghe 2009); (Haughton & Rybar 2009). Those contributions examine transformations in the national political landscape from a top-down approach in which parties reposition themselves in response to new tensions that EU accession or participation generates. Looking at the evolution of public opinion in six West European countries, Kriesi *et al.* note a shift in societal concerns from the left/right divide to a demarcation/integration cleavage (2006). Partisan realignment occurred due to the fact that new tensions did not align with previous axes of political competition.

Marks *et al.* reveal that the ideological profile of a political party influences party position on European integration differently in Western old member-states and in new Central and Eastern European countries (Marks et al. 2006). In the West, pro-European attitudes are associated with party positions on the political left, post-material values and left libertarian platforms, while anti-European discourses come hand in hand with right-wing party positions that emphasize the importance of tradition, order and national sentiment. In the case of Eastern Europe, the literature points out that pro-European attitudes are associated with parties on the center-right and right of the political spectrum, parties that favor on the economic front privatization, government withdrawal from the economy, the reform and reduction of social security systems, and on the cultural front, support varieties of left libertarianism with emphasis on the expansion of individual freedoms, post-material values and participation in cosmopolitan culture. Opposition to European integration usually rests within communist-successor left-wing parties that blend nostalgia for authoritarian times and command economy with nationalist discourses and the glorification of state authority, a "historically contingent configuration" (Kitschelt 1992). These differences

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between West and East have been explained as a result of diverging historical legacies. "The legacy of communist rule has generated what we call a 'demarcation magnet' that bundles left-wing economics with cultural traditionalism, whereas the reforms and constraints of EU accession have produced an 'integration magnet' that pulls parties in the opposite direction toward market-liberal economics and cultural liberalism" (Vachudova & Hooghe 2009). This has allegedly generated one main axis of political competition that brings together older issues and newer concerns.

The literature discusses the factors shaping the supply side of political competition, through top-down dynamics in which political elites play the main role, whereas this project examines the causal mechanisms and actors that trigger the bottom-up transformation of political landscape on the demand side. Party repositioning does not result from the top-down pressures of EU participation alone, but also from the emergence of new constituencies, power groups that have participated in the European market either individually or as a part of a household relying on intra-EU mobilities to make a living and achieve socio-economic and status goals. As seen in Chapter II, EU market migrants and their families want European integration to continue in order for them to maintain access to labor, educational and training opportunities in other EU member-states. Migratory networks are more active and concentrated in some regions and not others (Muntele 2003; Burrell 2009b). Joining the EU has opened up access to the continental labor market for all, greatly reducing the costs of seeking employment abroad and eliminating some inter-regional disparities. However, counties still participate unevenly in intra-EU migratory flows. As a result, it is possible to compare electorally expressed political orientations and economic development indicators in regions with high levels of reliance on migration with those in regions where engagement in migrant labor is less widespread.

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To use the demarcation-integration terminology introduced above, I hypothesize that counties that depend more on the EU labor market will develop and vote in ways that support and reinforce integration. I examine this in two ways. First, I compare county-level vote shares for specific parties that are broadly associated with either integration (center-right, liberal-democrats, pro-market etc.) or demarcation (left wing, state intervention in the economy, isolationist, nationalist etc.) on the political spectrum.

While this is a good way to take a first look at subnational variation in the electorate's economic and political preferences, research about the supply-side of post-communist party politics suggests that party positions and platforms on matters such as European integration or state intervention in the economy have changed over time under the influence of top-down pressures (Vachudova 2005; Vachudova & Hooghe 2009). Very often, political parties faced dilemmas resulting from the tensions between the requirements of EU accession and the post-communist transformations aimed at democratic consolidation (Ekiert 2008). Finding solutions frequently required altering political platforms and agendas. By attaching excessive weight to party labels, only tracking the over-time change in vote shares for political parties may distort the actual, concrete meaning of the vote in terms of support for specific policies and values. It would not capture the fact that party identities and positions are to a certain degree fluid, not completely rigid or fixed, so much so that the party label can, in fact, change its meaning over time. To overcome this issue, my second approach is to translate the meaning of vote shares for specific (evolving) parties in terms of positions on relevant axes of political competition using party position scores assigned at different points in time through a multi-round expert survey (for further details, see the detailed description of the empirical data and the methodology presentation below).

I expect regions with high levels of migration to favor pro-market, pro-integration political positions and to show little support for political agendas that favor economic and political

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demarcation of the nation-state from the European project. I expect these regions to support a reduction of the government's role in the economy, to lean towards center-right and right-wing economic agendas (market-liberal economics), and to have declining levels of support for communist-successor and nationalist parties. I also hypothesize higher levels of private investment, since market migrants send remittances to their families and generally invest their earnings in sending communities rather than abroad. For regions with lower levels of intra-EU migration, I hypothesize higher levels of support for government intervention in the economy (left-wing economics) expressed in higher vote shares for center-left and left-wing political parties.

In line with the observable implications derived from the third modernity paradigm developed in Chapter I and in light of the micro-level mechanisms explored in Chapter II, I hypothesize that counties with higher levels of intra-EU migration will show more pronounced orientation toward center-right and right wing, supporting the withdrawal of the state from the market (i.e. a reduced economic role for the national government), privatization, less regulation, reduced government spending and a downsizing of the welfare state. I expect that high-migration counties will be, on average, less supportive of center-left or left-wing communist-successor parties, and that low-migration counties will have higher levels of support for parties that want the state to play an active role in the economy.

In the case of the early-reformer legacy (Poland), where there is some degree of persistent disagreement over European integration among political parties, I expect that counties with higher intra-EU mobility will support political parties with pro-EU agendas, while those with lower exposure to and experience with intra-EU migration will tend to vote for parties that are more Eurosceptic. Poland had a stronger negotiating position entering into the pre-accession process. Hence, the initial and general principled attitude in favor of European integration coexists with Euroskepticism and criticism directed at particular EU policies and aspects of the acces-

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sion process considered skewed or unfair towards candidate member-states (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2001; Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004).

In the case of the late-reformer legacy (Romania), since all political parties have ended up converging on a pro-EU position, the presence of substantial time effects makes it difficult to detect in the pooled data regression analysis differences between high- and low-migration counties on electorally expressed support for European integration. I conduct a cross-sectional data analysis for years before and after this broad consensus emerged to see if variation on this dimension of electorally expressed political preferences was observable at some point in time.

"Citizenship of the market" and attachment to the nation-state are not mutually exclusive under the third modernity paradigm. Indeed, they are compatible and, in some cases, they can reinforce each other. For that reason, at regional level, I expect to find few (if any) observable and measurable differences between higher and lower migration regions on political dimensions that have to do with attachment to the nation-state and its symbolic role as a moral authority (for a full discussion of the problems resulting from the all-encompassing and vague *gal-tan* axis in the expert survey, see the description of the data below). While, at micro-level, migrants themselves tend to be more cosmopolitan and less state-centered in their views than people who do not migrate (a hypothesis that was tested in Chapter II), at meso-level I do not expect to find strong differences in levels of support for traditional values versus postmaterialist values (after all, the third modernity does not necessarily involve a shift away from material values, and market migrants are strongly oriented toward the economic-material aspects of existence themselves). However, in the regressions that do not use expert survey scores, I do expect that nationalist parties would have lower vote shares in high-migration counties and higher vote shares in low migration counties. I hypothesize that this pattern will be evident in the model that uses nationalist party vote

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shares as the dependent variable, and less so in the model that uses *gal-tan* scores (for reasons explained in the next section of this chapter).

Literature on post-communist party politics emphasizes the importance of historical legacies, in particular party's historical experience and the "relevance and timing of postcommunist reform" influence economic agendas and EU accession positioning (Vachudova & Hooghe 2009). A crucial aspect of post-communist historical legacies has to do with the speed of reform in communist successor parties after 1989. This usually set the tone for the entire accession process, since communist-successor parties played a key role in the first phases of transition toward democracy and free-market economy (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Bozoki & Ishiyama 2002; Grzymala-Busse & Innes 2003). The literature differentiates between early reformers (like the Polish SLD), late-reformers (like the Romanian PSD) and never-reformers (like the Czech and Slovak communist parties) (Vachudova & Hooghe 2009). More generally, Poland was an early reformer state that joined the EU in the first wave of post-communist enlargement in 2004, while Romania only entered in 2007 and has yet to join the Schengen space. Consequently, I expect that economic and political trends associated with intra-EU migration will be more pronounced in Poland (an early reformer) than in Romania (a late reformer). Polish migrants have had a longer period of access to the EU labor market than Romanian migrants, and their mobility has been much less impeded.

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Decomposing the Demarcation-Integration Political Party Vector along Three Dimensions of Political Space: An Assessment of Electorally Expressed County-Level Economic and Political Preference Profiles

The focus of this project does not concern the evolution of specific political parties, i.e. the supply side of political competition. Rather, this dissertation attempts to identify and explain transformations in the demand side by revealing the mechanisms underlying observable variation and identifying the agents driving bottom-up shift in economic and political attitudes.

Dependent Variables

To measure political attitudes and preferences, I use two sets of variables: party vote shares (in the case of Romania), and regional levels of political support and views constructed using vote shares and party political positions on a number of dimensions (for both Romania in Poland). In Romania, there are relatively few major parties that remain relatively stable throughout the time period that we examine, so examining vote shares can give a meaningful holistic picture of the landscape. Poland, however, has a more diverse political arena, with many different parties represented, and which turn over at a high rate; as a result, it is difficult to construct meaningful measures based on vote share alone. To address this fact, I construct measures of *expressed political attitudes* for each region based on party vote shares and party positions on economic policy and political agendas. Doing so requires systematic knowledge, as well as objective and reliable indicators of the positions that political parties adopt in national political spaces on various dimensions. I rely on the expert survey conducted by University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (CHES), which scores political parties on a variety of dimensions to locate their economic preferences and political orientations. Since this survey is repeated over time, I am able to compare political attitudes both over time as well as over many political parties. In precise terms, if x_{ij} de-

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notes the vote share of party i in region j, and s_i denotes the score of party i along some dimension — for instance, support for EU integration — I construct the *region* score, s_j, as the vote-share weighted mean of all party scores, i.e., $s_j = \sum_i x_i s_{ij}$.

The Chapel Hill expert survey collects data on party positioning at regular intervals since 1999. Until now, four waves have been completed (1999, 2002, 2006 and 2010). The survey asked hundreds of academics who study the European Union and political parties in Europe to rate parties in terms of their positions on a number of ideological scales and specific policies. Expert surveys allow researchers to "obtain positions for a large number of parties irrespective of their size, parliamentary status, whether they have a manifesto or not, and independent from the electoral cycle" (Marks *et al.* "Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1990-2010: 2). Studies have demonstrated that expert surveys are a reliable and valid measurement instrument (Steenbergen & Marks 2007).

My analysis below uses the scores for party position on three axes/dimensions of political space captured in the CHES data. First, to measure EU-favorability in county profiles, I use as an indicator the position on European integration score, i.e. the "general position on European integration that the party's leadership has taken" assessed on a seven-point scale ranging from one (strongly opposed to European integration) to seven (strongly in favor of European integration).

Second, economic orientations and political values are measured through vote shares by using the experts' placement of each political party on eleven-point scales on two ideological dimensions. *Left/right* placement differentiates parties in terms of their stance on economic issues: redistribution, welfare and government interference in and regulation of the economy. The mean expert score on an eleven-point scale ranges from zero (extreme left ideology on economic issues)

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to eleven (extreme right stance). The survey question prompts experts by reminding them that parties to the *right* of the political spectrum "emphasize a reduced economic role for government," support "privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, reduced government spending and a leaner welfare state." Parties to the *left*, on the other hand, "want government to play an active role in the economy." With that in mind, experts are asked to indicate where parties stand on issues that reveal their *economic ideology*.

Finally, the *gal/tan* axis of the Chapel Hill expert survey situates political parties according to their stance on traditional/authoritarian versus post-materialist value orientations. This provides a very approximate measure of political culture. Scores range from left libertarian or post-materialist (0) to traditional/authoritarian (10). According to the codebook, this measure encapsulates three facets: (a) post-material values/individual lifestyle issues, (b) authority-related matters and (c) nationalism. *Gal* stands for "green-alternative-libertarian," while *tan* represents "traditionalism-authority-nationalism" on the spectrum. A party that receives a predominantly *gal* rating can be described as libertarian or post-materialist; it favors expanded individual freedoms, such as access to abortion, doctor-assisted suicide, same-sex marriages and greater democratic participation. *Tan* parties have much more traditionalist and conservative platforms; some of them have authoritarian leanings. They value "order and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority" (Vachudova & Hooghe 2009).

Unfortunately, the *tan* designation is an umbrella label that fails to distinguish between varieties of nuanced positions that parties and their voters may hold when it comes to nation-state attachment. It is one thing to declare the overall superiority of one's nation, however defined and understood, over others (nationalism); another to express deep national sentiment and emotional attachment to one's country of birth (loyalty and affection, coupled or not with the willingness not to exit despite unfavorable economic circumstances and lower standards of living);

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and yet another to express frustration at manifestations of state ineptitude in maintaining infrastructure or enforcing contracts, and support an increase of state capacity to ensure that government authorities effectively protect the rule of law, and maintain a predictable and reliable business environment. Despite its limitations, the *gal-tan* indicator still provides a good way of testing the "long-distance nationalism" hypothesis (Anderson 1992). According to this theory, high migration can boost support levels for nationalist parties that successfully manipulate nostalgic voters. This outcome has been documented in some studies of transnational migration (Glick Schiller & G. Fouron 2001; Glick Schiller & G. E. Fouron 2001); (Mügge 2010), so it is worth investigating in the case of intra-EU migratory flows, even if does not capture some significant, non-extreme facets of national sentiment, like "protective nationalism" (Bücker 2007).

It is also worth noting that the regression tables include a model that has a fourth axis as dependent variable, an indicator of overall ideological positions of political parties: the general left-right dimension. The survey asked experts to score parties according to their overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). This indicator is not precisely defined or specified, however — in some ways, it subsumes the economic left-right dimension, but it also includes less clearly defined aspects of "left" and "right." For that reason, I rely on the latter as a more exact measure of party position on specific issues. In most cases, however, the general left-right dimension does not seem significantly explained by migration, which suggests that free movement has a most direct impact on preferences for economic policy, and provides evidence for the argument that free movement has the effect of unbundling the economic aspects of citizenship and state responsibilities from the political and social.

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Other Variables

For Poland, I translate the CHES party scores to expressed political attitudes using vote share data from the three parliamentary elections (2001, 2005 and 2007). This covers the period immediately before and after Poland's accession to the European Union in 2004. I use census and statistical survey data from the Local Data Bank of the Central Statistical Office of Poland for migration and socio-economic development indicators at voivodship level, as well as a variety of controls (unemployment levels, urbanization levels, GDP per capita, year effects to control for the sizable time trends etc.). To measure intra-EU migration levels, I use temporary registered absences due to a departure abroad for a period of above three months as a proxy for intra-EU migrations. Data on temporary migrants are collected at the end of each year, on the basis of registration for temporary stay documentation at local level and through CSO statistical surveys. The data thus collected cover only a small fraction of the total number of intra-EU migrants, since few migrants leaving Poland report their absence in registry units (Nowak et al. 2007). As a result, the reported numbers represent an underestimation of actual migratory flows, but there is no reason to believe that there is any systematic bias in the level of reporting across years or voivodships.

Poland has one of the longest migratory traditions in East Central Europe, with regions that have been transnationally connected decades before the country joined the European Union. Data on temporary absences does not give the possibility to differentiate between intra-EU movements and mobilities outside the Schengen area, i.e. "newer" versus "older" migrations. Several studies show that EU accession has brought about an increase in migration levels and a diversification of sending regions in new post-communist member-states (Muntele 2003; Rey 2003; Black et al. 2010). In other words, more people migrate, and migratory networks have expanded to new sending regions that were relatively isolated in the past. To distinguish voivod-

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ships that have recently began to rely on temporary intra-EU migrations, in addition to running regressions with registered temporary absences as an independent variable, I run the same set of standard OLS regressions using a different measure of intra-EU mobility, the average growth rate of registered temporary absences at voivodship level. This derived measure attempts to identify counties in which migrations have grown much faster than in other parts of the country in recent years, in an effort to distinguish "new" EU-associated labor migrant flows from previous migrations.

For Romania, I use party vote shares from election data covering the first round of four presidential elections (1996, 2000, 2004 and 2009). This time-horizon includes the years of pre-accession negotiations, the period of joining the EU (2007) and the years immediately following Romania's entry. I translate the vote shares for political parties using the party position scores of the Chapel Hill expert survey of 2002 and 2006. Since the Romanian political party scene has been much less fluid than Poland's, I also run regressions with just vote shares for individual parties (the Social-Democrat communist-successor party, labeled PSD – *Partidul Social Democrat* – even though it has changed names a few times in various rebranding efforts; the Democrat and Liberal center-right of the political spectrum, DEM; and the Nationalists, PRM – *Partidul Romania Mare*). For the independent variables, I use census and survey data available through the TEMPO-Online database of the Romanian National Institute of Statistics. For migration, I use emigration data since this is the only indicator about the presence of Romanian citizens abroad that the Institute collects and makes available. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Romanian emigration represented a mere residual of much larger temporary flows, reflecting the special situation of some intra-EU migrants who decided to resettle in their countries of destination. This measure, hence, underestimates the magnitude of European mobility, but this is the only available in-

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dicator. I use census data from the National Institute of Statistics for demographic variables, education levels, unemployment rate, urbanization levels, GDP per capita etc.

I ran standard OLS regressions with clustered standard errors (by voivodship in the case of Poland, by judet in the case of Romania). For elections taking place in 2005 and after, I use the party scores from the 2006 wave of the Chapel Hill expert survey. In the regression analysis, independent variables are averaged and lagged one year to capture trend levels rather than election-year specific variations. For Poland, independent variables are averaged over two years, i.e. if T is the year of the election, independent variables are averages over years T-1 and T-2. For Romania, independent variables are averaged over four years. Larger windows would be preferable to maximize the use of available data, but the timing of elections in Poland, where two of the elections are only two years apart (2005 and 2007), requires adjustment to prevent the windows from overlapping. All regressions have year fixed effects — this is especially important for the time period under consideration due to the large national-level swings in attitudes that occurred between elections.

Data notes and caveats

Before proceeding with the presentation and discussion of empirical results, it is necessary to make some general observations about the quality of available data and, in light of these observations, introduce some caveats at the general and country-specific level. As any migration scholar knows, existing statistics on migration (particularly temporary migration) and remittances are "incomplete and uneven": "not only do undocumented migrants and informal remittance flows often escape official detection, particularly in developing countries, but the comparability of cross-national data is often compromised by different methodologies" of data collection and levels of reliability (Burgess, forthcoming 2014). Furthermore, the EU-associated freedom of move-

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ment that allows citizens to cross boundaries into other EU member-states without having to produce anything but an ID card generates additional data-gathering difficulties.

Ideally, data on intra-EU migration levels (and other socio-economic, political and cultural variables of interest) would be available at national, local and individual level; however, this is not the case. Since freedom of movement across state boundaries makes it impossible for government authorities to collect information on migrants who travel to other EU member-states, available indicators only imperfectly capture the phenomenon and underestimate its magnitude. In the case of Poland, a country that has already joined the Schengen Area, migrant citizens who are temporary absent from Poland for more than three months are expected to register before leaving the country. This system gives an approximate measure of intra-EU migration levels, even though many citizens do not actually register these temporary absences. In free movement conditions, individual migratory projects are exceptionally fluid; hence, an originally-intended short stay abroad of only a couple of months can easily turn into a longer absence from home, which the migrant did not anticipate and, consequently, did not register. In the case of Romania, the National Institute of Statistics collects and makes available data on emigration, not temporary absences, at the regional level. Notoriously, Romania has recently faced major political issues due to very high and unmeasured levels of intra-EU mobility, particularly while trying to determine if the 2011 referendum on the impeachment of the Romanian President Traian Basescu was valid or not. The National Institute of Statistics came to the disturbing conclusion that about one million Romanians were unaccounted for in its database.[19] It eventually corrected the official numbers; understandably, in light of recent uncertainties, disorder and recounts, current statistics re-

[19] Popa, Dan, "Recensamantul populatiei, rezultate definitive: Populatia stabila a Romaniei este de 20.121.641 persoane, cu un milion mai mare decat o aratau rezultatele preliminare/ Alti cel putin 727.000 de romani sunt plecati in strainatate/ Avem 245.400 persoane analfabete," July 4, 2013, HotNews.ro, Economie/Finante si Banci: http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-finante_banci-15122357-recensamantul-populatiei.htm.

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main rather questionable. Intra-EU migratory flow levels still appear underestimated, particularly when compared with reports from government authorities and non-governmental organizations assessing the intensity of migrant flow originating in Romania from the angle of receiving countries. While in both cases, the raw migration numbers are likely to underestimate the true levels of movement, there is no reason to believe that the report accuracy should differ systematically by voivodships, in the case of Poland, or *judete*, in the case of Romania. Since we are primarily interested in the *relative* levels of these numbers, the underestimate may bias our effect size, but not the direction or significance.

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Results



Figure 1. EU Support in Poland by Voivodship over four election years

Figure 1 shows the evolution of expressed attitudes toward EU integration by voivodship through the 2000s. Higher numbers, depicted by darker shades of blue, represent higher support for EU integration, whereas lower numbers, depicted by darker shades of red, represent lower support for EU openness. Since the CHES scores capture movements in party position over time, the scores should be comparable across years, so the same shade of red/blue in 2011 represents roughly the same degree of opposition/support for EU integration as in 2001. While on the whole there is a gradual increase in receptivity to EU integration, we see that 2005 saw a general movement away from EU integration in all regions — the coming accession fanned fears of decreasing national autonomy, but these had calmed by 2007. That said, it can also be seen that

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while most regions began to view EU integration more favorably, there is considerable variation in the degree of change; Podkarpackie in the south-west generally shifted toward more nationalist views. A similar trend can be seen in Figure 2. Economic Policy Preferences in Poland over four election years, which shows regional political attitude scores on the economic left-right scale. Darker shades of blue represent right-wing policies, as decreases in taxation, and darker shades of red represent left-wing policies, such as higher levels of social support and redistribution.



Figure 2. Economic Policy Preferences in Poland over four election years

Regression results for both Poland and Romania confirm the hypothesis that counties with higher migration show higher levels of support for center-right and right-wing economic agendas (market-liberal economics). The results are strong and statistically significant on this dimension of comparison. Historical legacies appear to play a role, since trends are much more

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pronounced in the case of the early-reformer country (Poland) than in the case of the late-reformer (Romania). Moreover, there appears to be a main effect on economic policies and secondary effects on political attitudes on other dimensions: the economic preferences are those most strongly influenced by the presence of free movement.

The results for Poland are shown in Table 5. At the county level, temporary registered absences are associated with higher levels of support for parties with a pro-EU agenda. Regions with higher intra-EU migration have, on average, a much higher level of support for market-liberal economics (center-right, pro-market, pro-privatization, anti-regulation, pro-welfare state reform etc.) than those where new mobility levels are relatively lower. The levels of private investment per capita are higher in voivodships that benefit from higher levels of remittances than in voivodships that rely less on the money that intra-EU migrants send from abroad. The coefficient for the post-materialist values versus traditional/authoritarian spectrum (the *gal-tan* axis) is not significant, which suggests that "long-distance nationalism" is not associated at meso-level with the political culture of high-migration counties. A strong attachment to the free market is not necessarily correlated with disengagement from the national political project or with a decrease in the symbolic importance of tradition and the nation. The second set of regressions that use the average growth rate of registered temporary absences as an indicator for intra-EU migrations reveal that voivodships where migration has recently increased at a faster pace relative to average mobility levels tend to vote in ways that support parties that are favorable to the European integration project. The result is statistically significant. After a wave of disappointment with the EU project generated by the harsh terms of pre-accession negotiations, the cross-sectional analysis reveals a strengthening of EU-support across most voivodships, including those that used to be more Eurosceptic prior to accession (see attached maps that represent the levels of support for European integration as reflected in party vote shares).

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Table 5. Political Attitudes Regression Results for Poland

	Dependent variable:			
	EU position	Left-Right (Econ)	Left-Right (General)	GALTAN
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GDP per capita	0.00002***	0.0001***	0.00003***	0.00002
	(0.00001)	(0.00002)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
Unemployment Rate	−0.518	−27.848***	−20.600***	−14.332***
	(2.429)	(5.703)	(3.933)	(5.005)
Pct Temp Absent	18.148	195.023***	87.094***	65.155
	(19.911)	(39.865)	(30.623)	(43.781)
Constant	4.220***	−0.156	4.274***	3.988***
	(0.476)	(1.034)	(0.753)	(1.010)
Observations	48	48	48	48
Adjusted R^2	0.840	0.749	0.732	0.751
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Romanian results using vote shares are shown in Table 6. Higher levels of emigration are positively associated with higher vote shares for the pro-EU center-right Democratic Party, and negatively correlated with vote shares for the center-left, communist-successor late-reformer Social-Democrat Party (PSD). The pooled election data analysis shows that the judete (counties) with higher rates of emigration support center-right, pro-free market political parties more strongly than counties with relatively lower migratory rates. The results are substantial and statistically significant. Strong year effects prevent the aggregate regression analysis from picking up significant differences in terms of vote shares for the extreme nationalist party, PRM. However, the cross-sectional analysis for different election years shows that vote shares for the nationalist, Euroskeptic PRM plummeted after the onset of new intra-EU migrations. The ArcGIS maps (Figure 3 through Figure 7) show the evolution of vote shares over time for the communist suc-

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Table 6. Vote Share Regression Results for Romania

	Dependent variable:		
	DEM vote share	PSD vote share	NAT vote share
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Emigration Rate	33.955***	−42.220***	8.265
	(12.916)	(15.321)	(8.511)
Unemployment Rate	−0.006**	0.006**	−0.0001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
GDP per capita	0.00001*	−0.00001	−0.00000
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00000)
Urban Pop (%)	0.116**	−0.172***	0.056
	(0.054)	(0.065)	(0.036)
Constant	0.369***	0.538***	0.093***
	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.023)
Observations	166	166	166
Adjusted R^2	0.797	0.403	0.841
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

cessor party, the Democrats and Liberals, and the nationalists. In judete where migration participation is increasing, the size of the vote share for PSD and PRM decreases. In the pooled data regression analysis, there are no significant differences on the *gal-tan* dimension, which again suggests that "long-distance nationalism" does not appear to result from recent transnational labor flows. As for the levels of support for European integration, the analysis is rendered inconclusive due to the fact that Romanian political parties eventually reached a broad consensus on the benefits of EU accession and membership, so that – in more recent elections – all parties score as more or less EU-supportive in the Chapel Hill expert survey.

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

Figure 3. Voting for major parties and emigration in Romanian 1996 elections

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

Figure 4. Voting for major parties and emigration in Romanian 2004 elections

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

Figure 5. Migration and electoral behavior in Romania post EU accession (PSD vote share)

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

Figure 6. Migration and electoral behavior in Romania post EU accession (DEM vote share)

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

Figure 7. Evolution of Social Democrat vote share in Romania 1996-2009

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Table 7. Political Attitudes Regression Results for Romania

	Dependent variable:		
	EU position	Left-Right (Econ)	GALTAN score
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Emigration Rate	−1.031	97.163**	−50.074
	(23.844)	(39.510)	(42.358)
Unemployment Rate	−0.004	−0.019**	0.015*
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Urban Pop (%)	−0.069	0.311*	−0.084
	(0.100)	(0.166)	(0.178)
GDP per capita	0.00002	0.00004**	−0.00004*
	(0.00001)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)
Constant	6.172***	3.497***	5.718***
	(0.064)	(0.106)	(0.114)
Observations	166	166	166
Adjusted R^2	0.891	0.892	0.871
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Romanian regression results on political attitude scores are shown in Table 7. As mentioned above, the parties are relatively indistinct on the EU position score, so it is unsurprising that the coefficient is insignificant. Similar to Poland, higher emigration regions show higher levels of support for center-right economic policies. Moreover, the coefficients on GALTAN and Left-Right (General) are not significant, which suggests that some political attitudes take longer to change than others, but that free movement has a direct and large impact on preferences for economic policy.

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Discussion

The data scarcity issues mentioned earlier make it difficult to control for all other potential sources of variation — with only four election years, and 16 or 52 regions, year fixed effects already take out a lot of variation in regional outcomes, especially for the case of Poland, with only 16 regions. On the one hand, this gives even greater credit to the explanatory value of migration; on the other, there is an inherent difficulty in ruling out selection effects.

To address this possibility, I also ran regressions for Romania on the PSD vote share for individual years. The idea is that since free movement is a relatively new phenomenon, and the impact of migration is caused by the new supranational infrastructure and citizenship opportunities of the EU, our variables should not be significant before the 2000s. In this case, it is impossible to run similar tests on Poland because individual year regressions are particularly low-powered with only 16 regions. The results for Romania are shown in Table 8. Consistent with my hypothesis, in the mid 1990s, before free movement, emigration is not a significant predictor of voting behavior across judete. It is only after EU free movement, for elections in the 2000s, that the effect is significant and in the expected direction. While data limitations make it practically impossible to show that all other things are equal, this is strong evidence for the causal impact of migration — if this were not the case, it would be difficult to explain why migration predicts voting behavior only after accession.

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Table 8. Vote Share Regression Results for Individual Years in Romania

	Dependent variable:			
	PSD Vote Share			
	1996	2000	2004	2009
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Emigration rate	−13.491	−151.804***	−139.780***	−111.223**
	(27.711)	(51.224)	(41.916)	(56.053)
Unemployment rate	0.013	0.003	0.004	0.012
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)
GDP per capita	−0.00002	−0.00002	−0.00003	−0.00000
	(0.0001)	(0.00005)	(0.00002)	(0.00001)
Urban percentage	−0.099	−0.040	−0.124	−0.021
	(0.232)	(0.168)	(0.088)	(0.145)
Constant	0.278	0.466***	0.564***	0.308***
	(0.200)	(0.100)	(0.063)	(0.073)
Observations	40	42	42	42
Residual Std. Error	0.128 (df = 35)	0.090 (df = 37)	0.047 (df = 37)	0.063 (df = 37)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Another way to interpret my findings is that even if there is "selection" of some sort, the different characteristics do not affect political attitudes without institutionalized free movement. Recent studies have also shown that while migrants may differ a priori along some dimensions, and that these differences may affect their choices of destination, the opportunity to migrate is nonetheless transformative, endowing them with new experiences, resources, and skills (Ambrosini et al. 2011). Analogously, while high migration *regions* may be different in some way, these differences only become expressed in *voting behavior* after free movement is instituted across the EU. Finally, it should be noted that many of the high migration regions are typically rural

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border regions, which are strongholds of traditionalist, conservative views – if anything, one would effect a ”selection effect” to produce results in the opposite direction, in favor of nationalist parties.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that in recent years, levels of free movement and migration have a significant impact on the way that people vote, and documents this change in regional level voting patterns in Poland and Romania. They vote increasingly for parties that support EU integration, and overwhelmingly for parties with center-right *economic* policies. Furthermore, these voting patterns emerge only *after* accession to the EU and the institutionalization of free movement. While it is difficult to make deep claims regarding citizenship patterns on the basis of coarse voting behavior and political ratings, these patterns support the argument that free movement, by enlarging the labor market beyond national boundaries, effects a significant recalibration of the state-citizen relationship that unbundles economic from social and political issues. While in Poland, which has a longer history of migration, higher levels of movement are correlated with broader differences in political attitudes, in Romania it is primarily linked to economic policy preferences. At the very least, free movement provides the option of a new state-citizen relationship that is particular relevant as welfare states become increasingly resource-strained: citizens can shift away from demanding particular services of the government in favor of a state model that guarantees *access* to a broader supranational market.

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Chapter IV. Some Migrants are Keepers: Diaspora Management vs. Free Movement Management and the Mixed Blessing of Citizen Mobility

> "Despite more guards, more laws and more restrictions, the symbolic and real boundaries that divide societies are eroding. This is a result of ideas, images, money, music, electronic messages, sport, fashion and religions that can move without people, or without many people – forms, if you like, of virtual migration. But nothing is as disturbing to national societies as the movement of people." (Cohen 2006)

Citizenship studies differentiate between two institutional dimensions of citizenship. The first is "the legal category of nationality that defines membership in a state understood as a territorial and national organization." The second is "citizenship as rights and duties stemming from membership and participation in a political community" (Iordachi 2009). The former concerns matters of inclusion and exclusion, by constructing the legal borders between those who are and those who are not citizens. The second dimension refers to the content and the concrete meaning of citizenship for individuals in terms of rights, obligations and entitlements. The literature on international migration examines both dimensions most frequently from the standpoint of immigrant-receiving countries with an emphasis on naturalization, incorporation and inequality between native-born and naturalized citizens; the latter is used as a measure of unsuccessful incorporation (Odmalm 2006; Body-Gendrot & Schain 1992; Brubaker 1990; Joppke 1999; Givens et al. 2008; Bodnar 1987; Borjas 1987; Freeman 1978; Smith 2006). This scholarship asks how receiving states cope with migrant inflows (Body-Gendrot & Schain 1992; Cornelius et al. 1994; Joppke 1999; Brubaker 1990; Givens et al. 2008; Guskin & Wilson 2007).

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A relatively newer branch of research on citizenship looks at migrant-sending countries. These studies focus on the first dimension, analyzing constitutions and citizenship laws to see how states create opportunities for former *émigrés* (i.e. current non-citizens) and their children to return to and regain citizen status in the country they left (Gonzalez Gutierrez 2009; Henry & Mohan 2003; Kapur 2010; Ionescu 2006; Macalou 2009; Padilla 2011; Rannveig Agunias 2009; Rannveig Agunias & Newland 2012). This literature concentrates on issues of "diaspora management," i.e. policies that states implement in order to reconnect with citizens who permanently left the country, voluntarily or not. It also covers policies designed to encourage the return of diaspora members and facilitate their subsequent incorporation in the national community (Mylonas 2013).

While filling an important gap in political science scholarship by drawing attention to the émigré-directed citizenship policies of migrant-sending countries, literature on diaspora management fails to capture the dynamics of high-mobility contexts. Findings about the relationship between migrant-sending countries and immigrants do not apply to the relationship between migrant-sending countries and mobile, temporarily extraterritorial citizens. To exacerbate confusions, journalists and policy-makers use the terms "emigration," "immigration" and "migration" interchangeably, as does, for instance, the Romanian PSD Diaspora website in its section introducing the "Fundamental Affirmations Regarding the Objectives of the Social Platform" (*Afirmatii fundamentale cu privire la obiectivele Platformei Sociale* (PSD Diaspora 2011)), or a 2013 article from *The Economist* that, under the title "Poland's emigration headache," talks about migrants from the town of Siemiatycze, who work in Brussels while maintaining residence in Poland and travel back and forth on a weekly basis (The Economist 2013). The article mentions that, according to Poland's Central Statistics Office, 2.1 million Poles currently live abroad, most within Europe. It goes on to say that after the peak of 2.3 million people who "lived abroad" in 2007, some moved

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back during the recession, but that, contrary to public expectations, the "mass return of emigrants" did not happen. Finally, it mentions that the "number of emigrants has been rising steadily again." Obviously, the article does not describe the situation of permanent emigrants, now citizens of another country, but rather that of highly mobile Polish citizens.

As previously noted, intra-EU circular migrants do not exit the country of origin permanently: their formal citizenship status does not change. The number of people declaring they want to leave is very small as well (Wallace 2002). However, the content of the citizenship they practice changes significantly, since a new supranational dimension – citizenship of the market – takes priority as a life-structuring principle. A new set of associated entitlements detached from the national territory becomes relevant in their lives. The previous two empirical chapters have shown that intra-EU migration affects migrants themselves, their households, communities and sending regions. In this chapter, I argue that migration determines sending countries to adapt, by rethinking their policies to reincorporate mobile citizens into the polity.

To restructure the debate and eliminate conceptual confusions, I introduce a new term, *free movement management*, to distinguish this set of macro-level adjustments from the related but separate domain of diaspora-management policies and politics. Since intra-EU migrants maintain their citizen status in the countries of origin, changes in government policy toward them constitute, in fact, reforms affecting all citizens, migrants and non-migrants, by expanding or limiting the life choices of the entire population. For that reason, it makes sense to understand the ways in which national-level actors adapt to citizen mobility as a recalibration of the state-citizen relationship in its ensemble. By taking seriously individual decisions regarding citizenship status, research designs differentiating between diaspora management and free movement management can generate more precise and nuanced analyses of citizenship in transnational contexts.

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In this last empirical chapter, I assess *free movement management* in Poland and Romania by examining government policy responses of migrant-sending countries to the challenges and opportunities that mobility produces. This introductory section discusses some methodological considerations and summarizes the argument. Then, the rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: First, I provide some background about the states' experiences with migration in modern and recent history. This provides insight into the characteristics of "classic" diaspora management (before intra-EU visa-free movement and European citizenship) in the two countries. Second, I present the challenges and opportunities that high-mobility contexts generate for states. Third, I compare Poland and Romania in terms of their free movement management, i.e. the institutions and policies that the governments of these two countries use to cope with and capitalize on intra-EU mobility. The analysis covers a range of policy dimensions including socio-economic, political and cultural rights. Free movement management is contrasted with diaspora management to determine which set of policies is prioritized at the national level. Fourth, I analyze how political parties adapt to the geographic dispersion of their constituencies and how politicians cope with the challenges of transnational electoral campaigning. This sets the stage for a discussion about the influence of historical legacies on the current politicization of free movement management in migrant-sending countries, which concludes the chapter.

To show how migrant-sending states (and the main political parties in them) cope with and capitalize on the free movement of citizens across national borders, I rely on official documents, statements, legal documents, records of Parliamentary procedures and deliberations, information brochures and reports published by government authorities, political discourses concerning migrant citizens, press releases and other mass media coverage. For the case of Romania, early rounds of research revealed a high degree of politicization of macro-level strategies towards migrant citizens, with national political parties essentially infiltrating politics abroad and setting

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up branches in other countries to establish a stronger connection with dispersed constituencies. By contrast, Poland's free movement management appeared to fall back on relatively apolitical partnerships between the national government and civil society organizations abroad, structures that the country has long used for diaspora management. While analyzing the central role political parties play in Romania's crystallizing strategy towards citizens abroad, I came across other two intriguing, previously neglected political phenomena: (1) the emergence of new Romanian political parties of migrants and immigrants in some host countries (Italy and Spain) but not others (France); and (2) the establishment of diaspora organizations targeting Romanian voters abroad by all three main political parties in Romania (PDL: the Democratic-Liberal Party, PNL: the National Liberal Party, and PSD: the Social Democratic Party). Political party activity was more concentrated in new migrant-receiving countries (the states where "citizens of the market" work) and less vibrant in countries where old diasporas still form the majority of the migrant presence (France).

From the very beginning, I would like to emphasize that documenting the development and activity of diaspora organizations of national political parties abroad requires serious detective work. First of all, the diaspora extensions of political parties into migrant-receiving countries typically remain relatively dormant between election seasons, often disappearing from the radar and resurfacing after a couple of years, sometimes in revised configurations, with completely new branches, websites, blogs and Facebook pages. To track their evolution over time, I did considerable data mining using a creative combination of online resources, news portals, diaspora media archives, official communiqués, long-abandoned political websites, press coverage of national elections, interviews with informants etc. To my knowledge, this is the first detailed account of these full-fledged party organizations abroad, active in migrants-sending countries and running transnationally oriented activities. Second (and relatedly), since foreign political parties cannot

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register branches abroad, the legal status of these organizations is often uncertain. In some cases, they are registered as civil society organizations (e.g. the Liberal Clubs of the National Liberal Party), while in other cases they function informally (Stanculescu 2012). Third, diaspora branches of Romanian political parties have a high level of adaptability and organizational flexibility. Local or territorial organizations abroad work hard to ensure that their activities have full impact (which many of them do – see the 9,000 people festive event organized in Castellon, Spain, by PDL to launch the electoral campaign of incumbent Romanian President Traian Basescu, who was running for re-election). To achieve that, the organizations of political parties abroad take into account and balance both the ever-changing presence of Romanian voters abroad and the presence of experienced political organizers and supporters who can successfully coordinate transnational campaigns and mobilize voters. In other words, the geographic distribution of constituencies abroad may change from one election to the next, and so does the distribution of human capital resources on which the party can rely. The investment in transnational political party-building has high costs, but also high rewards in terms of candidate visibility: media coverage about a campaign launch abroad receives much more attention than a "banal" event somewhere at home (interviews with local and national level politicians).

Under the umbrella term "The Movement of Romanians from Europe," two political parties emerged in Italy (*Partidul Romanilor in Italia – Identitatea Romaneasca*, registered as *Partito dei Romeni d'Italia – Identità Romena,* the Party of Romanians in Italy – Romanian Identity) and Spain (*Partidul Romanilor din Spania, PIRUM* or *El Partido Ibérico de los Rumanos*, the Party of Romanians in Spain). Both parties constitute unprecedented presences on the political arenas of their countries of destination. To my knowledge, their existence has been completely ignored by political scientists until now. While still marginal, these parties develop their own agendas and target politics both in sending and receiving countries. They claim to represent the interests of both diaspora

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members and mobile citizens, but do so by forming partnerships with political forces in receiving countries. They help migrants make their voices heard, often encourage them to run for office in local elections, but do so while reasserting that members differ in terms of political identity from the autochthonous population (author's own research based on party documents, party websites and media coverage). In Italy, PIR follows a center-right, pro-EU platform, while regularly publishing press releases with strong condemnations of corrupt, communism-tainted and self-interested political elites in the homeland. The simultaneous grounding in two national political arenas allows these parties to combine the discourse of a mainstream conservative political party in the receiving country (e.g. Italy) with the injunctions of a protest party targeting the country of origin (e.g. Romania) from outside the national territory. They generally attempt to mobilize migrants politically in the receiving country, while demobilizing them in the sending country (e.g. encouraging them to register and vote on Italian instead of Romanian lists in European Parliament elections). As a result, tensions emerge between Romanian parties of immigrants abroad and the branches of national political parties trying to build up their electoral appeal among mobile citizens with the ultimate goal of mobilizing them at home.

To clarify the nature of political interactions between diaspora members, migrants, and political elites, I supplemented the historical-institutional analysis for the Romanian case with interviews with political elites: high-level government officials involved in intra-EU migration management (at the Romanian Ministry of External Affairs, at the Department for Romanians Abroad etc.), representatives of the Romanian government in the embassy and consulate network (in Italy and France), and political party leaders, politicians representing Romanian political parties and the party of Romanian migrants in Italy (PIR). I interviewed a former Romanian Prime-Minister and former Minister of Foreign Affairs (currently PNL MP in the Chamber of Deputies) who made a 2008 run for a Senate seat for Diaspora (the 43rd electoral constituency), for the first

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electoral college (Europe and Asia). To gain a better understanding of the complementarities and frictions between diaspora management and free movement management, I discussed the challenges and opportunities of migration with officials in the Romanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at the Department for Romanians Abroad (*Departamentul pentru Romanii de Pretutindeni*), and in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including a Minister councilor (*Ministru Consilier*) who served as negotiator between 2000 and 2007 for the introduction of free movement for Romanian citizens and for accession negotiations, while also coordinating Romania's affiliation to Europol, Eurojust, Frontex etc.

In a nutshell, the findings show that Poland and Romania rely on different institutions for free movement management, with different degrees of politicization attached. Poland continues a long history of state-diaspora relations that relies on partnerships between the Polish government and civil society organizations that immigrants establish in their receiving countries. While this diaspora management apparatus is vast, resourceful and well coordinated, it does not prioritize the concerns of intra-EU migrants over those of established diaspora communities. Paradoxically, the existence and stickiness of diaspora management institutions does not result in a massive *savoir-faire* advantage when it comes to tackling the challenges of citizen mobility. While efforts have been made to develop government programs for circular migrants, most have had only modest success and very few made a difference in the lives of Poles abroad. Free movement strategy crystallizes reactively, in response to economic issues or external pressures of various sorts. For example, in the years preceding the 2012 UEFA European Championship that Poland and Ukraine jointly hosted, Polish authorities made desperate efforts to persuade Polish workers to come back from abroad and help the country build the soccer stadiums and facilities needed for a top-notch event. Polish Labor and Social Policy Minister Anna Kalata traveled abroad to India to persuade foreign workers to consider construction jobs in Poland, while a national task force

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led by PM Jaroslaw Kaczynski himself worked on strategies to overcome the labor shortage (WorkPermit.com 2007).

At a first glance, Poland appears to be more advanced when it comes to general political rights of mobile citizens. The 2011 Polish Electoral Code gives Polish citizens residing abroad the right to vote by correspondence ballot (Chapter 8: Articles 62-68). It should be noted that it was the representatives of the Civic Platform (PO) who initiated the motion to introduce correspondence voting as an option for all citizens. All citizens living abroad and holding a valid Polish passport who are entered into the roll of voters by consuls are eligible (Poland Electoral Code 2011). Voting in national elections does not distinguish between citizens residing abroad and citizens who are temporarily abroad (Article 35.1). Migrants can vote in national parliamentary and presidential elections, as well as in elections to the European Parliament. In Romania, a PDL initiated bill proposal that attempted to introduce correspondence voting was rejected in a Chamber of Deputies dominated by Social Democrats and their coalition partners (PDL 2011). However, Polish migrants do not have their own representatives in Parliament: Poland uses a system of assimilated representation, whereby the votes cast by citizens abroad are assimilated in the voting district for Central Warsaw (Article 14.3 and 78.2) (Korzec & Pudzianowska 2013). By contrast, since as early as 2008, Romanians abroad elect their own MPs in the Chamber of Deputies (4 seats) and in the Senate (2 seats).

Correspondence voting has numerous supporters in Romania, but its adoption is a politically thorny affair because of the center-right preference of migrant constituents and their propensity for voting PDL (or, in any case, against the social democrats). Since 2010, President Traian Basescu, a PDL leader himself, declared he supported the introduction of correspondence voting, the opening of additional consulates and the establishment of a call center for Romanians abroad. During his first mandate, the President developed a privileged rapport with Romania's

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mobile citizens, especially with intra-EU migrants. He gave them visibility and insisted on making them feel politically salient. He visited Romanian communities abroad frequently and even launched what was to become his re-election campaign in Castellon, Spain, at a festive open-air event that 9,000 Romanians attended (Predescu 2007). The campaign continued with other visits at Romanian communities abroad. The president condemned those who scornfully refer to migrants as *capsunari* ("strawberry pickers," a term with derogatory nuance that refers to low-skilled workers who can do nothing but work in agriculture; it's used in Romania to refer generically to Romanian migrant workers who sought jobs in the EU): "Politicians have no idea who Romanians abroad really are or what they do," said the President, declaring himself solidary with migrants in Spain and thanking the audience for sending money home.[20] Basescu never missed opportunities to highlight his contribution to increasing political rights and better accommodating mobile citizens, while contrasting it to the indifference of his political adversaries: "We do not intend to differentiate between Romanian citizens in the country and those outside. Promoting the interests and protecting the rights of both categories represents a priority for me and for the Romanian foreign policy," said Basescu at a meeting with Romania's ambassadors at the Cotroceni Palace, the Presidential residence in Bucharest (Ziare.com 2010b). The President emphasized the need to develop institutions and implement procedures that are "better positioned to help [Romanians outside national territory] in their day-to-day life and especially in their contacts with the country [of origin]." He added that one of the greatest satisfactions of his mandate was the fact he managed to fulfill the promises he made to Romanians abroad, "whether it was about the liberalization of the labor market in a significant number of EU countries, the modifi-

[20] Journalists pointed out that just a couple of streets away from the Castellon arena where the huge gathering in support of President Basescu took place, three hours earlier, the leader of PSD Bucharest Marian Vanghelie managed to gather merely 200 supporters for his visit to promote a Romanian diaspora politician running as a socialist candidate for a seat in the Local Council in Castellon (Predescu 2007).

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cation of laws on citizenship, the representations of these Romanians in Parliament, in Bucharest, or the increase in the number of consulates abroad" (idem supra).

Romania had a less much developed diaspora management apparatus and less extensive practice in maintaining close relations with citizens abroad at the onset of intra-EU mobility. Paradoxically, this lack of experience resulted in a higher prioritization of free movement management, which posed major challenges and opened unprecedented opportunities for the country. It required the development of institutions more or less from scratch, in response to national and international pressures. No convenient institutional short cut was available. Diaspora management and free movement management crystallized in tandem, in a politicized transnational environment dominated by political parties rather than civil society organizations. To be sure, the objectives of diaspora management policy (e.g. promoting Romanian cultural, linguistic and traditional heritage, supporting diaspora organizations that promote Romanian identity, sponsoring summer camps for the children of Romanian émigrés to visit Romania, advocating in favor of Romanian ethnic minorities in neighboring countries etc.) are significantly less controversial than those of free movement management. For that reason, given disagreement between political actors, the Romanian government has yet to produce a coherent strategy of free movement management.

Attempts to cope with free movement follow a more politicized path, since communist-successor forces were identifiable on the national political scene as a main political party (the Social Democrats – PSD). Recent elections made it obvious that intra-EU migrants ("citizens of the market") predominantly vote for the center-right, "anti-communist," Democratic-Liberals. PSD made some efforts to change its image and appeal to a broader electorate by adopting a more pro-European message and selecting former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mircea Geoana as candidate for the 2009 Presidential race. A young career diplomat with reformist views, Geoana

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gave a likeability boost to the dusty PSD façade: known for his pro-Western views and successful term as Romania's ambassador to the United States, he managed to defeat Ion Iliescu in the race for the PSD presidency in 2005. Still, Geoana was defeated in the race against incumbent PDL candidate Traian Basescu. In both presidential and parliamentary elections, clear majorities of Romanians abroad voted against PSD. Recently, as PDL started promoting migrant rights more vigorously, PSD blocked the initiatives of its political opponents. When a group of 55 PDL Deputies and Senators initiated a bill to introduce correspondence voting for Romanian citizens abroad (PL-x no. 336/2011), PSD, together with its party leader, Romanian PM Victor Ponta, opposed the bill and secured its rejection in the Chamber of Deputies (PDL 2011). The following year, the referendum on impeaching President Traian Basescu sparked yet another political battle for Romanians abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it was going open a relatively small number of voting stations abroad, a total of 150, with only eight stations open in Italy and nine in Spain. The decision caused a tidal wave of protests from Romanians abroad and PDL politicians, so the Ministry had to supplement the number of open stations. 56 stations were open in Italy, 46 in Spain, 21 in the US (instead of the initial 4), and 10 in France (instead of the announced 5). The overall number of stations was raised to 301 (Fratila 2012), but the damage to the image of Ponta's cabinet among Romanians abroad had already been done. The referendum failed and the president was reinstated. This confirmed that political parties differ considerably in terms of electoral appeal to migrant constituencies.

In recent years, national governments and politicians running for key offices in Poland and Romania have gone out of their way to reach out to mobile citizens. Free movement constitutes both an unprecedented challenge and a unique opportunity. It erodes traditional citizenship in which economic and political elements are fused and internal to the nation-state. By enabling economic exit without compromising political membership, circular migration under the aegis of

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the European Union recombines elements to usher in a new era of state-citizen relations. In it, national citizenship becomes brittle as the borders of the state and those of the market cease to coincide. The transformation does not undermine the state, since it is precisely through their membership in the state that migrants have access to the bundle of socio-economic, civil and political rights known as European citizenship. If anything, the availability of citizenship *à la carte* empowers and legitimizes governments. It allows states to provide cost-effective, flexible solutions by giving access to a wider range of opportunities than the domestic economy could offer. While political citizenship remains largely unchanged under European citizenship, economic and social rights involve state and non-state actors beyond the domestic realm. This requires countries to adapt to citizen mobility and take a stance on how they want to deal with extra-territorial, circular migrants and with those who return. At the same time, high mobility also becomes as problem-solving tool for countries of origin, helping them tackle a wide range of issues, from unemployment and welfare provision to law enforcement and medical services. Esping-Andersen's observation concerning the interactions between states and markets at the national level also captures situations in which markets work on a supranational scale: "it is a myth to think that either markets or the state are more naturally equipped to develop welfare. Instead, markets are often politically created and form an integral part of the overall welfare-state regime" (Esping-Andersen 1990).

This chapter reveals how intra-EU free movement creates a new set of problems that differ starkly from the issues associated with more "traditional" migratory flows that stem from globalization. In the case of global migrations the emphasis falls on security and policing borders to prevent inflows, in conjuncture with nation building to incorporate those immigrants who successfully naturalize. In the case of EU-associated mobility across the Union's internal borders, the conversation often revolves around the key dimensions of citizenship of the market: political par-

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ticipation while working abroad, representation despite living outside the nation-state, socio-economic rights, social protection and benefits, education and labor market integration. While in the case of globalization migrants, the (destination) state develops ways to exclude individuals who are on national territory, in the case of EU migrants, sending states come up with institutional strategies to include individuals who are outside the country's physical borders. Contrary to evolutions in old EU member-states and Western advanced industrialized democracies, in post-communist EU member-states, citizen mobility (out-migration/emigration) has played a more important role in recent citizenship reforms than immigration (Bauböck et al. 2009).

Nihil Novum Sub Sole? Continuities and Discontinuities in the Political Histories of Polish and Romanian Migration

Despite a tumultuous past marked by dramatic political transformations, population displacement and alternations between authoritarianism and democracy, Central and Eastern Europe has a relatively uninterrupted history of relying on citizen mobility and diaspora support as resources ("brain gain," transnational sponsorship, international lobbying etc.). To understand contemporary diaspora management in Poland and Romania, one needs to understand how present-day strategies are informed and shaped by historical legacies. Most of the countries' current citizenship policies and diaspora management strategies have a "compensatory or restitutional function" using citizenship access to "redress historical wrongs" (Liebich 2009). Another dimension of diaspora management concerns persuading émigré communities to invest in development and contribute to the improvement of the country's image abroad, the latter being an obsessive leitmotiv recurring throughout the entire body of press releases, political discourses, legislation,

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and official documents on citizenship and diaspora management that I studied for the purposes of this dissertation.

Until the 19th century, Eastern Europe was still primarily a migrant receiving than migrant sending region. In the 19th century, academic and artistic magnets like Paris, Vienna or Berlin began attracting young intellectuals from Central and Eastern Europe. Many pursued their university education abroad and returned home with new ideas and ideals. Many of these remitted ideas rapidly demonstrated their power and fascination, inspiring the Revolutions of 1848. Education of political elites abroad contributed to the development of growing national consciousness (Górny & Pudzianowska 2009; Bücker 2007; Iordachi 2009) and fostered resistance to partition and domination by foreign powers. Across the board, Eastern European societies embraced the idea that economic, cultural and political models from advanced Western European countries could be imported by migrant middlemen (mostly wealthy elites, but also artists and promising young scholars and political thinkers). These cultural and political remittances offered a simple way to overcome the East-West development gap: elites needed to learn, import and adapt reformist, current frameworks to country-specific conditions. In the first half of the 20th century, Polish and Romanian diasporas formed in more advanced, Western democracies. Poland, under the inspiration of Italian and German models, established official channels connecting the national government with Polish communities abroad (a diaspora affectionately called Polonia), to capitalize on the financial and political advantages of émigré loyalty, access and connections. Nazism and the geo-political shocks of WW II displaced populations once again. The establishment of communist regimes led to an exodus of people fleeing dictatorship. Governments in Eastern Europe accused these political expats of "lack of loyalty" (Górny & Pudzianowska 2009) and treated them with maximum suspicion until 1989. Some regimes (like that of Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania) exported discontent, ostracizing citizens thought to pose

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a threat to the existing socio-political and ideological "order" (Diminescu 2003). International travel was closely monitored to reduce the possibility of subversive ideas being imported from abroad. While communist regimes restricted and closely regulated the international mobility of their citizens (Rey 2003; Muntele 2003), the idea of boosting human capital by sending elites abroad for better training survived even behind the Iron Curtain (with students and highly-trained professionals now sent to Moscow or other destinations inside the communist bloc). Only the few considered reliable by the regime could travel to "dangerous" destinations in the West; many were asked to submit reports upon return.

After 1989, the newly established post-communist governments started working on reestablishing rapport with diaspora communities. By gaining their confidence, sending countries hoped they would be able to later rely on them as partners in the tough process of transitioning to democracy and free market economy. By normalizing the state-citizen relationship and righting some historical wrongs, government officials hoped to acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

Poland

Unlike Romania, Poland has a longer history of migration and ample experience with extraterritorial citizens. The country's repeated disappearance from the political map of Europe (the "Partitions" of 1772, 1793 and 1795) and the shift in its borders at the end of WW II consolidated a culture of mobility of ethnic Poles (Davies 1981). Especially in the 19th century, while Poland was partitioned among the Prussian, Austrian and Russian empires, the magnitude and diversity of migration was striking. During that time, exile had already become an "integral political tool of opposition" and inspired numerous Romantic works of art, especially in literature. For instance, Adam Mickiewicz's epic poem in 12 books of verse *Pan Tadeusz* (English title: *Sir*

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Thaddeus, or the Last Lithuanian Foray: A Nobleman's Tale from the Years of 1811 and 1812) was published in 1834 in Paris. At the time, the author himself was in exile to escape Russian censorship and write freely about the occupation (Burrell 2009b). Because of the occupation by foreign powers that all attempted to suppress Polish language, cultural heritage and identity, the Poles who emigrated maintained a strong "commitment to the Polish cause": those who migrated to America in the 19th century, for instance, "generally held a very emotional attachment to their homeland and a strong desire to see its independence regained" (Pula 1995). These aspirations animated Polish communities abroad until the reestablishment of an independent Poland in the aftermath of World War I, and were – to a significant extent – revived during the period of Nazi-Soviet dominance, from the invasion of Poland in 1939 to the fall of communism in 1989. Abroad, with immigrant communities congregating around Roman Catholic parishes, Polish patriotism was often infused with religious commitment to Catholicism (Pula 1995).

Political émigrés sought refuge abroad after the failure of the Polish November Uprising against Russian rule (1830-1831), the abortive Mieroslawski revolution (1846) and the "Springtime of Nations" (1848-1851). There were also those who, between 1835 and 1845 attempted to fuel support for a united and free Poland (the United Polish Emigration – a European Polish organization led by historian Joachim Lelewel, the Association of Poles in America – a branch of UPE that adopted the motto "to die for Poland," the more radical Centralization of Polish Democrats based in London, but with branches in Europe and America etc.). Diaspora communities increased with each and every political convulsion: the January Insurrection against Russia (1863), the oppression and exploitation of Poles following the Germanization campaign (in the 1870s, after the unification of Germany), the Russification campaign (1870s) etc. (Pula 1995). Polonia crystallized as a vast network of civil society organizations, Polish-language publications, churches, schools and mutual aid societies between 1880 and 1914. The promotion of *Polskosc*

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("Polishness") was an objective that diaspora organizations in the US like the Polish Roman Catholic Union and the Polish National Alliance shared, despite their disagreements about the definition of *Polskosc* (and whether the religious component was *sine qua non*).

Economic instability that partitions caused led to a constant flow of Polish migration towards the United States, across Europe and especially in Germany, mostly people from the rural environment who wanted to make enough money abroad to be able to return to the homeland and purchase land (Burrell 2009: 2). Between 1850 and 1920, several hundred thousand Polish workers went to find work in the emerging centers of the coal, iron and steel industries in France (Lorraine), Germany (Upper Silesia, the Ruhr basin) and Britain (the Midlands) (Fassmann & Munz 1994). As in Romania, Jewish emigration from Poland rose in this time of restricted economic opportunity and anti-Semitic persecutions, especially the increasingly violent pogroms in the Russian Empire. By 1914, it is estimated that over 3.5 million people had left the Polish lands. In the interwar period, as economic problems undermined the newly independent Polish state, emigration kept rising. Migrants settled down abroad, forming "a strong Polish infrastructure" (Burrell 2009), the basis for the development of a visible, numerous and vibrant Polish American community that is still active today (Znaniecka Lopata 1994; Jaroszyńska-Kirchmann 2004). Very few returned to the *Stary Kraj* (the Old Country), as the homeland was tenderly called.

After the unification of Poland after WW I, the cause of independence disappeared as a cohesive ideal around which Polonia could gather. The diaspora had to rethink its relationship with Poland. Some émigrés chose to return (around 100,000 from America alone). Others tried to invest in the homeland from abroad, but many Polish business enterprises failed (Pula 1995). The inter-war period marks the emergence of diaspora management as a national strategy involving government authorities at home and émigré communities abroad. In the early 1920s, the

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Polish *Sejm* was discussing with great concern the "Americanization of immigrants abroad" and considering solutions to maintain the allegiance, financial and political support of Polonia. The leaders of the independent Poland reached consensus that assimilation was "incompatible with the interests of the Polish nation and state" (Pula 1995). Polish diplomats were instructed to look into ways of using the assimilation process for the benefit of Polish interests abroad. The conclusion was that Poland should promote national history, literature, folklore, cultural activities and crafts, funded – if needed – with covert government subsidies (70). Parliament strongly and emotionally endorsed consolidating the connection with diaspora communities. Tadeusz Brzezinski, an official working for the Polish Foreign Ministry, declared that "Poles living outside Poland represent our country abroad... It is necessary that the Poles abroad sustain a certain extraterritoriality of the spirit in order to remain a part of our nation. In such a way, they will be able to promote the interests of the nation at home, through reemigration and serve the nation abroad in the area of cultural and economic expansion" (70). He proposed a plan of reaching out to émigrés by sending over Polish teachers, establishing cultural, student and artistic exchanges etc. The enthusiasm was so overwhelming and paternalistic in tone that certain elements of Polonia even resented the interference of Warsaw in diaspora affairs.

The Senate assumed responsibility for maintaining ties with Polish immigrant communities, a channel of institutionalization that was promptly revived after the fall of communism (see below) and still functions today. In 1929, the 1st Congress of Poles from Abroad took place and a Council of the Organization of Poles from Abroad was set up to coordinate state initiatives aimed at Polish expatriates and émigrés, with the Marshal of the Senate (Juliusz Szymanski, at the time) appointed as president. The 2nd Congress took place in 1934 and established the World Alliance of Poles Living Abroad (*Swiatpol*), whose president was again the Marshal of the Senate, an office held by Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz. *Swiatpol* worked to consolidate the ties between Polonia and the

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immigrants' country of origin, had numerous partnerships with émigré cultural and educational organizations, raised funds and sponsored Polish publishing houses abroad with the goal of promoting *Polskosc* and preserving national identity. Many programs targeted second-generation immigrants, the children of Polish immigrants who were born abroad (Polish Communities Abroad Office - The Senate of the Republic of Poland: Chancellery of the Senate 2012). Delegates to the congress were apportioned on the basis of the estimated Polish population of various destination countries. Diaspora management continued apace throughout the interwar period.

The Invasion of Poland (Operation *Fall Weiss*) in September-October of 1939 by Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and a small contingent of Slovak troops ushered in a period of great trauma and destruction of human life. Forced migration, deportation and brutal displacement all occurred at unprecedented rates. In 1945, as WW II came to an end, Poland faced various relatively chaotic, intersecting migratory flows: Germans and Ukrainians faced expulsion and "resettlement"; the returnees from Soviet territories tried to find places to start a new life. As the change in country borders shifted the entire Polish state territory to the West, Poles who used to live in the East had to relocate to newly gained lands in the West. Displaced survivors who wanted nothing more than to resume life as usual and return home faced a difficult choice between returning to a homeland that had fallen under Soviet rule or continuing the forced deportation with a chosen self-exile and join one of the Polish ethnic communities in the West. Wartime refugees had already reached countries as diverse as the United States, Canada, Australia and Kazakhstan (Burrell 2009: 3). In Britain, a government decision to allow Polish soldiers to settle down, coupled with the decision to bring in displaced migrant labor force from the Nazi labor camps to fill worker shortages, led to the emergence of a Polish diaspora in the UK (Burrell 2006). An ethnic community of 162,000 was recorded in 1951; only small inflows of migrants

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arrived in the UK until 2000, and there was some return migration from Britain to Poland after the collapse of communism (Drinkwater et al. 2009).

The establishment of communist regimes reduced international mobility throughout Central and Eastern Europe. However, Poland did not seal its borders. During the first decades of communism, the Polish government concentrated on creating better conditions for Polish citizens repatriated from the Soviet Union. As in Romania, in Poland temporary travel abroad was allowed as long as the destination was also located in the Eastern bloc. In stark contrast with Romania, however, Poland was one of the most liberal communist countries when it came to migration. Still, citizens could not keep their passports at home, and traveling to the West necessitated prior governmental approval that could be requested on the basis of invitations, as well as for students and citizens with certain job offers. After 1956, a relaxation in exit policies led to increasing emigration, even though, emigration was not officially permitted. Poles who could demonstrate some sort of German ancestry could escape to Germany on the basis of the *Aussiedler* program (Fassmann & Munz 1994; Iglicka 2001). Communist authorities could require Polish migrants to officially renounce their Polish nationality when they returned to Poland to visit. "If they refused to do so, they risked being imprisoned in Poland for illegally overstaying abroad. Here 'a need to renounce' Polish nationality was justified not in terms of the ethnicity criterion, but in terms of lack of loyalty towards the Polish People's Republic and its ideology" (Górny & Pudzianowska 2009).

Under Edward Gierek, Warsaw attempted to initiate rapprochement and resume diaspora management in the early 1970s. The Polish state took some steps towards reactivating its connections with Polonia. Under the title "POLAND: Polonia, Come Home," an article in Time Magazine presented in August 1972 a campaign aimed at attracting Polish émigrés back to their homeland at least as tourists (TIME Magazine 1972). This was an official reconciliation attempt,

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at the time when it was estimated that Polonia included 1.5 million native-born Poles and the 12 million people of Polish origin in the United States. The "chief instrument of Warsaw's policy of being friendly to Poles abroad" was the Society for Liaison with Polonia, a giant "state-run public relations venture" that sponsored an ever-growing number of cultural and educational exchanges, historical celebrations, tourist attractions and even retirement plans. The state prepared everything to make return easier for its former citizens (30,000 were expected to come from the US alone). LOT, the Polish national airlines, added new aircraft to its charter service between US cities and Warsaw. To respond to the anticipated Westernized tastes of returning Poles, Orbis, the state tourist agency, built a new resort that included Poland's first postwar golf course. The summer resort was strategically located in Warka, the birthplace of American Civil War hero, Casimir Pulaski (idem supra). Some Polish-Americans took advantage of the opportunity to visit relatives, while citizens of Polish descent (third or fourth generation Americans) wanted to discover the country of their ancestors. Many of the elderly took advantage of the government-sponsored bargain retirement program to settle down in Poland, according to Time Magazine. The program allowed Polish-born retirees to re-establish residence in Poland without having to give up American citizenship or their Social Security benefits. Resettlers enjoyed a range of benefits, some inaccessible to co-nationals. They could bring in the country their belongings and cars without having to pay tax. They had access to goods and services through special banks and stores dealing only in hard currency. US Social Security payments were exchanged for zlotys at almost twice the official rate. Returnees had access to the free national healthcare system. Low living costs in Poland boosted the value of income from abroad.

These return migrations were the exception rather than the rule. Emigration continued throughout the communist years. Increasing anti-Semitism after 1968 led to the exodus of Jewish Poles. Other people took advantage of family reunification opportunities to join relatives abroad.

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The protests of the 1980s and the Martial Law declared in 1981 triggered an increase in emigration. Many fled to the United States. It is estimated that over two million Poles emigrated during the last decade of communism. As the country sank into deep economic recession, clandestine, short-term labor force migration to Germany increased. Poles reopened older migratory routes to cope with hardship (Burrell 2009b).

After 1989, Poles were once again free to exit the country in order to live, study and work abroad, and "crucially, to return afterwards" (Burrell 2009: 4). Despite the changing national and international contexts, much of the post-communist migratory patterns built on former routes. In the early 1990s, Poles engaged in short-distance, short-term, circular migrations, primarily to Germany; due to the features of this migration, some scholars refer to it as mobility rather than migration (Wallace 2002). However, against the background of an increasingly more integrated and fluid Europe, these mobilities replaced previous permanent emigration trends: as circular mobility increased, emigration levels decreased (Burrell 2009; Cyrus 2006: 38).

The historical legacy of interwar diaspora management reemerged after 1989. The partnership between the Polish government and the vast network of civil-society organizations was revived as early as 1990, again under the aegis of the Senate. The Association "Polish Community" was established under the leadership of Andrzej Stelmachowski, the Marshal of the Senate of the First Term. Civil society organizations meet regularly in Congresses of Polish Communities and Poles Abroad and rely on the financial support of the Polish Senate for their activities. The most recent Congress of the Polish Diaspora was held in Pultusk, near Warsaw, on August 24-26, 2012, under the honorary presidency of President Bronislaw Komorowski, and brought together 300 delegates from 44 countries representing, among others, the Polish-American Congress, the Congress of Canadian Polonia, the European Union of Polonian Communities, the Federation of Polish Organizations in Ukraine, the Congress of Poles in Russia, Polish Organizations' Convent

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in Germany, the Central Representation of the Brazilian-Polish Community BRASPOL, and the Polish communities in Hungary and Lithuania (The Warsaw Voice 2012). The Polish Parliament maintains ties with Poles and people of Polish origin residing abroad mainly through the work of the Committee of Emigration Affairs and Contacts with Poles Abroad (Polish Communities Abroad Office - The Senate of the Republic of Poland: Chancellery of the Senate 2012). The Polish Senate notes that "Polish communities living in countries with a long-standing democratic tradition have been free to organize and acquire experience in conducting social, cultural or even political activities" and that diaspora communities expect the Polish government to provide funding for their activities in receiving countries to "boost the prestige of the Polish ethnic minority, contributing to the positive image of our country abroad" (Polish Communities Abroad Office - The Senate of the Republic of Poland: Chancellery of the Senate 2012).

The rise of new migrant communities is undeniable. According to the reports of the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS, Warsaw), in 2009, one in ten households in Poland had a family member working abroad, which amounts to approximately 1,5 million Polish citizens who work outside their country. 11% of those surveyed declare having worked abroad in the last decade; and official estimates put the total number of Polish citizens who have worked abroad at circa 5 million (CBOS Public Opinion Research Center 2009). Germany and Great Britain are the main two destinations, but Italy, the Netherlands and France are also popular among work destinations.

Overall, the long history of Polish migration reveals a striking image of continuity. The repertoire of diaspora management strategies that Poland developed to cultivate its connection with émigrés in the interwar period constitutes a lasting legacy marking evolutions after the end of the Cold War. The partnership between government and diaspora civil society appears to be remarkably resilient.

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Romania

In the 19th century, Romanian elites and intellectuals participated in temporary migratory flows towards Western European countries, particularly France, Germany, Austria and Italy. The Phanariot Princes of the Romanian principalities had already imported numerous elements of foreign culture, language and civilization (especially French). The French Revolution of 1789 had significant echoes on Romanian territory, spreading the ideals of *liberté, égalité, fraternité* and inspiring the future leaders of the Romanian unification movement. In the first half of the 19th century, young Romanian elites traveled abroad for a part of their studies. Between 1835 and 1838, the sons of many boyar (aristocratic) families attended universities in Western Europe and were exposed to new political ideas. These rising politicians and intellectuals saw the power of national ideals in action and learned about models of constitutional rule. Most of them studied in Paris and actively participated in the revolution of 1848 abroad. By the time they returned to Romania, they had already matured into the generation associated with importing 1848 ideals (The Generation of '48 – *Generatia pasoptista*). Some prominent members of the group were personalities like Ion Ghika, C.A. Rosetti, Nicolae Kretzulescu, Alexandru Ioan Cuza and Nicolae Balcescu (Pastre 2003).

In contrast to national elites, the rest of the population had little migratory experience. Romanian peasants generally led their lives in an environment contained within the limits of their village, with occasional trips into neighboring towns or cities to sell, purchase and exchange goods on fair days (Rey 2003). With some exceptions, only the most affluent merchants and privileged community members participated in local, short-range mobility. Even among the inhabitants of towns and cities, most had little exposure to migration apart from the local rural-urban flows associated with late modernization. Emigration was rare.

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The situation changed in the second half of the century. Following the efforts of the '48 Generation, the Romanian principalities of Moldova and Wallachia united in 1859 to form a modern Romanian state. The first wave of non-elite emigration occurred between 1848 and 1918, when Romanian workers (mostly agricultural) left the country to settle down in America or in Western Europe. In 1908, a small Romanian community (80 people) is recorded in Montreal, Canada. In America, Romanians emigrants found work in agriculture or in building railroads. In Alberta, Romanian migrants founded a few villages with Romanian names (Boian and Ispas in Alberta). Many relocated from the rural to urban environments in the receiving countries, as soon as they gathered sufficient resources (Dumitrescu 2010). But the numbers of Romanian émigrés remained modest and so did their socio-economic standing in receiving countries. Diasporas did not try or could not afford to initiate themselves a transnational communication channel with Romania, and the government in Bucharest did not address the matter of Romanians abroad or develop a national strategy for diaspora management.

In fact, Romania was for a longer time in its history a country that attracted migrants from elsewhere. Between 1860 and 1918, the Romanian Kingdom pursued a policy of social and economic modernization that required importing specialized labor force from abroad (Muntele 2003). Before 1880, 27% of the population growth in Romania was due to immigration. The number dropped to 4% after 1900. Researchers estimate the stock of migrants at 427,084 individuals. At the time, Romania ranked second in the hierarchy of countries with high number of foreigners relative to total population (Colescu 1944, cited in Muntele 2003: 35) and fifth in terms of the absolute number of citizens from abroad (the majority came from Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Greece, Italy and Bulgaria). Muntele cites Ghelerter 1916, who reported that Romania received around 43,000 Jewish émigrés between 1890 and 1912 – the last wave of immigrants were 3,222 Jews fleeing the 1905 pogroms in Tsarist Russia. Many of these political refugees left Ro-

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mania to continue their journey towards Argentina. In the early 1900s, the first communities of ethnic minorities left the Romanian territory: the Muslims of Dobrogea migrated towards Turkey, and a significant part of the Jewish minority who, after traveling from Moldavia (in the north-east) to Muntenia (in the south), joined the transatlantic migratory flows to the Americas that drew so many Central and Eastern Europeans.

The interwar period was an intermediary period with a relative balance between immigration and emigration, minus the beginning and the end, when emigration registered high levels. Romania became less attractive to foreign migrants, and the crisis of 1929 further enhanced this profile. Emigration continued between 1919 and 1939, but numbers decreased. Canada severely restricted immigrant inflows in 1929 when it was hard hit by draught; the economic crisis limited available work options for emigrants as well. The number of Romanians leaving for the Americas in the interwar period remained under 20,000 (Dumitrescu 2010). Most emigration in those years can be attributed to family reunification, but more highly educated and highly trained professionals also joined diaspora ranks. At home, the demographic expansion and shift rendered the small number of exiting citizens less noticeable (Muntele: 35). The migrations of students was complemented by a small but culturally significant flow of emigrant artists, most of whom settled down in Paris (Pastre 2003).

Between 1940 and 1948, Romania experienced its first wave of massive emigration. It is estimated that about 230,000 people were forced to leave the country. There were several directions: some people fled from territories surrendered to the Soviet Union, Hungary or Bulgaria; the Germans of Bucovina and Bulgarians of Dobrogea were "repatriated." In order to eliminate cases of dual citizenship generated by post WW II border changes and to solve pending juridical controversies, Romania signed international citizenship conventions with Hungary (1949), the USSR (1957) and Bulgaria (1959) (Iordachi 2004). Between 1944-1946, emigration reached the

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highest levels, with many ethnic minority members leaving the country, in particular Germans, Jews, but also Hungarians. Most notably, for the first time, large numbers of Romanians left to avoid Soviet occupation (Muntele: 36). Some emigrants were deportees and war prisoners. Those who emigrated after WW II were usually well educated, came from urban environments and left the country for political reasons, i.e. to escape communist repression (Dumitrescu 2010).

Communism triggered the reversal of migratory trends from inflow to exodus. While there were still temporary migrants (especially study-abroad students coming from other communist countries), their numbers were surpassed those of Romanian emigrants fleeing persecution and dictatorship. Following the long-experimented tactics of ostracism, Romanian Communist Party leaders used emigration as a safety valve to preserve regime stability. In general, return was out of the question, unless the person leaving had previous political approval. Emigration trends responded to the policy line of the regime: a moment of relaxation in the 1970s, followed by increasing repression in the 1980s, under the last years of Ceausescu's rule, led to a peak of out-migration. It is estimated around 800,000 citizens emigrated from Romania during communist rule. The regime controlled international migration, restricted the right of Romanian citizens to travel abroad and monitored closely the movement of foreigners living on Romanian territory (Buletinul Oficial al Republicii Socialiste Romania 1969). Citizenship legislation under communism was "an instrument of political repression and control" (Iordachi 2004). This fact shaped the relationship between the Romanian government and diaspora communities. The first communist Constitution (1948) allowed the repatriation of ethnic Romanians, but in practice repatriation was only selectively granted, "according to strict political criteria" (Iordachi 2004). Decree No. 563 of November 5, 1956, stripped many politically undesirable persons of their Romanian citizenship. The 1971 Citizenship law reasserted the right to repatriation, but stated that

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former citizens needed to obtain the approval of the Council of State, give up their second citizenship and swear loyalty to the Socialist Republic of Romania (idem supra).

The fall of the Iron Curtain allowed Romanians to leave behind the days when a trip abroad meant an escape from communism with no possibility of return. As any inexperienced population in terms of international migrations, Romanians relied in their first projects of crossing state boundaries on readily available models from their environment: the paths of self-exile that political asylum seekers had taken; the departures of ethnic Germans (the *Aussiedler* played an important role in determining the country of destination, but also by giving an example of exit-and-return in the collective imaginary - (Michalon 2003)); the circular migrations of ex-Yugoslavs and their investments upon returning to the homeland, mainly to build houses; the cross-border Hungarian migrations towards Romania (mostly Transylvania) and Austria, typically for business and shopping; the *suitcase tourism* of the Poles who passed through Romania on their home from Turkey (Diminescu 2003).

In the immediate aftermath of the 1989 Revolution, the repatriation of persons who had been politically persecuted by the communist regime and the restitution of nationality to former citizens constituted major priorities for the government in Bucharest. The National Salvation Front, the communist-successor political ancestor of present-day PSD, was eager to establish international legitimacy and secure support by reconnecting with Romanian diaspora communities and kin-minorities abroad (Iordachi 2009). On December 31, 1989, the government established as its seventh Decree the right of repatriation to all Romanians living abroad. The decree did not require returning citizens to renounce their foreign citizenship. In a subsequent decree, in May 1990, the provisional government detached re-naturalization from actual repatriation, enabling former Romanian citizens to reacquire nationality upon request, without having to establish residence in Romania. This policy line towards Romanian communities abroad was reasserted and

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expanded in the 1991 Law on Citizenship. The law emphasized the dimension of restitution/restoration in Article 37, by "stipulating that the right to reacquisition of nationality is also granted to all those who were stripped of Romanian citizenship against their will or for reasons beyond their control, and their descendants" (Iordachi 2009).

The first phase of post-communist migration was one of temporary attempts, crossing country borders to approach a previously forbidden, mystified West. After the Revolution of 1989, Romanians took advantage of the more porous borders and started experimenting with capitalism to reproduce at home long-desired Western consumerism. People loved the myth of the small business owner or entrepreneur who starts small and, through wit and skill, manages to acquire a fortune over time. Many invested in small commerce, often selling merchandise from abroad. Tourism provided a good façade for the emergence of the *suitcase trade* (small commerce that gets its name from the fact that the merchandise is undeclared and transported from one country to another in a suitcase, as personal belongings of a trader claiming to be a simple tourist). Neighboring countries became important destinations, with Turkey and Poland being the most popular, the former due to the variety and affordability of its open-air bazaars, as well as the lax attitude of local authorities towards illegalities, the latter due to its proximity to the West. Going abroad meant travelling for an entire day (by car, by train or by bus), and the trip rarely lasted more than three months (Diminescu 2003). Typically, those engaged in *suitcase trade* were employed and used trans-border commercial activities as a way to complement other sources of revenue. A whooping one million Romanian 'tourists' traveled to Istanbul in 1992 (Diminescu 2003: 3). In addition to importing goods, many found jobs abroad and stayed for a while (Gangloff & Pérouse 2003). Those traveling abroad returned loaded with presents for families and friends, and the extras were sold informally to co-workers and acquaintances. These flows undeclared imports fueled the most common small business of the time: the improvised, generally

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unauthorized, eclectic, overflowing street-corner *boutique* that sold anything and everything: glittery dresses and Turkish delight, toys and cassette-players, make-up and Bulgarian cigarettes, cotton T-shirts and "leather" jackets, peanuts and jewelry. People who participated in this type of migration told me that as long as the owner had enough foreign currency to bribe border control officers, the entry of the merchandise into the country was guaranteed. The consumerist impulse was so strong that *boutiques* appeared on every street corner, some in the street-facing room of family homes, others in unauthorized metal-and-Plexiglas kiosks built on public domain. Romanian state officials turned a blind eye to it all and allowed citizens to bask in the joys of international mobility. While diaspora management became a priority immediately after the Revolution, the much more ambiguous population cross-border movements of citizens did not draw too much interest or attention. The state adopted a *laissez-faire* approach, allowing the black market to flourish. It also tolerated the exit of persons who left as tourists and requested political asylum in the West, e.g. the Roma (Dumitrescu 2010; Reyniers 2003). Later, under European pressures, stronger policing of the border prevented the out-migration of citizens who did not meet the requirements for traveling abroad.

The mid-1990s saw a decrease in *suitcase trade* and political asylum migration (Diminescu 2003; Dumitrescu 2010). As the initial excitement following 1989 subsided and the transitional recession set in, the migrations of people seeking jobs abroad started to increase. "My business was not going well. I had this kiosk next to the market. I was not making profit... and there were so many taxes to pay. Officials were making our lives very hard... So I gave that up and started looking for work," said Dana from Targu Neamt. Some of the previous suitcase traders managed to transition towards entrepreneurship and start up small businesses in their communities of origin, using their connections from previous migratory experiences. Others attempted to find work abroad after the transition-associated recession hit in Romania. Most found jobs on in Tur-

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key, Israel and, increasingly, Western Europe. Religious networks also facilitated out-migrations towards Western Europe without meeting any interference from the Romanian government: neo-protestant churches that had been suppressed by the communist regime resumed their activities and encouraged many Romanians to consider migration (Cingolani 2009). This period also marks the beginnings of academic collaboration and exchange programs (R-M Lagrave 1998), a harbinger of future "brain-drain/brain-gain" migrations of Romanian students and highly educated professionals towards Western Europe, but especially towards the United States and Canada.

Despite the risks of migration, Romanians were irresistibly drawn towards the Schengen area, initially due to its aura, then later due to the concrete benefits of working abroad. Following the logic of economic and political opportunity, migratory paths reconfigured after the mid 1990s: instead of Hungary, Turkey or Poland, Romanians tried to reach Germany and France. Migrations towards France intensified around 1998, precisely around the time when migrations to Germany start decreasing. Massive flows of migration began reaching Southern European countries, especially Italy and Spain, but also, to a lesser extent, Portugal and Greece (due to the language barrier). Turkey and Israel both in demand of work force, remained attractive destinations. Traditional Romanian diaspora destinations (Canada and United States) and new ones (UK and Ireland) attracted smaller migrant flows. Many migrants crossed several borders illegally to reach their final destination, in journeys that lasted months (Anghel & Horvath 2009); the first escape was that from the nation-state itself, often with the logistical assistance or sponsorship of diaspora members from abroad (interviews with return migrants in Targu Neamt and Certeze). The migratory plan changed in the late 1990s when the norm was a legal entry in the Schengen space, followed by a clandestine stay in a country different from the one that had ini-

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tially granted the Schengen entry visa, a regularization of presence in that country of destination and a legal return (Diminescu 2003: 8).

The collapse of industries and the high cost of life in cities led many to move back to the countryside. In the early days of transition, only about 3% of people moved out of cities and into villages. Ten years later, about 30% left the urban environment for the rural (Diminescu 2003: 11). Some regions were confronted with big waves of internal return migrants. Moldavia received two waves of migrants, one around 1995, when the industries in the Brasov area (central Romania) disappear and the region ceases to attract migrants from less developed counties, the second around 1998 when the mining and steel production region of Hunedoara turns from migrant-receiving into migrant-sending (Rey et al. 2000). The agrarian reform of 1991 and the Lupu law of July 2000 that aimed at restituting land that was confiscated during communism to its owners further provided incentives for people to consider moving back to the countryside. Peasants (38% of the active population in Romania) were not the only group that benefited from restitutions. The children of previous owners were the ones who received land, even though 50% of them resided in towns and cities. Even though they return to the countryside, return migrants do not work in agriculture. While they may have a vegetable garden and raise chicken in their household, the returnees generally look for jobs in the service and the private sector.

After 1989, Romanian émigré communities formed non-governmental organizations to contribute to the post-communist reconstruction effort. They raised funds, medical equipment, clothes and toys, and joined forces with communities in receiving countries to organize the transport of donations to reach communities in Romania. "There was a very high level of international support after the Revolution. Everyone wanted to help. International public opinion was highly favorable towards Romanians" (interview with Father Iorgulescu, Strasbourg, France). The Romanian state managed to establish a good relationship with Romanian diaspora commu-

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nities, but these quickly came under pressure because of the inflow of new migrants who attracted negative media coverage and raised suspicions. In most cases, communication channels among émigrés and new migrants are absent. This pattern has been documented for Poland . Romanian communities have little information about one another; mass media usually focuses on the negative events associated with Romanian presence abroad. Until now, the Romanian state has done little to foster communication between the different generations of migrants. Solidarity usually arises through informal channels (i.e. at Romanian churches, where diasporans and new migrants have the opportunity to meet). The interviews with Romanian state officials in France, Italy and Romania showed that the government officials do not find anything unusual about this situation; since it is not perceived as a problem, Romania does not prioritize finding solutions to improve inter-generational migrant communication.

In contrast, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has started publishing since 2007, a publication called *Biuletyn Polonijny*, a monthly magazine of the diaspora available in Polish on the Ministry website. Jan Borkowski, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared in a press release announcing the first issue of the magazine: "Our goal is to acquaint you with the wealth of activity taking place in Polonia communities across the world. At times we will be dealing with issues of a political and legal character, though our main focus will be on the diverse aspects of daily Polonia life in such spheres as education, culture, the activity of individuals and organizations, and the protection of the Polish heritage abroad." (ref: ministry website).

One institution in particular encapsulates remarkably well in its own development the evolution of Romanian diaspora management: the network of Romanian Cultural Institutes (Institutul Cultural Roman – ICR). As part of the fieldwork I conducted in Italy and France, I interviewed ICR officials in Paris, Rome and Venice, and learned about the history, mission and evolution of these centers of Romanian culture abroad. Currently active in 18 countries, the ICR

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appeared for the first time in the interwar period, at the initiative of Romanian cultural and political personalities. The oldest three institutes were the ones I visited; as one of the researchers in residence, I spent a few days in Rome (Accademia di Romania) and Venice (at the Romanian Institute of Culture and Humanistic Research) learning about the history of Romania's oldest network of institutions entrusted with diaspora management and national-image promotion. The Romanian Cultural Institutes were all founded with the mission of hosting artists, researchers, students, and professors, giving them the opportunity to learn, experience and connect with the intellectual environments in the capitals of international culture. They organized conferences, concerts, receptions and meetings, as well as had their own libraries and study rooms. On April 2, 1930, historian Nicolae Iorga founded ICR Venice, the third institution of its kind, under the title of "The Historic-Artistic Institute of Venice" (locally dubbed *Casa Romana*). The project was sponsored by the Romanian government through the National Bank of Romania and the Ministry of Commerce (Institutul Roman de Cultura si Cercetare Umanistica - Venetia 2007). Nicolae Iorga said about the Romanian Cultural Institute in Venice: "The doors are open, let the light come in." After a vibrant decade of activity, ICR was basically abandoned as an institution right after 1945. By 1966, the ICR Venice headquarters in the Correr Palace were severely damaged, almost to the point of ruin, with crumbling walls, missing windows, broken floors and ceilings. During the Cold War, the Institute was abandoned. In 1988, the Mayor's Office of Venice asked the Romanian government to solve the problem of the ICR building. In January 1989, the government started renovations, which were interrupted by the Romanian Revolution but resumed in May 1990. Two years later, ICR Venice re-opened under its current name, with a mission quasi-identical to its original one (Institutul Roman de Cultura si Cercetare Umanistica - Venetia 2007).

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The history of ICR Venice mirrors the different stages in the chronology of diaspora management, with its fits and starts. Romania's political history of migration is marked by a relative lack of experience and severe discontinuity. Communism undermined the connections that began crystallizing during the interwar period. The repressive nature of Ceausescu's regime increased the size of the Romanian diaspora, as people fled communist persecution. After 1989, Romania prioritized diaspora management, since political elites in Bucharest had the difficult mission of proving they were not one and the same with the regime they had toppled, a claim that was rather difficult to accept for anyone familiar with Romania's pre-1989 leadership apparatus. Unlike Poland, where a vast network of organizations from the interwar era could be revived, Romania had to start from scratch and help Romanian associations emerge in the early 1990s. At the same time, the Romanian government was under great pressure to respond to the pressures of new migratory flows associated with European integration. The simultaneous processes of diaspora management and free movement management, coupled with the clear political cleavages on the scene of national party politics led to a high degree of politicization of state-diaspora interactions. Since most Romanian émigrés had left the country because of communism and most mobile citizens left the country because of the failures of former-communist politicians, anti-communism became the common denominator of political dialogue between old and new migrant communities. National political disputes often reflect political party disputes over diaspora management institutions and spheres of political influence abroad. For instance, in 2012, the newly minted Prime Minister Victor Ponta (PSD) decided to cut by 30% the budget of Romanian Cultural Institutes and to transfer it from the authority of the President's Office (Traian Basescu – PDL) to that of the Senate, thus making it responsive to his office. The transition caused public uproar abroad and at home, and elicited the protest of elected Diaspora representatives in Parliament, e.g. PDL Senator Victor Riceard Badea (Badea 2012). A vote in the Cham-

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ber of Deputies over the bill to introduce correspondence voting was perfectly split along party lines, with PDL in support and PSD in opposition. Political parties play a big role in calibrating the controversial relationship between the state and citizens abroad. This seems to indicate that, absent a tradition of civil-society driven diaspora management (as was the case for Poland), free movement management can become quickly politicized as opportunistic politicians try to capitalize on the electoral potential of mobile citizens.

Diaspora management and free movement management are not contradictory. However, while some policies (education, cultural promotion, youth programs) may benefit both migrants and immigrants, others – particularly long-term strategies – target diaspora members exclusively. The contrast is especially striking since the same institutions representing the migrants' country of origin abroad focus more systematically on émigrés (i.e. non-citizens) or those on the path to becoming non-citizens, rather than on citizens. This divided and skewed attention occasionally alienates new migrants who feel neglected, ignored or disregarded, as interviews with migrants in France and Italy revealed. The difficulty also stems from the fact that the same set of state-representing institutions on foreign territory had a double mission: that of addressing the needs of Romanian citizens traveling abroad through traditional forms of migration and that of addressing the issues emerging from new forms of international migration and the practice of market citizenship. The next section discusses the special opportunities and challenges that free movement creates for post-communist countries.

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Free movement provides states with a highly effective socio-economic and political problem-solving device. While relying on mobility does have its costs, post-communist democracies have greatly benefitted from circular migration during their transitional period and democratic consolidation. By adding citizenship of the market (economic rights and supranational market access) to Marshall's triad of civil, political and social rights, states use circular migration as a safety valve and a development engine, while maintaining their citizens' loyalty. Governments can thus implement bold economic reforms, outsource local development, dismantle social citizenship without paying the full political cost, reduce pressures on their law enforcement apparatus, outsource higher education and professional training, export unemployment, keep inflation in check (Connolly 2007), increase labor productivity (León-Ledesma & Piracha 2004), diversify citizen choice without actually creating new opportunities at home etc.

As is the case with diaspora management, state strategies for managing intra-EU migratory flows aim at valorizing mobility as a resource and utilizing it as a problem-solving device. Before examining free movement management in Poland and Romania, it is necessary to briefly discuss the material and non-material advantages that migrant-sending countries derive from citizen mobility, as well as some of the challenges that a geographically dispersed and mobile population creates. Given their different historical trajectories (before and during communism), as well as their early transitional years, Poland and Romania have joined the European project on different timelines, under different circumstances (see previous chapters). I argue that, while the pros and cons of free movement are largely the same for all countries, its uses for solving problems in different national contexts are not. The management of citizen mobility involves different

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actors with different political agendas; in light of past and present imperatives, these actors will attempt to preserve or transform the relationship between state and extraterritorial citizens in ways that serve their own interests. The rest of the chapter reveals how supranational labor market integration, historical legacies and contemporary interests combine to produce different national strategies of adapting the state-citizen relationship to high-mobility contexts.

While in the case of émigrés, sending-state policies attempt to revive patriotism and provide a fast-track to citizenship, in the case of mobile citizens, state officials often invoke the duties and responsibilities that citizenship entails (i.e. the content of citizenship). State representatives acknowledge that new migrants work abroad in part because the state has failed to provide opportunities at home (interviews with Romanian embassy and consulate officials in Italy and France). From the point of view of sending-state authorities, free movement management revolves around re-establishing a balance between rights, duties and obligations in the state-citizen relationship.

Countries of origin work towards normalizing and institutionalizing economic rights of access to foreign markets as an integral dimension of citizenship beyond the classical state-bound triad (civil, political and social rights - (Marshall 1992)). The strategy has a clear compensatory function, offering a solution to a key dilemma of post-communist transitions: "how to provide greater social protection for the growing number of people in need, while cutting back on total social expenditure" (Standing 1996). The introduction of a "residual welfare state" in Central and Eastern Europe replaced the communist welfare state with a "mix of social insurance and social assistance, and a partial privatization of social policy" (Standing: idem). This transition amounts to an erosion of social rights and social citizenship. We know from classic writings on the welfare state that "the outstanding criterion for social rights must be the degree to which they permit people to make their living standards independent of pure market forces. It is in this sense

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that social rights diminish citizens' status as 'commodities'" (Esping-Andersen 1990). Weakening the welfare state undermines social citizenship, since the two are inextricably related: "social citizenship constitutes the core idea of a welfare state" (Esping-Andersen 1990; Marshall 1992). It is, moreover, a change in citizenship to which citizens are highly sensitive. "If social rights are given the legal and practical status of property rights, if they are inviolable, and if they are granted on the basis of citizenship rather than performance, they will entail a decommodification of the status of individuals *vis-à-vis* the market" (Esping-Andersen 1990). With welfare state retrenchment, the level of citizen decommodification that Central and Eastern European countries could afford dropped.

There is a broader discussion about the contemporary "hollowing out" of welfare states versus new interventionist solutions to shielding vulnerable populations from the risks of supranational markets. "The traditional interventionist-Keynesian European form of state is no longer in crisis. Most commentators have abandoned any hope of a return to the comfortable security of post-war expansionism. Now the welfare state is undergoing 'restructuring', 'transformation' or 'transition'" (Taylor-Gooby 1999). The question is how to compensate citizens for the disintegration of social citizenship. Most observers agree that the ultimate result of the welfare-state metamorphosis remains uncertain. However, they also warn that the transformation will be politically costly. The notion of "welfare state citizenship" is viewed favorably in most public opinion surveys. The "stability of public attitudes" on this issue is relatively unshaken, "despite the pressures and changes in the economic and political climates" (Taylor-Gooby 1999). The problem is not unique to post-communist countries. Demographic changes have generated welfare state crises in advanced democracies around the world: "Changes in population structure lead to a situation in which the cost of providing pensions, health and social care for older people – already the most expensive aspect of public provision – will continue to increase rapidly during the next half-

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century" (1996 EU Commission report cited in Taylor-Gooby: 1-2). One thing is clear for all: "It is no longer possible to meet these needs by continuing in the traditional way" (Taylor-Gooby: 2). Policy-makers around the world are rethinking social citizenship to find creative ways of reducing costs while still providing some level of social protection.

Since the mid 1990s, experts announced that Europe was in the "era of social insecurity" (Standing 1996). With Western countries struggling to figure out what could be done, scholars voiced concerns about how new Eastern European democracies would handle the pressures of adjusting to the common market. "The EU-imposed conditionalities underpinning the current enlargement process have been the main driving force behind the Europeanisation of the CEE countries" (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2008). Many feared that after accession, when conditionality stops providing leverage, Europeanization would lose its impetus in new CEE member states (Rupnik 2007). In countries like Romania, European integration initially met with resistance coming from a "dense network of domestic 'veto points' that prevented the country from making a clean break from its communist past" (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2008). Some rightfully pointed out that implementing the *acquis* required painful economic reforms that carried the risk of social upheaval (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2008). Top-down imposition of European norms led experts to voice concerns about democratic deficit (DeBardeleben & Hurrelmann 2007).

European citizenship and EU market access were strategically used to make more palatable the transition away from a system highly committed to decommodification. Post-communist governments insisted on the importance of EU membership and on the many solutions that accession will provide in all problems, big and small. Social rights, which were inefficiently provided by the state, would be replaced by a larger, more versatile and more efficient type of citizenship that grants access to higher-quality resources, goods and services abroad, making it easier for

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people to choose and plan for the future, to be in control of their own fate. On the economic front, free movement management has two components: one concerns a recommodification of citizens abroad (as temporary migrants, they can sell their labor in more advanced, better paying markets where they can also acquire new skills and competences), and the second concerns a new, limited decommodification, also abroad (as European citizens, migrants receive social benefits as any other citizen in their receiving societies, benefits that they continue to receive after returning to their country of origin). During the pre-accession period, these directions were already foreshadowed in the bilateral agreement that Poland and Romania signed with the main destination countries to regulate the movement of seasonal and temporary contract workers (Poland and Germany, Romania and Italy, Romania and Spain etc.). Until now, the first economic dimension of free movement management has been prioritized (the second remains controversial due to resistance from migrant-receiving countries). Politically, free movement management aims to give migrants a say in political processes at home and consolidate loyalty to the source country.

Poland applied shock therapy for macroeconomic adjustment, while privatization proceeded gradually. Romania, where the political and economic forces of the past maintained control of the government, relied on stop-and-go gradualism in economic reform. In both Poland and Romania, there were serious concerns connected to the presence of militant workers (e.g. the miners), the existence of influential trade unions deeply involved in political negotiations and a strong populist component of the political class led by demagogues (Balcerowicz 1995). Shock therapy – the Balcerowicz Plan – was designed to curb the high inflation and open the Polish market to outside competition. While the country's bold efforts earned prompt praise from international institutions and boosted the government's credibility on global markets (Sachs 1993), transitional recession hit the population very hard. The Balcerowicz Plan entailed ending price controls, eliminating trade barriers and government subsidies for state enterprises, restricting

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wage increases, reducing the money supply and increasing interest rates. This led to dramatic declines in all major economic indicators in 1990. After only one month of shock therapy, the individual purchasing power had dropped by 43%. Registered unemployment went from 0.3% in December 1989 to 16.4% in 1993. The gross domestic product dropped over 18%. Peasants' incomes dropped by about half and Polish agricultural goods lost out in the competition to better-packaged and heavily subsidized Western goods (Curry 2011).

Recession ended and economic growth began picking up in the mid 1990s, but the economic and socio-political consequences of shock therapy raised concern among policy makers and social scientists alike. Some underlined the devastating impact of government downsizing and noted the worrisome social response to economy hardship, in particular the revival of populism of the late 1990s and early 2000s (Rupnik 2007). They feared that Central and Eastern European countries would remain stuck in an enduring, low-level equilibrium characterized by incomplete transition to democracy and imperfect shift to a free market economy, a situation vulnerable to destabilizing collective action, unless government invests a great deal of resources in compensating the population for its losses, a strategy that Hungary followed to avert crisis (Greskovits 1998). Later on, following EU enlargement towards Eastern Europe, political scientists accurately connected the rise of political radicalism, the radicalization of centrist parties and the increasing popularity of illiberal extremist forces in some post-communist new EU member-states with the fact that compliance with the Maastricht convergence criteria had forced governments to implement painful welfare state reforms. They argued that EU enlargement coupled with the required welfare state retrenchment triggered a polarization of domestic political arenas, with the emergence of a new cleavage between, on the one hand, pro-reform elites and the middle classes who support "radical neoliberal agendas" and, on the other hand, their "radical illiberal opponents" who respond by embracing nationalist, ethnic and xenophobic programs. The

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rest of the electorate (a majority of the population) has become "dissatisfied with democracy" and politically disengaged from democratic institutions and processes (Greskovits 2007).

There is divergence among post-communist countries in terms of political and economic outcomes, but with trajectories showing a significant degree of non-consolidation: "liberal democracy has emerged and taken root only in a small number of post-communist countries." In the majority of cases, "political transformations have either lost their momentum and resulted in partially democratic systems or have been reversed and brought new authoritarian regimes" (Ekiert et al. 2007). Interestingly, the countries where liberal democracy has taken root are also the ones in which states rely on citizenship of the market to compensate for the erosion of welfare state citizenship.

Poland has the highest level of inequality of any country in the EU except Portugal (Curry 2011), and yet the country seems as far as one can be from the much-feared return to populism and social-democracy. Both leading parties, the Civic Platform (PO – *Platforma Obywatelska*) and Law and Justice (PiS – *Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc*), have center-right and anti-communist general orientations, despite the differences when it comes to European integration (Law and Justice adopts a pronounced populist-conservative tone, coupled with a soft-Eurosceptic stance on EU integration, favoring economic integration but resisting political initiatives that restrict state sovereignty) and social issues (PiS is national conservative and Catholic). In high mobility contexts, registered unemployment stands at lower levels than national and regional levels: for instance, in Siemiatycze, the town mentioned by the *Economist* article (The Economist 2013), unemployment levels reach 10.5%, lower than the national average of 13% and the average for Podlaskie, the voivodship in which the town is located, that stands at 14.6%. Non-migrants in both Poland and Romania enjoy the reduced competition on local labor markets. As a result of labor shortages, wages have been increasing (The Economist 2013).

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Migrant-sending countries benefit from the considerable inflow of remittances and the various socio-economic problems that this cash flow from abroad helps solve at home either directly, by increasing household consumption, providing capital for investments, allowing younger generations to provide for older ones, fostering local improvements of life quality and living environments, funding education in the private system or professional training abroad etc., or indirectly, by reducing demands on already shrinking welfare states, decreasing the population's frustration in times of poor economic performance, allowing for further cuts in social spending (e.g. the pensions and salary reductions in Romania after the recent economic crisis) etc. In both Poland and Romania, remittances boost national household consumption and significant source of foreign exchange. According to Eurostat, net remittances make a substantial contribution to balancing a negative current account. In 2010, Poland had a current account balance of -16.5 billion Euros and a net inflow of workers' remittances of 2.7 billion Euros. Romania had a current account deficit of 4.9 billion Euros and a remittance inflow of 2.2 billion Euros (Chukanska & Comini 2012). Considerable discrepancies between reported intra-EU remittance outflows and reported intra-EU remittance inflows (e.g. 8.9 billion Euros versus 12.3 billion Euros, respectively, in 2010) suggest that official statistics do not capture the full magnitude of revenue flows (idem: 7). The value of remittances largely surpassed that of EU funds that Poland received through the Union's structural and cohesion programs. In 2005, the value of remittances was five times that of the funds the country received from the EU (Barbone et al. 2012).

Most EU member states are net senders of remittances and post negative balances when calculating inflow-outflow differentials. In the last half-decade, Poland and Romania have led the short list of EU countries that constitute the exceptions to the rule (ahead of six other countries: Portugal, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Sweden, Slovakia and Estonia). Table 9 shows the average for all

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Table 9. Net Workers' Remittances (Inflows Minus Outflows) in million Euros

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
EU-27	-7,678	-9,044	-8,992	-9,839	-10,179	-11,828	-12,244
Hungary	-30	-30	-42	-40	-57	-39	-43
Bulgaria	336	353	316	612	671	708	753
Romania	1,316	3,031	4,337	4,780	4,921	2,853	2,192
Poland	891	1,463	2,335	3,079	3,171	2,626	2,579

Source: Eurostat (Chukanska & Comini 2012)

EU member states (EU27, before the accession of Croatia) and the net flows of workers' remittances (inflows minus outflows) for Poland and Romania.

Remittances contribute to reducing poverty and income disparities in Poland. Migrant earnings have contributed to improving living standards for some of the most vulnerable and least affluent segments of the Polish population (Barbone et al. 2012). Remittance recipients are more likely to live in small towns or rural areas, rather than in large cities, in places deprived of economic and educational opportunities. The voivodships that have the highest levels of participation in labor migration include Podkarpackie, Swietokrzyskie, Podlaskie (high migration but not ranked among main remittance beneficiaries), Lubelskie, Malopolskie and Opolskie. The affluent regions of Central Poland (e.g. Mazowieckie, Wielkopolskie, Lódzkie) have low percentages of households receiving income from overseas. In Romania, most migrants come from rural areas in Moldova (about 40% of total) and rural Transylvania. In these areas, most jobs that are not connected to migratory flows – if and when available – pay the minimum wage. Migrants working abroad told me that it was simply inconceivable for them to return to a job that pays very poorly: "it's a mockery; one cannot survive on that!" exclaimed Danuta. "That's why I prefer working there [i.e. abroad] where the value of my work receives the respect and compensation it deserves. Honest work gets rewarded here." There is empirical evidence that potential mi-

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grants who stayed at home would have performed better had they migrated, as compared to the ones who actually did migrate (De Coulon & Piracha 2005).

Remittances reduce household reliance on social benefits. In Poland, the GUS Household Budget Survey of 2008 reports that when comparing the disposable income of household that receive overseas income and those who do not, the difference is relatively small. However, households with access to funds from overseas derive three quarters of their income from employment and, on average, about 10% from social benefits (social insurance payments, disability payments and pensions). Households that do not have access to money from overseas derive one quarter of their income from social benefits and about 60% from employment (Barbone et al. 2012).

States reap significant macro-economic gains as a result of remittances, which have been extensively documented in the literature. The return of migrants has a positive and significant effect on the productivity level of the source country: migrants bring skills that contribute to economic prosperity in the home country by boosting labor productivity. Remittances contribute to increasing investment levels in the source country; consumption is also positively affected by remittances, but there is at least some empirical evidence that in the case of new intra-EU mobilities the gains from investment surpass those from consumption, as a higher part of remittances goes towards entrepreneurial activities (León-Ledesma & Piracha 2004).

Countries benefit from free movement politically and economically not only by importing benefits, but also by exporting problems. Romanian government officials in institutions responsible for free movement management (the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department for Romanians Abroad) discussed these in detail. The main issues mentioned were poverty, unemployment, low-skilled (or obsoletely skilled) labor force, as well as the problems of crime and law enforcement. Accession to the European Union and the right to work

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abroad "solved the problem of jobs," as citizens could seek employment elsewhere after 2001. This reduces the over-abundance of labor at home. (Indeed, in the case of Poland, it actually led to labor shortages that the country is trying to solve.) Remittances "pulled countless families out of poverty" and help them live a decent life. Most migrants undergo training at the workplace abroad, thus updating their professional skills and standards. They become better professionals and move up in the hierarchy at their workplaces. As soon as visa-free travel was introduced, "Romania became a safer country:" the levels of organized crime and violent crime dropped, as recidivist criminals could also move freely on EU territory. Since criminals are now tried and imprisoned in their country of destination (France, Austria, Italy), this ends up easing the burden on law enforcement at home (interview with the Romania's negotiator for EUROPOL and EUROJUST between 2000-2007). "Before the lifting of the visa regime, Romanians were number 1 when it came to problems... The lifting of the visas with the new right to residence and work solved many of those problems," declared an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Another problem that migration helped solve was that of unfulfilled professional aspirations of the highly educated: students and professionals could now train in the most advanced research centers and practice their skills using the most advanced technologies. Their country of origin could sponsor them (programs like Erasmus and Leonardo), but would not have to worry about not having sufficient funds for research and development in fields like medicine, where technology is very expensive.

Initially, migrant-sending states had the expectation that migrant citizens would leave and never return. This was particularly true in the immediately post-1989 period, when many citizens fled Central and Eastern Europe to ask for asylum somewhere in the West. The second expectation, most widespread in the mid 1990s, was that migrants would leave, but they would come back without having accomplished any of their ambitions. Migrants in both Poland and Roma-

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nia defied both expectations: they both returned periodically to their homelands and were highly successful at their workplaces abroad. Now, migrant-sending countries have embraced the reality of return and count on it. They do not fear brain drain, but count on the fact that returning migrants will bring an overall brain gain to the country. If there is any "brain drain," it is perceived as being all for the better, since it allows people who would not be able to pursue their aspirations at home to fulfill them in another country, instead of being trapped at home, unemployed and frustrated (interview with Romanian IT specialist in Strasbourg, France).

In the early phases of migration, states were struck by the magnitude of bottom-up development and the wealth produced by migrants. In Romania, the total value of remittances increased from 1.82 billion Euros in 2003 to 5.48 billion in 2006. According to the World Bank, 12 % of all Romanians go abroad to work (almost 3 million people). Despite its relatively small territory and population, Romania ranks 18th worldwide in the top of migration countries (Mexico was #1 with 12 million people working abroad, followed by India and Russia). Over 3,000 Romanian doctors have left to seek employment abroad. Their favorite destinations are Spain, Italy and Hungary. Romanians who live abroad have sent home 4.5 billion dollars in 2010, a smaller, yet still considerable sum, given the additional hardships caused by the recession. The number of Romanians who work on a contract abroad tripled in 2010 in comparison with 2009 – "The economic recession forced many Romanians to opt for a work place abroad, which offers better conditions and remuneration than those they could get at home," said Cristian Tudorache, General Director of the recruiting firm Thera Group.[21]

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[21] http://www.mediafax.ro/social/numarul-romanilor-care-au-plecat-in-strainatate-cu-contract-de-munca-s-a-triplat-7809428/

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Free movement management includes a component that has to do with political discourse on migration. Romanian state officials have increasingly used a rhetoric reflecting a normalization of citizen mobility, portraying professional mobility as a very positive fact (instead of focusing on the absence of opportunity at home). In 2010, for instance, President Basescu said that Romanians should not make a drama out of the fact that doctors go abroad to seek jobs. "Europe and America are waiting for them impatiently. The greatest goal for Romania was our right to leave to wherever we are better off."[22] The President also acknowledged the gap between pay levels in Romania and abroad, and emphasized that he did not criticize doctors and teachers for leaving the country to work for more money because "the Romanian state does not have the money to pay doctors or teachers as they deserve." On Romanian national television, the President thanked Romanians who work abroad for what they are indirectly doing for their country by not coming back and asking for unemployment compensation. He asked the population for patience and understanding:

> Now we are in a situation in which we cannot offer jobs. Unemployment was 7.43% in the last month, the month of July [2010]. This is Romania's reality. Romania is far behind states like Italy or Spain. In Italy or Spain, social insurance is so high that the Spaniards and Italians prefer to stay in unemployment than to work in tough jobs. Romanians accept these jobs and win more money.

Instead of seeing the exodus of highly trained, highly educated professionals as an issue, sending countries are banking on the benefits of brain gain. They see the mobility of these migrants as an opportunity to outsource higher education and highly specialized training to more technologically advanced countries in Western Europe. In August 2010, the adviser to the Romanian President, Sebastian Lazaroiu, commented as follows on the situation of doctors who consider leaving the country and those who decide to leave: "They go to other countries, which

[22] http://www.ziare.com/social/romani/sondaj-ziare-com-vrei-sa-pleci-din-romania-1033745 Olteanu, Irina, 2010, published 08/06/2010

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are of course more developed. There they have access to modern technology, and when they return – because we hope that 60-70% of those who leave will return in 5-10 years – one can say that the state has invested in these people."[23] Without exposure to work environments elsewhere, specialists in migrant-sending countries cannot achieve the same levels as their counterparts from advanced countries. This constitutes a strategy to close the skills gap without making the financial investment (which is currently unachievable) in better research facilities and better universities.

While Romanian officials seem generally happy about the short-term export of unemployment and the expected medium- and long-term brain gain, in Poland shortages in the workforce have created numerous problems. The shut down of vocational schools during the 2001 reform of the education system dealt a serious blow to worker training at home. As in the Romanian case, migrations have taken out of the Polish labor market skilled workers and mid-level professionals, like nurses. Skilled specialists in production and experienced skilled manual workers (e.g. welders or seamstresses) are in high demand. The problems have become so severe that they made the core of the agenda at the Polish Employers' Congress in 2007. A report by Jagiello and Wesierska (2007) (Galgóczi & Watt 2009), found that almost half of all Polish companies claimed that they lost revenues due to labor shortages. In 2006, only about 25% of companies had considered decreasing labor supply as a problem. A study conducted in the fall of 2007 revealed that 60% of companies had trouble finding workers; shortages were especially problematic in fields like trade and services. Many employers had to reduce production. Other positions that are among those most in demand are administration (human resources specialists and accountants), management, IT engineers etc. Employers have had to adjust to the pressures of migratory

[23] http://www.ziare.com/lazaroiu/consilier-prezidential/lazaroiu-basescu-nu-a-indemnat-pe-nimeni-sa-plece-din-tara-dar-nici-nu-ii-poate-opri-1035008

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flows and offer more competitive working conditions. This was the case in the IT sector starting in 2006. By facilitating exit, the Polish state has managed to incentivize companies to become more competitive on the European labor market in terms of attracting professionals. Poland seems to have used migration as a way to put pressure on private businesses – recent studies indicate that most employers think that a 10-30% increase in wages would keep most workers in Poland. Employers have become aware that workers have acquired considerable bargaining power in all branches of the Polish labor market. Galgoczi and Watt cite Eurostat reports that show a 12% increase in labor costs in Poland since 2005.

Despite the normalization discourses, there are certain challenges associated with free movement that require the attention and intervention of the state. In high mobility contexts, family relations come under severe strain. Divorce during or after migration is a phenomenon that local authorities in both sending and receiving communities have mentioned repeatedly during the informant interviews I conducted. Priests and officials at local town halls were particularly aware of this. The changing status of women in the household empowers female migrants relative to their husbands, leading to a reconsideration of the marriage itself, in some cases, and to divorce in others. The phenomenon has also been documented in the case of Polish migrations (Burrell 2008; Coyle 2007; Ryan et al. 2009).

A related and even more dramatic challenge is that of children left alone at home while one or both parents work abroad. Given the magnitude of the phenomenon, in Romania, the Direction for the Protection of the Child, an institution functioning within the framework of the Ministry of Labor, Family, Social Protection and Elderly Persons, in collaboration with the public services of social assistance, monitors the number of cases of children left at home and produces trimestral reports. According to centralized data, in 2006, almost 40,000 children had one or both parents working abroad. Researchers warned that real numbers greatly surpass official

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statistics. Of these, 16,300 children are staying with one parent at home, while 23,596 have both parents abroad. Most children left at home live with relatives, including those who have one parent in Romania. In 2006-2007, Romanian mass media reported four suicide cases among children whose parents worked abroad (3 in Iasi and one in Valea Jiului). In one case from Ciortesti, Iasi, a ten-year-old boy committed suicide a while after his mother left for Italy to work. She was planning to use her savings to buy a computer for her son and send him to a better school. The boy's father, who was unemployed, was the primary caretaker. The boy missed his mother very much, and kept in touch with her on the phone. When the father ran out of money to recharge the phone card, he did not allow his son to call his mother as usual. This, allegedly, determined the child to take his own life (Racu 2007).

The problem has been exacerbated by EU accession. At the end of 2012, there were almost 80, 000 recorded cases of children whose parents worked abroad, with 41% of cases being completely deprived of parental care (22,993 had both parents abroad, while 9,991 came from mono-parental families in which the only parent had gone to work abroad). The report noted that almost 3,500 children relied on the state-run special protection and care system, which includes several options from foster care and placement centers to forms of assistance at home and in the community (Salvati Copiii - Save the Children Romania 2013). According to the same report, the overall yearly figures were dropping from a peak of 92,328 registered children who had one or both parents abroad in 2008 (immediately after Romania's accession).

Other challenges of free movement include tackling the problems associated with the growing communities of citizens abroad, to respond to their needs and ensure their integration in the economic and political community of the nation-state even when they are abroad (obviously, this happens to the extent the government in the migrant-sending state finds it desirable). This cluster of inter-related issues requires the expansion of the consulate network, the establishment

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of new government institutions and the development of a coherent, effective national strategy to institutionalize the state-citizen relationship in high-mobility contexts. This strategy that refer to as free movement management will be analyzed in full detail in the next section of the chapter.

Something Old and Something New: Free Movement Management in Comparative Perspective

This section overviews the institutional and legal frameworks that two migrant-sending countries – Poland and Romania – have developed to cope with the challenges associated with the free movement of their citizens on EU territory. It compares these to the ones used in diaspora management. While there are many common elements in the institutional strategies that Poland and Romania use, I argue that the way in which states manage free movement has historical roots in previous experiences with diaspora-state relations. In the case of post-communist countries, these historical legacies come from the interwar period and communist regime.

A complete, perfectly functioning system that ensures the economic and political incorporation of citizens, wherever they may be, remains elusive. Circular migrants from Poland and Romania agree that their governments are not doing enough to support and protect them (see Chapter II). Intra-EU movers from both countries complain that the representatives of their states abroad prioritize diaspora relations over efforts to help mobile citizens. Highly mobile citizens also complain that the paperwork necessary to be able to cast a vote abroad is too onerous. For instance, to enter the voting station abroad, Romanian migrants have to show not only a valid Romanian passport, but also a document that demonstrates their residence in the foreign country where they are attempting to vote (Ministerul Afacerilor Externe & Autoritatea Electorala Permanenta 2012; Cajvaneanu 2009). Imperfections aside, the nature of government

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institutions and legal frameworks reveals interesting variation and speaks to the "stickiness" of management strategies.

With its long tradition of state-diaspora relations grounded in a partnership between government institutions and civil society organizations of émigrés, Poland has adopted a sophisticated, less politicized, more coherent approach to free movement management, centered on economic and social support rather than politics. Migrants can vote, even by mail-in ballot, but their votes are counted as part of the electoral college of Central Warsaw, not separately. Poland uses a system of assimilated representation that does not separate the migrant vote from that of citizens at home or give migrants their own elected representatives in Parliament. While migrants have a say and it is easier for them to register (Poland has recently introduced an online registration system to increase turnout at voting stations abroad) and cast a ballot, that vote does not allow citizens abroad to track the activity of their own MP etc. Historically, Romania has a more limited experience with émigré communities. While diaspora management was given high priority after 1989, in practice, diaspora- and free movement management developed in tandem after the Cold War. In the case of Romania, the strategy of coping with mobile citizens emerged as an integral part of EU pre-accession negotiations, at a time when public opinion and observers could still clearly identify communist-successor forces (integration-skeptic) and their declared opponents (pro-market). As a result, free movement management has been highly politicized from the start and produced institutional outcomes that perpetuate that characteristic. Following the recent electoral reform under PDL leadership, citizens abroad can elect their own MPs (four representatives in the Chamber of Deputies and two Senators). Even though Romania lags behind Poland when it comes to providing logistical, institutional and material support for its highly mobile citizens, paradoxically, when it comes to political representation, the government in Bucharest appears to be doing a better job at helping migrant constituents make their voice heard.

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With the exception of the Romanian Cultural Institutes, Romania lacked diaspora-management institutions that could be revived after 1989; for that reason, political parties ended up taking over the stage and setting the tone for the debates on mobile citizens.

The rest of this section covers in detail the free-movement institutions that Poland and Romania set up. It should be noted from the very beginning that both countries were under pressure to adopt migration control strategies in the early 1990s to fulfill EU requirements and demonstrate they can secure their border. Both countries signed bilateral agreements to attempt to regulate citizen outflows (Iglicka 2007; Muntele 2003), but these did not prevent irregular forms of mobility from emerging or continuing.

Poland

While the Romanian President talked about the normalization of circular migration and citizen mobility (see above), in Poland, official discourses on migration converge on the issue of diaspora-circular migrant partnerships and their contribution to furthering national interests. To give a full measure of how different the Romanian and Polish strategies of free movement management are on certain dimensions (and especially the apolitical, civil society based character of the latter), it is worthwhile to quote at some length from the 2011 annual address of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslav Sikorski:

> I am confident that I speak on behalf of all the members of this House when I saw that we want Poland to become not only a secure and prosperous country, but also one with influence. A serious country. So that we, like Spain or Turkey before us, will be able to regain some of our bygone prestige. A serious country is, in my opinion, one with an economy which – based on modern benchmarks – has a GDP of over a trillion dollars. It is a country that exports more capital and technology than it imports. Whose youth does not emigrate to find work, and whose opportunities attract at least its own diaspora..."
>
> Speaking of solidarity, let us remember the Polish diaspora and Poles living abroad. The main task of our new diaspora policy is to establish a feedback mechanism between Poland and its citizens abroad. It is in the interest of Polish communities to support the Polish state, because its every success strengthens their position in their country of residence. We are helping the Polish diaspora and Poles living abroad in various ways, soliciting their assistance in the implementation of

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our country's interests. The more effective this implementation, the stronger their position. (Sikorski 2011)

The historical roots of free movement management and the connection with diaspora management are made explicit. Free movement strategies represent, in the Polish strategy, a natural continuation of previous relations with émigrés. As a part of Polonia, new migrants are expected to support the Polish state and help advance its political and economic position on the bases of transnational solidarity.

The current program of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – "Support for the Civil and Local-Government Dimension of Polish Foreign Policy" – continues this management strategy. The government declares its intention to connect local authorities and non-governmental organizations with Polish communities abroad. By predicating the national strategy on decentralization and the promotion of local partnerships between civil society organizations at home and Polish communities abroad, the Polish government is moving in the direction of further depoliticization. The driving principle is the reintegration of Polish communities abroad by officially encouraging the formation of home town associations or their equivalents (Fin et al. 2013).

In Poland, the state's strategies of intra-EU and free movement management shifted from attempts to control and restrict mobility, to attempts to reconnect with migrant citizens and to facilitate their return. In the mid 1990s, researchers predicted that Poland would gradually shift from being a major migrant-sending country to a country of transit migration and net immigration. Instead, the country's accession to the EU in May 2004, coupled with unrestricted entry to EU member states like the UK and Ireland triggered one of the biggest emigration flows in Poland's postwar history. "The country became one of the largest exporters of labor within the enlarged European Union. In addition to a decreasing birth rate, migration accounted for a real reduction in Poland's population over the past decade"(Iglicka & Ziolek-Skrzypczak 2010). Po-

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land's EU accession boosted the level of remittances from US $4.7 billion in 2004 to US $10.7 in 2008. After the recession started, remittances dropped to US $ 8.5 bn (World Bank). The recession also changed the sources of remittances over the same period, according to the National Bank of Poland quoted by the Migration Information Source. In 2004, 35% of remittances came from Germany, while the UK and Ireland combined represented 34%. After Poland's admission to the EU club, by 2007, only 13% of remittances were sent from Germany as a result of the restrictive admission policies implemented by that country against Eastern European EU citizens looking for work. The UK and Ireland represented 34% *each*. After the recession, the level of remittances from the UK and Ireland has dropped to 16% and 19% respectively in 2009, as migrants in these countries sent home smaller sums less often, while remittances from Germany increased to 24% (Iglicka & Ziolek-Skrzypczak 2010).

In contrast with Romania, where recession hit hard, in Poland, the economic crisis only led to economic slowdown. Annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth dropped from 4.9 % in 2008 to 1.8% in 2009. Unemployment rate increased from 9.5 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 to 11.9 in the fourth quarter of 2009 (Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010). In fact, the country was the only EU member that maintained economic growth. This contributed to the decision of some Polish citizens who worked abroad at the time of the recession to return home.

As part of the requirements in preparation for EU accession, Poland amended in 2001 its Aliens Act, adding an Office for Repatriation and Foreigners, its first separate government agency dealing solely with migration issues. This was, however, a diaspora management structure that did not influence the status of intra-EU migrants. The Repatriation Act adopted in 2000 came into force in January 2001. It was the first comprehensive legal framework regulating the resettlement of people of "Polish ethnicity or descent" in their country of origin. Its goal was allowing Polish people in the former Soviet space to return. The Repatriation Act targeted those individu-

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als who "due to deportations, exile and other ethnically motivated forms of persecution could not settle in Poland." It established the automatic acquisition of nationality through repatriation. Those holding a repatriation visa become Polish nationals automatically on the day they cross the Polish border (Article 4). "Repatriation visas are granted to those of Polish descent, which is further defined to include those who once had Polish nationality or who have at least one parent or grandparent or two great-grandparents who were ethnic Poles or held Polish nationality" (Górny & Pudzianowska 2009). To obtain the repatriation visa, migrants have to declare that they are of Polish ethnicity and to demonstrate attachment to Polish culture by nurturing Polish language, traditions and customs. The process has an ethnic and cultural requirement. Repatriates can claim reimbursement of the cost of transportation. They may request support for education-related costs for minor children in Poland. They are entitled to a free Polish language course, as well as a settlement and maintenance grant. Finally, the government reimburses Polish employers who hire repatriates for bonuses, social insurance, equipment purchased and vocational training (Migration Information Source).

In September 2007, the Polish government passed the Act of the Polish Chart or Polish Card (effective April 2008) and built on the notion of Polish ethnicity and the previous Repatriation Act. The initiative targeted initially ethnic Poles from Kazakhstan. The introduction of the Polish Card has made it possible for any ethnic Pole to live and work in Poland after demonstrating that one of his parents, grandparents or at least two of his great-grandparents are Polish. The applicant is tested on knowledge of Polish language, culture and history. Card holders can apply for a free, long-term residence visa and eventually Polish citizenship. They have access to free emergency medical care, free entrance to museums and free reduced fares on public transportation means. They are not eligible for welfare benefits. Most people who take advantage of this

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legal framework for repatriation by April 2010 came from Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Russia. Again, these policies contributed primarily to diaspora management.

After 2004, new priorities emerged in migration policy debates, with politicians starting to discuss migration in socio-economic policy terms. The key points on the agenda concerned encouraging the return of migrating Poles from Western Europe; recruiting skilled and unskilled foreign workers to compensate for the absence of Polish workers in sectors like agriculture or construction; advancing towards a better control of the Eastern border coupled with ensuring and expanding free movement for Polish citizens in the Schengen space. Institutionalizing, facilitating and stimulating return became a national priority for the Polish state as a solution to labor shortages and the aging of the population. The government also counts on the active role that remittances and new capital will play in investment and development at home. The center-right government's 2007 campaign emphasized the importance of bringing back young migrant Poles. The state is also working on its image as a destination country, the logic being that, if a country appears attractive to foreigners, its citizens will be more likely to appreciate it as well. The Interministerial Committee for Migration, established in February 2009, functions as an advisory body to the prime minister.

Many other government activities targeted migrant workers abroad (Galgóczi & Watt 2009). Through information and assistance campaigns, the state reached out to provide support to polish citizens working in the EU. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs again assumed the leadership role. In 2006, the MFA presented a program aimed at providing assistance and information to Polish citizens in countries where transnational migration levels are very high. The Ministry entitled the program "Closer to work, closer to Poland" (*Blizej Pracy, Blizej Polski*). The initiative comprises several elements: reforming consulate offices to render them more responsive and accessible to Poles living abroad (longer working hours, increases in staff, modernization of offices

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and the opening of new offices where current ones are insufficient). This institutional framework provides information on living and working conditions in the countries where the consulates are situated, as well as information about employment opportunities in Poland, basically trying to contribute to a *de facto* integration of the labor markets from the point of view of the Polish citizen working abroad who tries to decide whether or not he/she should return to the homeland or pursue employment opportunities abroad.

The consulates focus their activities on preserving cultural identity and the Polish language. They offer language instruction for children and propose cultural projects. Thus, the state presents itself as a supporting force, one that makes it easier for parents to educate their children and communicate a rich cultural and linguistic heritage that would otherwise remain hard to access due to the distances separating the family from the homeland. The Polish government invests considerable effort in strengthening the ties that link migrants to their homeland, placing particular emphasis on the promotion of cultural and linguistic heritage. To manage the activities of Polish embassies and consulates, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates the "Government Program of Cooperation with Polonia and Polish Citizens abroad," established in October 2007 after Poland's accession to the EU. Implementation takes place through the networks of consulates and embassies for the most part. As representatives of the Polish state, consuls now carry the responsibility of developing contacts between new organizations of Polish migrant workers in EU countries. State representatives also have the mission to promote and support the integration of new organizations of mobile citizens (new migrants) with older ones that resulted from previous waves of migration (Polish diaspora organizations). In other words, the state intends to integrate "old emigration," diaspora civil society with the recent back-and-forth migratory flows. Since the Catholic Church plays a key role in supporting Polish migrants abroad, the Polish government has also intensified its communication with Polish Catholic missions. Twenty-one Polish Insti-

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tutes operate abroad, focusing primarily on cultural promotion. On this front, the Polish government contributes financially and logistically to organizing Polish film festivals, exhibitions and concerts. Consulates and embassies also provide financial aid for Polish libraries and clubs, as well as Polish artists and groups who perform traditional Polish music and dance.

In October 2007, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (MPiPS) announced the launching of Program "Powrot" (*Return*). *Return* aims at "creating the best possible conditions for return for those who in recent years have decided to leave the country and migrate to more developed EU countries." Several ministers contribute to this ample initiative. The Ministry of Finance has the responsibility for proposing regulations for migrants returning to the homeland and establishing businesses – the Ministry can for instance grant tax privileges and allow reduced social security contributions for a limited time period. The MFA has to work on improving Poland's image *among migrants and emigrants*. The Ministry also has the responsibility of promoting business, and providing information and legal advice for those interested in this area. The Ministry of Labor has the responsibility to provide information about job offers available in Poland, a task it fulfills in collaboration with consulates and largely online.[24] MPiPS officials that have high levels of familiarity with the labor market are appointed to work with consulates. The program website covers issues like social security and taxation for returning migrant workers, as well as offers tips for those who come back with the intention to set up new businesses. Apart from its practical role, the website emphasizes the advantages of returning home and tries to get migrants enthusiastic about the prospect of returning to an exciting country of origin where they are eagerly awaited. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science also contribute to the pro-

[24] The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy publicizes information about job offers available in Poland on a special website: www.powroty.gov.pl

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gram *Return*. Their main responsibility is producing e-learning opportunities for children of Polish migrants who live abroad and for those who are getting ready for continuing their education in Poland. The Ministry of Education is in charge of pushing for the introduction of Polish as a foreign language in schools abroad. For highly-qualified migrants, the Polish government developed the program "Powroty/Homing" that encourages young scientists who work abroad to come back to Poland and continue their research endeavors. A two-year scholarship is available, with financial support for continuing international cooperation and implementing a research project plan. The yearly amount is circa 11,500 Euro.

In terms of taxation, Poland has taken steps to eliminate the burden of double taxation by concluding bilateral agreements on the issue with all EU countries, Switzerland, Norway, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. In 2008, the government passed the Tax Abolition Act, thus allowing Poles who earned money abroad between 2002 and 2007 to apply for a refund on taxes they had already paid. In terms of benefits, the UK and Ireland opened their labor markets to Polish migrants but did not grant full social security to all; only those who had worked over a year could receive social benefits. However, there are reports of Polish citizens working abroad who still collect social benefits in Poland, a situation policy makers could still not monitor or control two years after accession (Iglicka 2007).

The current administration's campaign featured plans to encourage the return of young Polish migrants. Prime Minister Donald Tusk initiated in 2008 the campaign "Do you have a PLan to return?" (the capitalization makes reference to Poland, the destination of the advertised return). The campaign tried to facilitate returns and publicize job opportunities. The program, run in consultation with Polish diaspora organizations, included a guidebook and a website targeting Polish citizens abroad. The resources provides details about required paperwork, warned returning citizens about potential problems they may face at home, offered information about job

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openings and employment agencies at regional level to help returning migrants navigate the local labor. The costs of the program reached 1 million Euros (4 million Polish zloty), and produced resources that were informative, accessible, interactive and updated in real-time. While the success of the campaign has been a matter of controversy, the Polish state clearly signaled its commitment to citizens abroad.

A survey funded by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has found that Polish migrants want future policy to stop distinguishing between Polish citizens living in Poland and Polish citizens living abroad, especially in light of EU free movement (Fin et al. 2013). As in the case of Romanians (Cajvaneanu 2009), Polish migrants also complain about the fact that political participation from abroad is excessively burdensome and ends up preventing many from voting (Fin et al. 2013). Since migrants constantly complain that their country has a poor image abroad. Their own perceptions of their country of origin are predominantly negative (Cajvaneanu 2009; Angi et al. 2009; Fin et al. 2013; Eade et al. 2007; Rolando 2009). The problem is, however, that the blame is officially cast on new migratory waves through initiatives that aim at differentiating "respectable, high-cultured, educated, naturalized" diasporas who are established abroad and are not planning to go back anytime soon from the "low-skilled, less affluent, uneducated" new migrants who want to make some money, possibly by working without a contract. This phenomenon was evident in the case of Romanian migrants in France (with the recent and ongoing campaign "Je suis Roumain... AUSSI" – "I am a Romanian, TOO," a campaign with occasional anti-Roma undertones, in which the Association of Romanian Students and Doctoral Students in France played a key role) and Italy, where government officials and Romanian diaspora organizations are obsessed about the need to show the Italian public opinion "anche l'altra faccia della medaglia" (the other side of the coin, *my translation*), i.e. that "in Italy there aren't just [Romanian] caretakers and blue-collar workers... but also cultural and art-world personalities" ("in Italia non

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essistono solo badanti e operai romeni... ma anche personalità nel mondo della cultura, dell'arte e dello spettacolo," *my translation* (Rolando 2009)). These campaigns emphasizing highbrow migration may be overall counterproductive since they have little, if any, impact on the intended audience (citizens of receiving countries), with the side-effect of deepening divisions between immigrants and new migrants who do not feel welcome at exclusive cultural events designed to differentiate intellectual participants from the average Polish plumber, Romanian construction worker or the Romanian *badante.* The conversations I had in Italy and France with officials at the Romanian Cultural Institutes, representatives of diaspora organizations and embassy officials all revealed the existence of this gap, but the interviewees perceived it as something natural, rather than a problem to be addressed, and did not think about the effects of we-are-not-them campaigns on the majority of Romanian migrants (who are, currently and predominantly, intra-EU free movement migrants).

Attempts to find information about any equivalent Polish parties abroad produced an abundance of search results concerning themed soirées and other social gatherings with music, dancing and traditional food, but not much politically relevant content. In the UK, the Federation of Poles in Great Britain (*Zjednoczenie Polskie w Wielkiej Brytanii*) is the structure that coordinates Polish civil society organizations. Its origins date back to the WW II wave of immigration and had political roots. The Federation started in 1946 when the British Government formally withdrew recognition of the Polish Government in Exile. Until the end of the Cold War, The Federation assumed the mission of representing the interests of the Polish diaspora with respect to British authorities. In 1990, Ryszard Kaczorowski, the Polish President of the exiled Polish government in London, passed the Presidential Insignia to Lech Walesa. Subsequently, The Federation was recognized as the organization representing the Polish ethnic minority in the UK and renewed its mission of promoting and defending Polish interests in Great Britain, as well as pro-

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moting Polish history, culture and traditions among the Brits (Zjednoczenie Polskie w Wielkiej Brytanii n.d.).

Poland's free movement management relies heavily on continuity as a principle. Historical legacies play a key role in shaping current strategy, with state-diaspora institutional channels providing a "natural" starting point. State authorities are actively working on developing partnerships between diaspora communities and new migrant communities. The government-sponsored partnerships involve local organizations in migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries, with the state adopting an increasingly decentralized approach. Instead of expanding its presence abroad, the Polish state takes pride in having cut the number of consular employees, all while increasing their efficiency (Sikorski 2011). In terms of political representation, while voting abroad is much easier now, thanks to the introduction of correspondence voting and online voter registration, the political voice of migrants remains relatively unheard. The migrant vote is counted together with domestic votes from Central Warsaw, and migrants cannot elect their own representatives in the Polish Parliament. This is very much in line with the cult of anti-politics that developed in the diaspora during the communist period. After WW II, Polish diaspora organizations proclaimed loyalty to legal authorities in exile and simply withdrew from post-war party politics. The Polish American Congress "repeatedly criticized party politics" and emphatically reasserted its disengagement from political power struggles..." (Jaroszyńska-Kirchmann 2004). Poland has relied on its diaspora management institutions to integrate new migratory flows. As a result, the legacy of depoliticization remains noticeable in contemporary free movement management.

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Romania

The previous sections of this chapter have already revealed the most important characteristics of the Romanian state strategy towards migrants. In particular, I have shown the lack of a history of diaspora management and a trajectory marked by discontinuity in the short history that does exist. I have discussed the quasi-simultaneous emergence of diaspora and free movement management, and mentioned its high degree of politicization. This characteristic will be fully examined in the next section. In this section, my goal is to overview the range of institutions that the Romanian government has created until now, in its efforts to connect with citizens abroad and cope with the challenges of free movement. To avoid repetition as much as possible, I will not insist on the points that have been already made, but instead focus on the dimensions of the state-citizen relationship that I have not yet covered.

In February 2000, Romania was officially invited to begin pre-accession negotiations to join the European Union. As EU membership became a plausible, feasible, reachable endpoint to a painful transition process, circular migration was also normalized and legalized. Its irregular forms were seen as a temporary deviation that would not constitute a problem as soon as visa-free travel was introduced. On December 7, 2001, the Council of Internal Affairs Ministers of the European Union (JAI) decided that, starting on January 1, 2002, Romanians could enter the Schengen space without a visa. Migrants were henceforth entitled to travel freely on European Union territory for 90 days in a six-month interval. Free movement under the aegis of European citizenship finally became a reality (Muntele 2003; Diminescu 2003).

Bilateral agreements with destination countries (Germany, Hungary, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg and Switzerland) eliminated the rigid framework in which migrants were expulsed, permitting instead seasonal workers to cross the national boundaries as needed. A system of quotas was set up, with priority sectors for certain professional categories: information technology,

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health (doctors and nurses), agriculture, the restaurant industry, construction etc. In turn, Romania agreed to actively participate in the process of coordination and harmonization of migration policy in the EU, mainly by taking measures against clandestine migration. Since, upon accession, Romania's northeastern border became the external frontier of the Union itself, the candidate country had to prove that its capacity to police the border effectively against *extra-communautaire* illegal migrants and against transnational crime networks operating through the post-Soviet space and attempting to enter EU territory through Moldova and Ukraine (interview with JAI and EUROPOL negotiator). Since, like Bulgaria and Cyprus, Romania was not at the time accepted in the Schengen space, border controls were maintained until the EU Council decided that the conditions for abolishing internal border controls had been met.[25] Meanwhile, transnational migrants were already sending home remittances that made up 3% of the Romanian GDP (Muntele 2003).

As the EU negotiations transferred responsibility for managing migration to the Romanian state, the state-citizen relationship gained a new dimension. Under the pressures of the European Union, the Romanian state had to shift from its previous *laissez faire* take on citizen mobility to an approach in which the homeland itself prevents some migrants from leaving, creates selection criteria and enforces them at the border. In this early phase anticipating free movement management, the Romanian state often had to act as the barrier preventing citizens from enjoying the benefits of EU citizenship. The criteria for filtering migrants at the border were economic, as specified in the Executive Order (*ordonanta de urgenta)* of the Romanian government 144/2001 and the order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 177/2001. According to the new legis-

[25] Official European Union portal: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33020_en.htm

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lative framework, exiting citizens were required to demonstrate they have sufficient resources for the trip itself and also show that their plans include return. To enter the Schengen space, Romanian citizens had to show at the border-crossing point a return ticket (or travel documents for the car), health insurance valid abroad, and at least 100 Euro per each day of their trip abroad.

As a result of the imposed restrictions, despite the elimination of visas, 2002 marked a drop of 16% in cross-border mobility. The number of re-entries increased slightly as migrants who had been prolonging their irregular stays abroad indefinitely, for fear of not being able to return to their job after a visit in their homeland, were finally able to come back home to visit. Families that were separated for years could spend time together. Clandestine migrants could return and then resume mobility legally, at lower costs, with lower risks and smaller constraints. Their families could visit them. Since these migrants had already gathered a mobility capital (social, financial and cultural), they adjusted very easily to the new conditions prescribed by the law: they crossed boundaries more frequently and abided by the time limits imposed, moving back and forth every three months. Since the demand for transportation means increased significantly to accommodate the amplified migrant flow, transportation means also flourished and diversified, from bus and shuttle services to low-cost airlines.

The Romanian state's policy towards intra-EU migrants evolved from a wish (and need) to control migrants, to a desire to reap some benefits from citizen mobility. To secure migrant financial and political support, the Romanian government wanted to assert its presence in the life of highly mobile citizens, to assist them in confronting the challenges of working abroad, and to help them reconnect with their homeland and facilitate their return.

In terms of the legislative and institutional framework, the Law # 156/2000 of July 26, 2000 regarding the protection of Romanian citizens who work abroad, republished in 2009 in *Monitorul Oficial* (Part I, May 5th, 2009) was the first document to create an institutional frame-

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work for current citizens domiciled in Romania but working abroad (Art. 1). This was the first law to complement the provisions of international treaties and conventions that benefit other categories of Romanian citizens working abroad (diplomatic personnel, employees of international organizations etc.). The Romanian state asserted its authority over concluding accords, understandings, treaties or conventions with counterparts in other states to establish the work conditions for Romanian migrant workers. The documents were going to specify at the very least the level of minimum wage, working hours and rest, the general conditions of work, work protection and safety, the insurance for work accidents or professional diseases, as well as for those conditions that occur outside the work process (Art. 3, para.3). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was put in charge of overviewing this and solving cases resulting from alleged violations of rights. The Law #156/2000 also specified the conditions that agents for the occupation of labor force abroad need to satisfy in order to function in accordance with the law.

The law had as a goal to protect Romanian citizens from the risks associated with working abroad and imposing some general guidelines for companies who wanted to recruit Romanian workers. Art. 9 outlined the elements that a contract concluded by agents of foreign hiring companies had to include: duration; number of available positions; the nature of the job; the hiring conditions as well as those concerning the end of the contract and re-hiring; work and rest times; wages and dates for payments; raises and other wage rights; vacations, the possibility to transfer the wage to Romania; the medical insurance of Romania workers similar to the one required for citizens of the receiving country; compensation to Romanian employees in the case of work accidents, professional diseases or death; housing/living/rental conditions and food; assurance of formalities, the specification of transportation conditions from Romania to the receiving state and back for employees and any family members that may accompany or visit them, as well as the guarantee that these expenses will be covered; the taxes and other contributions that influ-

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ence the revenue of employee Romanian citizens, to ensure that employees avoid the double burden of contributing to social insurance twice; the obligations of Romanian employees abroad. Under Art. 1, Romanian citizens who worked abroad on contracts described in the law are entitled to national health insurance, unemployment benefits or the public retirement compensation system as well as other social insurance rights if, in accordance with concluded insurance contracts, they pay the required contributions to the right institutions in Romania, on the basis of declarations of monthly revenue earned abroad.

To address the problem of children left at home, an important modification to this law later asked citizens who are responsible for minors while in Romania to provide agencies for the occupation of labor force a document released by their town hall to certify that local authorities were informed about the situation of children remaining in the country. The measure aimed at making it possible for the National Authority for the Protection of Children's Rights to monitor the situation. In 2006, the institution released an order establishing a protocol for identification, intervention and monitoring of children who lack parental supervision while their parents are working abroad, as well as the responsibilities of welfare services.

In 2004, the Department for Work Abroad was founded as a part of the Ministry of Labor, Social Solidarity and of the Family, under the leadership of Doru Claudian Frunzulica. This confirmed the shift from control to protection and connection in the Romanian state's approach towards its mobile citizens. The government began developing an institutional framework in which it could anticipate and address the needs and concerns of citizens working abroad. In justifying its decision to create the Department, the government explained that the structure was absolutely necessary due to the high number of Romanian citizens who work abroad and who are entitled to a form of institutionalized protection by the Romanian state. The Department had as a mission the defense of Romanian citizens' rights and freedoms, the elimination of discrimina-

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tion between Romanian citizens and the citizens of the countries where Romanians work, support and consulting in work litigations and information dissemination according to the laws and access on the European Community labor market. Other functions of the Department included promoting measures that protect workers' rights; preventing abuses against Romanian migrant workers; "*facilitating the permanent connection of citizens with their country so that they be able to exercise their constitutional rights*"; offering support in solving litigations and work conflicts; offering support for solving work and social issues; monitoring the accords signed by the Romanian government with other countries' governments; organizing awareness raising campaigns about the risks of illegal work and the lack of social insurance; preparing some conditions for integration in the EU and for the post-enlargement access of Romanian citizens to the EU labor market. Finally, the Department could also propose the modification or amendment of national legislation in the field of worker protection for Romanian citizens who work abroad.

Through this institutional move, the Romanian state attempted to reassert its usefulness and relevance for its citizens, to make a point about its willingness to correct the shortcomings of the European labor market. Department coordinator Doru Frunzulica emphatically expressed this point in an official statement: "In the following period, we have as objectives to act so that Romanian citizens not be discriminated against, so that they feel like first-rate citizens in Europe or anywhere in the world, because there is no difference between the Romanian citizen and the citizens of the European Union or those or other states." The Romanian government promoted a vision of work migrants as both Romanian and European citizens, while asserting its willingness to defend the equality of rights between its citizens and those of other European countries.

Several institutions were subordinated to the Department for Work Abroad: the Direction for protection of Romanian citizens working abroad; the Direction for registering and monitoring; and the Office for the Migration of Labor Force. The Government also established an inter-

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ministry Working Group at the state secretary level that integrated the activities of the various state structures whose function is to solve problems specific to Romanian workers abroad. This group included representatives of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the European Integration Ministry, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Education and Research and the Ministry for Work, Social Solidarity and the Family (MMSSF-Ministerul Muncii, Solidaritatii Sociale si Familiei). Also, within MMSSF, the Body of Attachés for social and work problems, ensured the representation of the ministry in diplomatic missions, the consulate offices and other Romanian representations abroad. Frunzulica, in the period following his appointment, visited all the countries that host large numbers of Romanian workers (Italy, Spain, Germany and Hungary) for outreach and case-by-case interventions. The purpose of the visits was to create an "inventory of problems that Romanians have abroad, work problems, work security issues, problems related to legislation, violations of work schedules or the minimum wage requirements in that country, violations of sojourn and living conditions."

The Department dealt with concrete issues affecting the transnational migrants' everyday life and work abroad. In Spain, it contributed to matters as diverse as securing driver's license recognition for Romanian citizens and setting up a system through which Romanians abroad can obtain the documents they need faster. The Department also set up more phone lines and help lines free of cost, as well as an interactive website that workers abroad can access to ask questions that are promptly answered. The Department reiterated its mission to maintain "permanent contact with Romanian citizens who work abroad to help them and participate in solving the problems that they confront themselves with." It also ran an information campaign, producing flyers to be distributed in all countries where Romanians work abroad.

The Romanian state also developed legislation in the areas of taxation and education. In terms of tax law relevant to Romanian workers abroad, Law 571/2003 according to the Fiscal

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Code specifies (Art. 55, para. 4, letter m), that "the sums or advantages received by a person from dependent activities completed on the territory of a foreign country, regardless of the fiscal regime applied in that state, are not included in salary revenue and are not taxable in Romania." In terms of education for the children of migrant citizens, the Ministry of Education gave an order with rules for teachers who want to teach Romanian language, culture and civilization in Spain, Italy and Belgium in the academic year 2010-2011. The Romanian government said it would pay these teachers for a maximum of 72 hours per month. Romanian teachers who teach abroad are paid per hour; the state does not give them retirement funds, health insurance or vacation periods when they are not paid. They do not pay taxes. They can work full time or part time and teach in multiple schools.

The management of the relationship between state and its citizens abroad reveals in its institutional evolution numerous political disputes over competencies, restructuring, and transfer of subordination. The structure that is currently in charge of managing the relations of the Romanian state with its citizens is the Department of Policies for the Relation with Romanians Everywhere (often translated as the Department of Policies for the Relation with Romanians Abroad) – *Departamentul Politici pentru Relatia cu Romanii de Pretutindeni*. Its institutional ancestor was the Council for the Problems of Romanians Abroad (*Consiliul pentru Problemele Romanilor de Pretutindeni*), founded in 1995 and subordinated to the Prime Minister. The Council was the first governmental structure established to support Romanian communities abroad. In 1998, it was replaced with *Subsecretariatul de State pentru Romanii de Pretutindeni*, which was revamped as the Department for the Relations with Romanians Abroad (*Departamentul pentru Relatiile cu Romanii de peste Hotare*). In January 2001, the Department was renamed the Department for Romanians Everywhere (*Departamentul pentru Romanii de Pretutindeni*; official English name: the Department for Romanians Abroad) and was subordinated to the Ministry of Public Information. Then the Department was trans-

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ferred a few more times to the General Secretariat of the Government (2003) and to the Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2004). In 2009, it was subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and renamed the Department for Policies Concerning Relations with Romanians Abroad (*Departamentul Politici pentru Relatia cu Romanii de Pretutindeni*).

It is interesting to point out that the formula *Romanii de Pretutindeni* in the department's name, which usually gets translated as "Romanians Abroad," translates word-for-word to an inclusive and ambiguous formula ("Romanians everywhere" or "Romanians wherever they may be") that does not distinguish between Romanians who live within or outside the country's borders (the Department's sphere of activity does, in fact, concern only Romanians outside Romania's territory). According to the definition provided in Law 299/2007, the formula refers to individuals of "Romanian origin and belonging to the Romanian linguistic and cultural vein who freely assume Romanian cultural identity." This includes "autonomous ethnic groups that live in the states neighboring Romania, (...) the members of Romanian communities originated from emigration, Romanian citizens domiciled or residing abroad" (Ministerul Afacerilor Externe - Departamentul Politici pentru Relatia cu Romanii de Pretutindeni 2013).

During the Forum of Romanians Abroad, the Minister Secretary of State in charge of the Department for Romanians Abroad, PDL member Eugen Tomac, encouraged Romanians abroad to vote: "The higher the percentage of Romanian citizens who turn out and vote during electoral races, the greater will be the support that the Romanian state can give Romanians, regardless of where they live. I invite you to see this thing as a normality because, very often, it is as if we were afraid to assume some engagements in the relation with the Romanian state or the Romanian state in its relation with you." He insisted that the leaders of civil society organizations abroad should encourage Romanians to go to the polls and establish a channel of political communication with the country: "I think that the support that the Romanian government can pro-

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vide in the future will be much greater if you, in your quality of leaders of Romanians abroad, will persuade our co-nationals to go vote, no matter what their vote may be" (Ziare.com 2011a).

It is estimated that 15% of the Romanian population of voting age currently lives outside the national territory (Angi et al. 2009). The uninominal voting system introduced for the Parliamentary elections of 2008 made possible the establishment of four new electoral colleges for the Chamber of Deputies, one for each of the following Romanian diasporas (Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East, and North and South America) and two electoral colleges for the Senate, one per pair of Chamber colleges. In the 2008 elections, Romanians abroad elected four (out of six) Representatives and Senators from the ranks of center-right political parties: in the Chamber of Deputies, William Gabriel Branza (the PDL candidate) was elected as Representative for Electoral College no.1, which includes Europe, and in the Senate, the PDL candidate Vorel-Riceard Badea won the seat for Europe and Asia, while a National Liberal candidate won the other Senate seat. PSD only managed to win one Diaspora seat in the Chamber, while the candidate of the Democratic Union of Magyars in Romania (also center-right in terms of political orientations) won another. In fact, the PDL candidate had obtained a majority of votes in Electoral College no. 2 for the Chamber of Deputies, but the seat went to the PSD candidate, who had come in third, due to vote redistribution in the second phase, according to national party coefficients.[26] At the 2012 elections, despite the landslide victory of the social-democrat and liberal coalition (an uneasy alliance built with the sole purpose of defeating PDL candidates), PDL maintained its seats in the diaspora: Viorel Badea kept his Senator seat in Electoral College no. 1, while two PDL candidates won mandates in the Chamber. PSD did not manage to win any seats in the Chamber and secured one Senator seat. In the Commission for Romanians Abroad in the Ro-

[26] http://www.becparlamentare2008.ro/rezul/43/CD_43_2.pdf

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manian Senate (*Comisia Romanilor de Pretutindeni*), out of 11 members, 6 are PDL members, including two of the three leaders of the group.[27] In the Chamber of Deputies, the Commission for Romanian Communities outside the Borders of the Country (*Comisia pentru comunitatile de romani din afara granitelor tarii*) is chaired by PDL Representative Mircea Lubanovici.

After 2012, the PSD-led governing coalition attempted to restrict the political participation of extraterritorial citizens by reducing the number of voting stations abroad. In addition to that, they reduced the budget of the Romanian Cultural Institute network, despite protests coming from diaspora communities, as well as from Diaspora Senators and Representatives who pointed out that the budget cut interferes with numerous programs that have as a goal the preservation of national and cultural identity (Badea 2012).

While Poland's free movement management revolves around the priorities of encouraging return and establishing civil society partnerships between diasporas and new migrant communities, while reducing the state's role, Romania's approach currently describes intra-EU mobility as "normal" and beneficial, and emphasizes political integration of citizens abroad through elected representatives to the Romanian Parliament (four representatives in the Chamber of Deputies and two Senators). The elected representatives run typically as candidates of Romanian political parties. As a result of this increased attention, the political visibility of migrant communities is very high: at election time, Romanian mass media report from abroad and track the evolution of the Diaspora vote. Despite all logistical and bureaucratic obstacles, migrants eagerly participate in elections. Some travel over one hundred kilometers to the nearest polling station. For national level elections, there are always big crowds outside the polling station, waiting to vote. The rudimentary voting system considerably slows down the voting process: since very few offi-

[27] http://www.senat.ro/ComponentaComisii.aspx?Zi=&ComisieID=a755dfae-14b1-440f-8b58-acd3b9903687

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cial stamps are sent to polling stations abroad, only two-five people can be inside the polling station at any given time, in most cases. There were five stamps allocated to the Romanian embassy in Paris, France, for the presidential elections in 2009; there were two stamps in Treviso, Italy, at the 2008 referendum (author's own field work notes from personal observations and informant interviews). PDL politicians have attempted to change the system by introducing correspondence ballots, but the bill was rejected by the PSD-dominated Chamber of Deputies.

In the past, another obstacle that prevented Romanian citizens from voting abroad was the fact that many worked illegally until EU accession. Even now, after accession, while they have the right to stay, work and vote abroad, in order to cast a ballot in an electoral college outside Romania, migrants need to show in addition to a valid Romanian ID or passport, a document that proves they reside in the country where they are trying to vote. This proof of residence requirement often prevents many migrants from voting, since many are still registered on electoral lists "at home," in Romania (Ministerul Afacerilor Externe & Autoritatea Electorala Permanenta 2012).

Romania's free movement management has been institutionalized as a political dialogue between the state and its citizens abroad, conducted through the intermediation of political parties. To be sure, the number of civil society organizations has also skyrocketed in the aftermath of visa-free travel and EU accession (interviews with Romanian consulate officials in Italy and Spain). But diaspora management has not been a source of inspiration for the Romanian government while developing the strategy towards highly mobile citizens. The website of the Department for Policies Concerning the Relation with Romanians Abroad includes long lists of diaspora organizations for all the countries that have become the most popular destinations for Romanian citizens after 1989. While providing financial support to these organizations, the state does not expect them to connect into a vast network of contributors to Romanian interests. The

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Romanian government's approach is very much centralized and politicized, with political parties playing the main role in recent years.

Even the government institutions that appear to an outside observer as the most constant state actors in the process of defining Romania's approach to free movement are unable to generate a coherent strategy beyond vague, lofty goals. Diaspora management is relatively uncontroversial and maintains the same coordinates; free movement management has higher political stakes. Government institutions remain under the influence of political party actors. My attempt to conduct some interviews at the Department for Romanians Abroad happened to coincide with the period when it was undergoing restructuring following the 2012 elections. As a result, its beautiful headquarters in Bucharest were mostly deserted and I could only find a few young employees who kindly entertained my curiosity for a few minutes, provided some details about ongoing diaspora management programs, but could not say much about free movement management. One assured me that there was no coherent strategy on that subject, a statement corroborated by other interviews with Romanian politicians, including a former candidate for a Senator of Diaspora seat in 2008, who said "There isn't a strategy, a centralized thinking at state level concerning Romanian migrants." DPRP employees pointed out that, due to restructuration following the elections, everything was in flux and, if I wanted to get more information, I should stop by in a few months, when things settle down a bit. This shows to what extent the policy depends on political appointments and political representation (hence the government's insistence that Romanians abroad should go vote at election time).

Instead of following coherent strategies in their relationship with mobile citizens, the recalibration of the state-citizen relationship comes together as patchwork, under the influence of economic and political interests, some centrifugal, other centripetal. The only constant in the picture remains European citizenship. To the migrants' frustration, their own states provide much

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less reliable support. Policy initiatives can be pro-active, in theory, and attempt to anticipate migrants' needs before they emerge. In practice, the policy line is reactive, crystallizing in response to pressures coming from extra-territorial citizens and their dependents at home.

* * *

Diaspora management for both Poland and Romania focuses on righting historical wrongs. Nationality policies have obvious compensatory or restitutional functions, with deep roots in history. These have been given priority in the years immediately following the collapse of communism. In the case of Poland, the diaspora focus emerges clearly from analyses of Parliament proceedings after 1989, as well as from legislation concerning nationality adopted in recent years: the Repatriation Act of 2000 and the Act of the Polish Ethnicity Card of 2007 (*Ustawa o Karcie Polaka*) (Górny & Pudzianowska 2009). Similarly, Romania decided to remedy some of the wrongs that World War II and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 inflicted upon Romanian citizens (Liebich 2009). In the case of free management policies, Poland's tradition of cooperation with Polonia and civil society structures informed the approach of the state in coping with citizen mobility. In the case of Romania, the absence of such a tradition led to a politicized development of state approach towards new migrant communities.

Parties, Parties Everywhere...

Political parties from migrant-sending countries are known to reach out across national borders to raise funds or increase the visibility of certain national political leaders in diaspora communities (Itzigsohn & Villacrés 2008; Navarro Fierro et al. 2007; Lieber 2010). The phenomenon is far from new and also far from unique to the EU context (Smith & Bakker 2008;

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Mügge 2010). Polish candidates campaigned in London in 2007 and 2011 (The Economist 2011). Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited Polish communities in Western Europe not only to ask for their vote, but also to thank them after elections. Homeland politics draw the interest of émigré communities even when they cannot have a direct say, sometimes leading to situations in which diaspora involvement happens informally (Cunningham 2001; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003) Big queues in front of polling stations abroad signal, apart from poor organization, the great political interest of migrants who stand in line several hours to vote (e.g. three-four hours to vote in the Romanian presidential elections in Paris; a couple of hour at the 2007 Polish Parliamentary elections in London) and travel hundreds of kilometers to reach the nearest polling station (Cajvaneanu 2009).

In the Romanian case, however, after EU accession and in the context of a politicized free movement management approach, the race for the migrant vote mobilized political parties to an unprecedented level. This section analyzes this case of runaway party-building on a transnational scale, paying particular attention to the two categories of participant parties: the official and unofficial party organizations that parties from the migrants' country of origin establish in migrant-receiving countries and the diaspora parties of Romanians established in the immigrants' new country of citizenship.

From the early days of its presidential career, Traian Basescu insisted that he wanted to be *Presedintele tuturor romanilor* (the President of All Romanians). PDL was the first Romanian political party to establish an organization outside the Romanian borders. PDL Diaspora started from its first branch, founded on April 20th, 2008, Castellon, Spain. In 2009, press articles announce the opening of a branch in Chicago and another one for the Oxford-London region. According to a 2009 website of PDL Diaspora, the party had five organizations in Italy (Florence, Rome, Milano, Padua, Torino), fourteen in Spain (Castellon, Alcala de Henares, Zaragoza, Madrid, Al-

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icante, Coslada, Malaga, Teruel, Billbaou, Valencia, Seville, Barcelona, Taragona and San Sebastian), as well as organizations in Portugal, Ireland, Israel, France, Great Britain, Greece, Canada and the United States (PDL Diaspora 2009). The activity of the PDL campaign staff was impressive: while walking along the *Grands Boulevards* in Paris in 2009, I was greeted by the familiar site of electoral posters in Romanian with President Basescu's picture on them. The party's transnational organization has grown very quickly in the last five years. As of 2011, Viorel Badea, PDL Senator for the Romanian diaspora, declared that PDL had 22 organizations in Italy, each having between 20 and 400 members (Petrovici 2011). The Democratic Liberals have systematically performed very well in elections abroad.

In October 2010, at the Founding Conference of the Organization PSD Diaspora, the President of the party's National Council, Adrian Nastase, praised the decision to establish a PSD Diaspora organization as "wise." He remarked that PDL had managed to play a much more active role than PSD in the diaspora, due to better financial resources (Ziare.com 2010a). In November 2010, the President of the PSD Youth Organization, Nicu Banicioiu, acknowledged at a meeting of PSD Brussels where the Diaspora organization elected its leadership, that the Party had until recently neglected its communication with Romanians abroad. Banicioiu also underlined that the social-democrats had changed their approach and were interested in bettering not only the status of Romanians "gone out" (i.e. who live abroad), but also that of families left at home (Ziare.com 2010c).

According to its statute (*Regulament de Organizare si Functionare*), the Organization PSD Diaspora is composed of local organizations (at the locality level) and territorial organization (at state level) – Article 16 (Organizatia PSD Diaspora n.d.). Its mission (Article 5) is to stimulate and maintain the link between PSD and its members and sympathizers in the diaspora, as well as creating the organizational framework for them to get involved in the current activities of the party

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(*orig.* Romanian, my translation). The statute places unusually strong emphasis on hierarchy and organization, with strict rules about the duties of organization members, possible sanctions and rewards, the procedures for excluding members or organization leaders who have not fulfilled their obligations etc. The statute also declares that members with exceptional performance can be nominated for special distinctions and rewards according to PSD rules and regulations (Article 15). For the 2012, PSD Diaspora had territorial organizations active online in Spain, Belgium, Italy, Greece, Great Britain and France. In Spain, there were nine branches (Barcelona, Coslada, Vila Real, Castellon, Madrid, Argande del Rey, Navas del Rey, Zaragoza and Ulldecona). The website for PDS Spain mentioned the launch of Social-Democrat Women Organizations in the country. PSD Italy advertised on its website in 2011 the launch of a Platform Program of the Diaspora for 2012-2014, a Social Platform of the Diaspora centered on the ideals of solidarity and progress, urging Romanians to get involved (PSD Italia 2011). The logo featured as the most prominent element, a red arrow pointing ahead with the letters "UE" on it (i.e. *Uniunea Europeana,* EU, for European Union). In 2011, PSD added a branch in Austria. In 2012, PSD continued its expansion, adding organizations in Hungary and Moldova. According to the President of PSD Diaspora, Cristian Rizea, some organizations are not officially registered in the countries of destination and do not have any juridical power, e.g. the PSD branch in Moldova, precisely because the party wants to signal that it does not intend to get involved in politics in the destination country, but simply contribute to the PSD electoral campaign for elections in Romania (Stanculescu 2012). In France, four local organizations were founded (in Paris, Bordeaux, Lyon and Nice), preceding the establishment of a territorial organization (StirileROL.ro Romania Online 2012). In 2013, there was some outrage over the fact that three leaders of PSD Diaspora were appointed as Consuls and General Consuls of Romania (in Barcelona, Rio de Janeiro and Hungary) without having had any prior diplomatic training or experience (Ziare.com 2013).

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Some branches of PSD Diaspora have collaborated with politicians in the countries of destination: Alexandru Petrescu, the President of PSD England and Vice-President of PSD Diaspora publicized the organization's partnership to support the Labour Party candidate for the office of Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, in 2012 (Ziare.com 2012). PSD President Victor Ponta signed in 2011 a collaboration protocol with the Democratic Party of Italy (where it is the main left-wing party and the main opposition party). The protocol had as a main goal facilitating the fight against anti-Romanian discourse and policy line of Italian populist right-wing forces (Ziare.com 2011b).

PNL Diaspora was founded as a network of party organizations abroad much later (Gazeta Romaneasca 2011). The National Liberals opted for a network of Liberal Clubs (*Cluburi Liberale*) for Romanians abroad. The PNL Diaspora website includes links to the webpages of eight branches: Toscana-Pistoia, Rome, Toscana-Lucca, Sezze-Lazio, Toscana-Grosseto, Siracusa-Sicily, Milano-Lombardia and Palombara (Partidul National Liberal Diaspora 2012). Later on in 2012, according to *Gazeta Romaneasca*, there were another two functioning branched (Marcellina and Padova), and eleven branches in the process of formation (Pescara, Mantesilvano, Vasto, Chieti, Perugia, Florence, Campi Bisenzio, Forli, Bologna, Luca, Aquila). According to an earlier press release announcing the launch of PDL Diaspora, there was also another liberal club in Bergamo (Gazeta Romaneasca 2011). PNL Diaspora press releases attest to the existence of liberal clubs in Italy, Germany, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Great Britain and Australia (Gazeta Romaneasca 2012). The Party website currently includes contact information and links for Liberal Clubs in Italy, Austria, Germany, Ireland, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal and Greece (Partidul National Liberal Diaspora 2012). PNL Italy functions under the banner of the Union of Romanian Liberals in Italy (*Uniunea Liberala a Romanilor din Italia*) under the coordination of Rob-

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ert Florin Araveicei, who also serves as president of ULRI. The network of liberal clubs organizes political and apolitical events on the territory of the state where the club is established.

This increase in transnational political engagement has triggered the outrage of diaspora parties and Romanian immigrants who now have a political career in migrant-receiving countries. Tensions are high between diaspora party officials and the representatives of national political parties abroad. "The activity of these parties is against the Italian law. We have repeatedly condemned their intrusions in our press releases and have told them to let us be. Romanians are fed up with Romanian politicians" (interview with PIR leaders, the Party of Romanians in Italy – "Romanian Identity," Rome). Diaspora politicians often encourage migrants to refrain from voting in Romanian elections as a protest vote and a way to punish corrupt political elites at home. Adrian Chifu, local counselor in Verbania, summarizes some of the reasons behind the skepticism of Romanians abroad vis-à-vis Romanian politics:

> The reticence towards the Romanian political class is completely justified, we are used only for electoral campaigns, both in Romania and in Italy, sometimes we are just cannon fodder and the Romanian state does not intervene to protect us. I think the time has come to penalize Romanian politicians at the voting booth, since this is the only and final weapon we have. It's a war without weapons, the votes are the bullets and the voting booth is the gun. Romanians abroad hold with a tight fist their votes. They will give it only to politicians who really deserve it. Otherwise, we will continue to withhold this vote in our hard-worked hands. I would like to remind everyone again that Romanians raise the Italian GDP by 1% every year, and the Romanian GDP by 10%.[28]

National parties advise migrants to participate homeland politics (at least at election time), but often fall short of migrants' expectations, since their platforms do not respond concretely to migrant needs. Migrants can still be mobilized for significant, national-level elections or campaigns, but their resources and enthusiasm for other political activities is limited. The former

[28] A.R., "Adrian Chifu îl acuză pe vicepreședintele Senatului român: Ne-a creat o pagubă morală și materială," article published in *Gazeta Românească*, 05/12/2011, accessed online at http://www.gazetaromaneasca.com/observator/36-comunitate/947-adrian-chifu-il-acuz-vicepreedintele-senatului-roman-ne-a-creat-o-pagub-moral-i-material.html

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High Representative of the Romanian Government on the problems that Romanians face abroad (who ran as a candidate for a diaspora seat in the Senate in 2008) concluded that "Romanians are politically disaffected. They are frustrated. They have resentments towards the Romanian state, they feel betrayed by it." For this reason, he says, migrants do not vote in very high numbers. He had visited Romanian communities abroad and met with constituents in France, Italy and Spain; he estimated that a total of about 30,000 people attended the events he organized, and many promised they would vote for him. Very few did. The former candidate (current MP) predicted that, when they come back, migrants would constitute "a critical mass for a change of civilization. Do we want to bring them back or not? Nobody knows." Usually, migrants influence politics at home through political remittances, i.e. communication with family members and friends back home. As breadwinners, migrants have an important say in the household when family members try to make up their minds about whom to support (interviews with state representatives and political party leaders in Rome and Paris). Political candidates and government officials acknowledge the salience of this new dynamic in both local and national-level elections. Electoral campaigns start abroad, even for crucial elections (parliamentary, presidential, national referenda).

Another point of convergence between all parties, which echoes the migrants' opinions, is that Romanian associations established abroad are not trustworthy. "Their only purpose is to direct, to exploit Romanian migrants for the leaders' personal profit" (interview with politician, former candidate for a Diaspora seat in the Senate, former High Representative of the Romanian Government on the problems Romanians face abroad).

The reactions of Romanian political parties abroad keep national politicians on their toes and spread the word at home about some otherwise unknown realities of migrant life abroad. For instance, in a press communiqué, PIR leaders advised Romanian politicians campaigning abroad

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that instead of wasting money for symbolic three-day tours with the only goal of making unfounded promises to Romanian communities, they could donate that money for the repatriation of the dead bodies of Romanian migrants who died abroad and who are preserved in hospital morgues in Italy, since neither the Romanian state, nor the family has sufficient resources to pay for transportation (Toma 2009).

Across the board, both state and political party actors involved in adapting the state-citizen relationship to high mobility contexts share one dimension of their message: they all encourage migrants to get politically engaged, to be informed about politics and vote. Even the Romanian Party in Italy, who occasionally encourages boycotting elections, had a campaign under the slogan "*If you do not vote, you do not count*" (Referendum). All agree that Romanian citizens abroad should have a say in Romanian politics. "I believe in increasing the political influence of Romanians who live outside the territory of the Romanian State (...) If some of us have chosen the Diaspora path, this does not mean that we are not Romanian anymore or that we do not care about Romania, on the contrary," declared Dan Luca (PSD Diaspora leader and the president of the PSD Organization in Brussels).[29] "We need a real connection among the 25 million Romanians. There shouldn't be any artificial "frontiers" separating Romanians who live in Romania from those living outside the country."

The branches of Romanian national parties take advantage of the opportunity to maintain a highly flexible organizational structure abroad. Local branches can be activated, deactivated and reactivated as needed, particularly in the period preceding national elections. The party presence continues to expand and draw members inside Romanian communities abroad, only to emerge at election time. This type of structure reflects the need to adapt to the realities of ever-

[29] http://www.danluca.eu/index.html

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changing communities of Romanian migrants abroad. As migrants relocate or return, the available human capital in any particular country changes significantly between election years. While a certain part of the network remains stable, the rest can be deactivated or reorganized.

The Historical Roots of Free Movement Management

The current configurations of free movement management in Poland and Romania reflect do not reflect only the priorities of post-communist governments and contemporary politicians. While these factors do matter, the decisive element that sets the tone for rethinking the state-citizen relation in high-mobility contexts is the nature of diaspora management before democratic transition. In the Polish case, free movement management relies on revived state-diaspora channels that have been reactivated and revamped after 1989. In the Romanian case, free movement management and diaspora management developed at roughly the same time, along parallel tracks. Across time, historical legacies influence the nature of free movement solutions, leading to relatively apolitical, civil society based structures in the relation between Poland and an expanding Polonia, and to a highly politicized transnational approach to citizen mobility in Romania.

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Conclusion. Towards a Theory of Migration-Determined Political Change: Citizenship and the Relation between Spatial Mobility and Socio-Political Mobility

"Avec son marteau piqueur
Il creuse le sillon de la route de demain.
Il y met du coeur.
Le soleil et le gel sont écrits sur ses mains. (...)

Il faut en faire des voyages
Il faut en faire du chemin
Ce n'est plus dans son village
Qu'on peut gagner son pain.

Loin de son toit, de sa ville,
À cinq cent lieues vers le nord
Le soir dans un bidonville
Le Portugais s'endort.

Il est arrivé à la Gare d'Austerlitz
Voilà deux ans déjà.
Il n'a qu'une idée: gagner beaucoup d'argent
Et retourner là-bas.[30]

(Dassin 1970)

Many authors have claimed that international migration creates "new and unaccountable power groups" (Itzigsohn and Villacres 2008) that can eventually lead to transnational forms of political radicalism, in particular long-distance nationalism (Anderson 1992; Glick Schiller & G.

[30] "With his jackhammer/He drills the furrow/ Of tomorrow's road./ He puts heart into it./ The sun and the frost/ Are written all over his hands./ One must make many trips/ One must travel a lot./ It's not in one's village/ That one can earn their daily bread./ Five hundred leagues to the north/ In the evening, in a shantytown/ The Portuguese man falls asleep. /He arrived at the Austerlitz train station,/ already two years have passed since then./ He has only one idea: make a lot of money/ and go back" ("The Portuguese Man," 1970, music and lyrics by Joe Dassin – *my translation*).

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E. Fouron 2001; Ong 2006). This type of migration-associated political change can endanger the prospects of democratic transition or consolidation in migrant-sending countries.

An alternative theory was that, after exiting the nation-state, migrants simply rely on the international human rights regime and benefit from post-national, personhood-based membership (Soysal 1994), without the need to transfer loyalty to their receiving country or to renew the connection with the homeland. Migrants thus become increasingly detached from nation-states in general: they are denationalized (Sassen 2003) and may develop a cosmopolitan worldview (Mau et al. 2008; Vertovec 2009) that departs from traditional values. The political implications of this theory are less clear, but the most plausible possibility is that a migratory dynamic of this type may increase levels of political apathy and non-participation, as mobile citizens become less interested in national politics *tout court*.

For contexts in which mobility is severely impeded either by strict state regulation or by the clandestine nature of cross-border movement, long-distance nationalism may be indeed a concern. De-nationalization may occur in the case of elites like Favell's "Eurostars" (Favell 2008), but even if that were the case, the political impact would be modest due to the small number of EU free-movement migrants in old member states (around 2-3% of the total population). The case of highly-mobile EU citizens of the market shows that some forms of migration have a significant contribution in strengthening democracy at home and creating socio-economic premises that facilitate welfare state reform and the country's competitiveness in the global economy. Thus, it turns out that highly-mobile citizens are far from unaccountable, even though they have been largely unaccounted for in political science scholarship.

My research contributes to filling this gap. In this project, I evaluated the political impact of intra-EU circular migration on people, parties and political systems in migrant-sending countries. Through a systematic analysis of the micro, meso and macro levels, this dissertation re-

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vealed the migrants' direct and indirect contributions to political life in their home countries. Due to their high visibility, newly acquired resources and rapid ascent in socio-economic and status hierarchies, citizens of the market have become agents of economic, social, political and cultural change, in particular the agents of EU accession. This concluding section puts the findings into a broader context. It reflects on the ways in which migration recalibrates the state-citizen relationship and the directions for future research about migration-associated political change.

The findings suggest that high-mobility migrations have a liberalizing effect. In terms of preference formation, intra-EU migrants become more self-reliant, pragmatic, work-oriented and pro-EU. At the meso level, the results show that counties with higher levels of citizen mobility do indeed tend to vote more for a pro-market, pro-EU, anti-nationalist and anti-communist platform. While return migration may play a role in these results, the largest part of the variation can be attributed to the always-operational communication channel between migrants and non-migrants at home. Political remittances appear to have a significant impact on politics in migrant-sending regions.

In Chapter I, I introduced a typology of possible state responses to citizen mobility inspired by the literature on societal denationalization (Zuern 2003). In light of the macro-level analysis in Chapter IV, one can conclude that those categories can be applied to understand free movement management in post-communist migrant-sending countries. Romania currently illustrates the first type of response, as it passively awaits the decline in migratory flows, explicitly encouraging its citizens to rely on circular migration in their problem solving. Poland strategy of free movement management embodies the second type of response, as it relies on fragmentative political restructuring: it favors decentralization and encourages sub-national, local authorities and civil society organizations, at home and in the diaspora, to assume responsibility, deal with challenges and develop migration-management partnerships that strengthen the position of the

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Polish state. The third type of state response, integrative political restructuring, characterizes both Poland and Romania in their attempts to reintegrate migrant citizens politically. Through revisions of the electoral codes and their discursive emphasis on solidarity, states try to regain a certain level of control by establishing new institutions, new channels of political representation and new networks that manage the state-citizen relationship.

Historical legacies from the interwar period and the communist regime) influence state's choice of free movement management strategies. In a fascinating way, free movement management and the recalibration of the state-citizen relationship emerge at the crossroads between the countries' past (their history and experience with diaspora management, the continuity and discontinuity in the relationship between states and émigré communities etc.) and their present (their status as EU members and pre-accession trajectories, their fluid political party scene, their challenging relationship with their own highly mobile citizens who have great aspirations and make more demands in their capacity as agents of accession than EU institutions themselves).

The poor institutionalization of the relationship between the state and its citizens constituted a characteristic of post-communist politics that rendered democratic consolidation particularly contentious (Ekiert & Kubik 2001). The fragmentation and weakness of the party system and legislative bodies, the frailty of the state and the ever-questionable legitimacy of political elites still burdened by strong associations with the communist past set the stage for a transitional period which area specialists believed would bring huge waves of protest and establish unconventional strategies of political engagement as the dominant form of participation. In this context, the lack of strong linkages between citizens and political parties and the declining popular trust in institutions all represented reasons for concern. Migrants focus on what they perceive as high-impact participation and, for that reason, they prefer direct communication with politicians and voting to protest and unconventional forms of participation. At home, in communities where

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most of the work force has "gone out," non-migrant family members are not particularly inclined towards mobilization and rebelliousness. "Most of us who stay at home are retirees. We take care of the grandchildren. We go out and vote, but that's about it," says Mihai from Targu Neamt. Paradoxically, one can conclude that high-mobility migration, with its renewed focus on voting, political campaigns and party platforms, currently contributes to a consolidation of democratic processes and conventional participation channels.

The findings presented in this project suggest that, on the one hand, migration functions as an effective safety valve by reducing in the short term popular pressures on the welfare state and creating an environment in which government downsizing becomes easier to execute. On the other hand, high mobility contributes to people's decisions to use conventional rather than unconventional political communication channels in their attempts to make their voices heard. Since the most common and, arguably, the most effective forms of unconventional political engagement (i.e. demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins, boycotts etc.) depend on physical presence on the territory of the nation-state, they do not constitute a real alternative for highly mobile migrants, who spend most of their time abroad. For that reason, voting and official political representation channels have been gaining importance in state-society relations. While voice may be reduced in the short term, between elections, it is increasingly salient in national elections when exercised from abroad, and amplified in the long term through political remittances, diffusion and social mobility.

Exit costs vary tremendously from one situation to another. When migration entails high material and non-material costs, only a small, affluent minority can afford leaving for a while or for good, while the poor have no choice but to stay put. From the point of view of the state-citizen relationship, this constitutes a case of unequal access to exit as a channel for society to signal discontent and determine the state to improve its performance. Over time, high exit costs

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create a cleavage between those who can afford migration and those who cannot. This situation significantly reduces the number of people who can effectively exercise voice on the national political scene, thus rendering this state recuperation strategy much less effective. When those who are most likely to express discontent (and to make their demands heard) whenever the economy, government bureaucracy or political environment do not function properly happen to also be the ones who leave the country immediately after deteriorations in state performance, the quality of services, goods or living conditions will continue to decline. In other words, when the most quality-conscious citizens exit first, widespread migration – i.e. "high exit" – "paralyzes voice by depriving it of its principal agents" (Hirschman 1970: 51).

A decrease in exit costs makes migration more affordable and broadly accessible. If both exit and reentry costs are kept low, as is the case with the EU-guaranteed free movement of persons, quality-conscious migrant citizens still exercise voice at home either in person or through their families and friends. Free movement does not have the same debilitating effect on voice, as citizens maintain their political attachment to home countries. The democratization of access to cross-national mobility enables citizens who lack resources to take advantage of opportunities available abroad, through the supranational market.

In general, mechanisms of recuperation tend to be mutually exclusive: if one exercises exit, they cannot use voice and vice-versa. In high mobility situations, however, European citizenship enables migrants to exercise exit (temporarily and frequently) to pursue economic goals in the supranational EU market without having to sever their political connection with their homeland. In other words, the migrant may choose to detach from the country of origin economically, by exiting its labor market, for example, while retaining citizenship and the right to vote at home. The state-citizen relationship becomes a multi-dimensional bricolage, in which the desire to preserve one's political attachment to a country does not force an individual to remain dependent on

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a chronically under-performing domestic market. Exit reinforces voice in the case of intra-EU migrants who gain prominence on national political arenas, acquire new special channel of political representation and constitute a key constituency in electoral campaigns. In sending communities, they often provide the only functioning model of socio-economic success and are, thus, perceived as experienced and knowledgeable.

Migrations and the state-citizen relationship constantly shape each other. Migrants import or communicate politically salient ideas from abroad (political remittances) that influence how people perceive the nation-state and what they expect from it. In other words, migrations may recalibrate the state-citizen relationship bottom-up. Top-down changes in the state's repertoire of interaction with its citizens may also trigger migratory flows, particularly when discontented groups try to flee a hostile political environment or to correct economic problems that prevent them from living the life they desire. Among other things, states can determine the formal and informal costs of crossing international frontiers. When the costs of crossing the border are high, people either stay put or resort to permanent exit, when the personal cost of non-exit becomes higher than the cost of emigrating. When the costs of leaving and returning are low, migration generally takes a temporary or circular form. In this case, international mobility does not have to result in relocation. Low exit and re-entry costs make foreign countries accessible and empower individuals by diversifying their options. Citizens can travel abroad and experience life somewhere else. They can compare countries, living standards and available opportunities. They can calculate how they can use inequalities between countries to their own advantage. For example, if jobs are available and workers get higher pay elsewhere, it then pays off to go abroad to work rather than stay at home, unemployed. If the cost of living is much higher in the country of destination than in the country of origin, it pays off to save earnings and return home to spend it, where prices are lower and the pay from abroad becomes a small fortune.

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My in-depth interviews with Romanian migrants currently working in Italy and France, and with temporary or permanent returnees back in the sending communities confirmed that migrants capitalize and depend on these differentials. Since their migratory projects are highly fluid, individual calculations are responsive to changes in state policy towards citizens. States thus become powerful magnets that can attract or reject migrants through the implemented policies that target either those working abroad or their families at home. Migrant presence has also pushed countries of origin towards establishing a more substantial and diversified institutional presence abroad. Embassies and a meager consular network have become insufficient. As the number of citizens abroad increased, new consulates had to be added, cultural institutes diversified their activities, new churches were built, negotiations for partnerships with local schools to provide classes in the native language were carried out. In other words, migration and increasing citizen presence in foreign countries generated demand for state-building abroad.

Building the state abroad alters the patterns of interaction between government (political elites) and citizens. Interactions happen in a different context, with migrant and state officials having different expectations and understandings of one another than in the homeland. Inevitably, nation-state enchantment and disenchantment take new forms, evolving under the influence of interactions abroad with the country of origin and other geo-political entities. These developments do not unfold in a vacuum; instead, current changes in attachment and loyalty toward the state can only be understood in historical perspective. One can decode them in the context of a broader story that includes a history of state-citizen relations, migration, and the citizens' experience with previously widespread varieties of nationalism.

The state generates through public policies a magnetic field that attracts or repels citizens, that holds them on national territory (either by providing incentives or by rendering exit unavailable) or encourages them to seek solutions to their problems outside the country's borders. State-

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building projects have migratory implications: their specifics determine the "push" and "pull" factors that influence citizens' decision to exit or not to exit, as well as the permanent or temporary nature of the migrants' stay abroad.

Free movement constitutes only the most recent chapter in a long history of Eastern European migrations. Assessing state-citizen relations against the backdrop of post-communist politics and societies requires contextualizing contemporary patterns and exploring their multi-level embeddedness, particularly with respect to mid-range historical legacies and institutional factors (Ekiert & Hanson 2003).

What Next?

As visible from the motto of this conclusion, temporary migrations and high-mobility schemes have accompanied the European project for quite some time. Future studies could analyze the socio-political consequences of present and past intra-EU migrations by comparing post-communist dynamics with the Mediterranean enlargement (Spain and Portugal). This would help develop a more finely calibrated typology of migration, by categorizing the varieties of high-mobility migration that stop short of free movement.

A fruitful future direction in assessing migration-associated political change would integrate research on free movement with research on other mobility arrangements (bilateral, supranational) and develop systematic ways of comparing and contrasting these frameworks. Ideally, political scientists would be able to cover the full continuum of citizen mobility depending on human choice. One end could be international mobility in which citizens have almost no choice (political exile). Then, the spectrum could go through varieties of strictly regulated international

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mobility towards visa regimes from the most strict to the least, through temporary work visa regimes in which states set up the structure through bilateral agreements, and interested individuals have the possibility to opt in (but once their are in, they do not have too much control over the specifics of the migratory experience). The other end of the spectrum would represent migratory decisions that are increasingly free of state interference and determined by the citizens' personal choice. The continuum could be then developed into a three-dimensional space by adding interactions with two other variables: (1) the levels of exposure to politics or politically significant life experiences in the migrant-receiving country; and (2) the nature and characteristics of political regimes in migrant-receiving country. Some one-country contributions at the boundary between political science, international migration and area studies that have already attempted this (Rother 2009; Pérez-Armendáriz & Crow 2010), but much work – especially comparative, cross-national – remains to be done.

Within the globalization literature, many studies have examined emigration and its multi-dimensional consequences in migrant-sending countries. Recent research explores the impact of emigration and diaspora involvement on socio-economic realities and urbanization patterns in Morocco (Agoumy 2007) and finds that remittances increase investments in real estate business and sponsor internal rural-to-urban migration domestically; they also appear to trigger changes in worldviews. Similarly, a study of Iran identifies social, cultural, political and economic transformations (Azadarmaki & Bahar 2007), with emigration having an impact on political culture, by increasing the criticism of social tradition, increasing criticism of the government, boosting support for human rights and democracy, stimulating private initiative and investments in local industries. Future studies could tackle the issue of differentiating between global migrations and European migrations in terms of political consequences, by producing more comprehensive ty-

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pologies of migration that allow us to understand the directions in which the state-citizen relationship is changing around the world as a function of citizen mobility patterns.

This dissertation establishes a new research agenda by opening the path towards future analyses of the relationship between migrations and the welfare state. The findings of this project suggest that the reconfiguration of the state-citizen relationship in high-mobility contexts has repercussions for the demand-side of politics, changing economic and political preferences in a direction favoring minimalist states and a reduction of state interference with the opportunities provided by European citizenship. However, the project leaves unanswered many questions concerning the relationship between spatial mobility and social mobility. Do migrations ultimately enhance the erosion of social citizenship, by producing alternative channels for climbing the social ladder? What is the effect of high-mobility migration on socio-economic status hierarchies in migrant-sending communities? Is there a socio-economic and political cleavage that emerges over time between migrants and non-migrants? Free movement has only been recently introduced in Poland and Romania, but over the next few years, sufficient empirical evidence will emerge for social scientists to address these salient questions.

The creation of a supernational labor market has dramatically unbundled the economic, social and political dimensions of citizenship. This generates a novel configuration of state-citizen relations that has never been observed or analyzed before, i.e. citizenship of the market. This project introduces a new theoretical framework and uses it to examine political transformations at the individual, regional and state levels. This dissertation reveals the far-reaching implications of one simple but striking fact: one does not need to live and make a living in the same country.

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